buildmymcpserver/apps/web/app/admin/encryption/page.tsx
Marco Sadjadi a68e882092 feat(crypto): envelope encryption + key rotation via admin panel
Closes structural weakness #4 from the audit (single global key, no rotation,
no KMS path). Customer secrets now use envelope encryption with a real
rotation story.

Model:
  KEK — Key Encryption Key, 32 bytes from env (SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY). Never
        stored in the DB. Root of trust.
  DEK — Data Encryption Key, 32 random bytes we generate, stored in the new
        encryption_keys table *wrapped* (AES-256-GCM encrypted) with the KEK.
        Secrets are encrypted with the DEK.

Schema:
- encryption_keys (version, wrappedDek, active, rotatedBy, createdAt, retiredAt)
- secrets.keyId — which DEK encrypted this row. NULL = legacy (KEK-direct,
  pre-envelope); decryptSecret handles both and the first rotation migrates
  legacy rows onto a DEK.

crypto.ts (full rewrite):
- ensureActiveKey() — boot-time, loads keys + creates v1 if none. Fail-closed:
  index.ts process.exit(1) if it throws — the API will not serve if encryption
  can't initialize.
- encryptSecret() — encrypts with the active DEK, returns { value, keyId }.
- decryptSecret(value, keyId) — DEK path or legacy KEK-direct path.
- rotateKeys() — mints a fresh DEK, re-encrypts EVERY secret under it inside a
  single transaction (decrypt-old / encrypt-new per row), retires the old key,
  activates the new one. A partial failure is recoverable because every row
  carries its own keyId.
- encryptionStatus() — active version, key history, secret + legacy counts.

Admin:
- GET  /v1/admin/encryption        — status
- POST /v1/admin/encryption/rotate — triggers rotateKeys, audit-logged as
  admin.encryption.rotate with { newVersion, reEncrypted }.
- /admin/encryption page — active-key/secret/legacy cards, Rotate button with
  confirm, key-history table, plain-English how-it-works. Added to admin nav.

Verified end-to-end:
- boot → encryption_keys v1 active, '[crypto] envelope encryption ready'
- created a server with secret MY_API_KEY → stored ciphertext, keyId = v1
- POST rotate → { newVersion: 2, reEncrypted: 1 }; ciphertext changed, keyId
  now v2, v1 retired, v2 active. The decrypt-then-reencrypt round-trip
  succeeded (rotation throws otherwise) — the secret is provably recoverable.
- admin UI renders the status + history correctly.

Deferred, named honestly (not built this iteration):
- worker reads secrets from the DB instead of the BullMQ job-data plaintext
  copy — would also remove plaintext secrets from Redis. Separate change with
  its own risk surface on the iterate/fork flows.
- per-server secret-value rotation UI
- audit_log hash-chaining (tamper-evidence)
- rate limiting on auth endpoints
2026-05-20 22:36:08 +02:00

