Sprint 3.5: close every dead link and replace the single-step wizard with the spec-mandated 3-step flow. Wizard: - Step 1 collects prompt + name + slug, calls /v1/servers/preview. - Step 2 renders parsed tools (name, description, input schema as copyable JSON) + a credential field per requiredSecret Claude actually identified. Self-contained servers see 'No credentials needed' instead of generic Notion placeholders. - Step 3 streams the live build over WebSocket and shows install snippets. New dashboard pages: - /settings — org, plan/usage, members table, API keys + billing stubs (Sprint 4), encryption status. Reads /v1/me/org. - /audit — filterable table over /v1/audit with action pills, resource refs, IP, metadata JSON. Docs site (/docs + 6 sub-pages): - Sticky 240px sidebar, max-w-prose article column, shared DocsTitle/H2/Code primitives. - Quickstart, MCP concepts, OAuth 2.1 flow (full walkthrough with curl), Authoring tools, Self-hosting, API reference, FAQ. Marketing pages: - /changelog with tagged release timeline. - /security with 8 pillars + disclosure. - /privacy with GDPR-aware sections. - /terms (10 clauses). - /pricing full page (nav now points here instead of /#pricing anchor). - /status with live 10s probes against /api/health and /login. Footer 'system status' badge now links to /status. All 20 routes 200 OK in smoke crawl. Typecheck clean across packages.
98 lines
4.5 KiB
XML
98 lines
4.5 KiB
XML
import Link from 'next/link';
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import { CodeBlock } from '@/components/code-block';
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export const metadata = { title: 'Security — BuildMyMCPServer' };
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const PILLARS = [
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{
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title: 'Per-server isolation',
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body: 'Every customer MCP server runs in its own Docker container. No shared process, no shared filesystem, no shared memory. One server compromised does not affect any other.',
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},
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{
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title: 'Encrypted secrets',
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body: 'API keys and credentials are AES-256-GCM encrypted at rest in Postgres with a 32-byte key sourced from env. Decryption happens only at the moment of container ENV injection. Plaintext is never logged.',
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},
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{
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title: 'OAuth 2.1, no API keys for end users',
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body: 'Every generated server is an OAuth 2.1 Resource Server. PKCE, Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591), Resource Indicators (RFC 8707), RS256-signed JWTs. Short-lived, audience-bound, replay-resistant.',
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},
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{
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title: 'No token passthrough',
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body: 'When a tool calls a downstream API, it uses its own server-side credentials — not the user\'s OAuth token. Tokens never leak across trust boundaries. This is mandated by the MCP authorization spec.',
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},
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{
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title: 'Static security checks',
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body: 'Every LLM-generated tool body is scanned for banned patterns (eval, new Function, child_process) before Docker build. Prompt-injection markers like "ignore previous instructions" also trip the check. Build fails fast, no risky code ships.',
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},
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{
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title: 'Container hardening',
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body: 'Production containers run with --read-only, --cap-drop=ALL, --security-opt=no-new-privileges, CPU and memory limits. Network egress can be restricted to whitelisted domains per server.',
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},
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{
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title: 'Audit log',
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body: 'Every privileged action — login, logout, server