179 lines
6.8 KiB
TypeScript

'use client';
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react';
import { apiFetch } from '@/lib/api';
import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button';
import { cn } from '@/lib/cn';
interface KeyRow {
version: number;
active: boolean;
createdAt: string;
retiredAt: string | null;
}
interface Status {
activeVersion: number | null;
keyCount: number;
secretCount: number;
legacySecretCount: number;
keys: KeyRow[];
}
export default function AdminEncryptionPage() {
const [status, setStatus] = useState<Status | null>(null);
const [rotating, setRotating] = useState(false);
const [message, setMessage] = useState<string | null>(null);
async function reload() {
setStatus(await apiFetch<Status>('/v1/admin/encryption'));
}
useEffect(() => {
reload();
}, []);
async function rotate() {
if (
!confirm(
'Rotate the encryption key?\n\nA fresh Data Encryption Key is generated and EVERY stored secret is re-encrypted under it in one transaction. The environment KEK is untouched. This is safe to run any time you suspect key compromise.',
)
) {
return;
}
setRotating(true);
setMessage(null);
try {
const r = await apiFetch<{ newVersion: number; reEncrypted: number }>(
'/v1/admin/encryption/rotate',
{ method: 'POST', body: '{}' },
);
setMessage(`Rotated to key v${r.newVersion}${r.reEncrypted} secret(s) re-encrypted.`);
await reload();
} catch (e) {
const detail = (e as { detail?: { detail?: string; error?: string } }).detail;
setMessage(`Rotation failed: ${detail?.detail ?? detail?.error ?? (e as Error).message}`);
} finally {
setRotating(false);
}
}
return (
<div className="px-8 py-8">
<header className="mb-6">
<h1 className="text-[22px] font-semibold tracking-tight">Encryption</h1>
<p className="mt-1 text-[13px] text-[--color-fg-muted]">
Envelope encryption for customer secrets. The KEK lives only in the environment;
Data Encryption Keys are stored wrapped and rotated here.
</p>
</header>
{!status && <div className="mono text-[12px] text-[--color-fg-muted]">Loading</div>}
{status && (
<>
<div className="grid gap-3 md:grid-cols-3">
<Card label="Active key" value={status.activeVersion ? `v${status.activeVersion}` : '—'} />
<Card label="Secrets encrypted" value={status.secretCount.toLocaleString()} />
<Card
label="Legacy (pre-envelope)"
value={status.legacySecretCount.toLocaleString()}
sub={
status.legacySecretCount > 0
? 'rotate once to migrate them onto a DEK'
: 'all on a managed DEK'
}
/>
</div>
<div className="panel mt-6 p-4">
<div className="flex items-baseline justify-between">
<div>
<h2 className="text-[14px] font-semibold tracking-tight">Rotate encryption key</h2>
<p className="mt-1 text-[12.5px] leading-relaxed text-[--color-fg-muted]">
Generates a new DEK and re-encrypts all {status.secretCount} secret(s) under it
atomically. The environment KEK is never exposed or changed.
</p>
</div>
<Button variant="primary" size="md" onClick={rotate} disabled={rotating}>
{rotating ? 'Rotating…' : 'Rotate key'}
</Button>
</div>
{message && (
<p
className={cn(
'mt-3 text-[12.5px]',
message.startsWith('Rotation failed')
? 'text-[--color-danger]'
: 'text-emerald-300',
)}
>
{message}
</p>
)}
</div>
<div className="mt-6">
<h2 className="text-[14px] font-semibold tracking-tight">Key history</h2>
<div className="panel mt-3">
<table className="w-full text-[12.5px]">
<thead className="border-b border-[--color-border] text-[--color-fg-subtle]">
<tr>
<th className="px-4 py-2 text-left font-medium">Version</th>
<th className="px-4 py-2 text-left font-medium">Status</th>
<th className="px-4 py-2 text-left font-medium">Created</th>
<th className="px-4 py-2 text-left font-medium">Retired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
{status.keys.map((k) => (
<tr key={k.version} className="border-b border-[--color-border] last:border-0">
<td className="px-4 py-2.5 mono">v{k.version}</td>
<td className="px-4 py-2.5">
<span
className={cn(
'mono rounded-full border px-2 py-0.5 text-[11px]',
k.active
? 'border-emerald-400/40 bg-emerald-400/10 text-emerald-300'
: 'border-[--color-border] bg-[--color-bg-subtle] text-[--color-fg-subtle]',
)}
>
{k.active ? 'active' : 'retired'}
</span>
</td>
<td className="px-4 py-2.5 mono text-[--color-fg-muted]">
{new Date(k.createdAt).toLocaleString()}
</td>
<td className="px-4 py-2.5 mono text-[--color-fg-muted]">
{k.retiredAt ? new Date(k.retiredAt).toLocaleString() : '—'}
</td>
</tr>
))}
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
</div>
<p className="mt-6 text-[11.5px] leading-relaxed text-[--color-fg-subtle]">
How it works: a 32-byte Data Encryption Key (DEK) is generated, AES-256-GCM encrypted
with the environment Key Encryption Key (KEK = SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY), and stored
wrapped. Secrets are encrypted with the DEK. Rotation mints a fresh DEK, re-encrypts
every secret, and retires the old one recoverable from a suspected DEK compromise
without ever touching the KEK.
</p>
</>
)}
</div>
);
}
function Card({ label, value, sub }: { label: string; value: string; sub?: string }) {
return (
<div className="panel p-4">
<div className="text-[11px] uppercase tracking-wider text-[--color-fg-subtle]">{label}</div>
<div className="mt-1.5 text-[24px] font-semibold tabular-nums tracking-tight">{value}</div>
{sub && <div className="mt-1 text-[12px] text-[--color-fg-muted]">{sub}</div>}
</div>
);
}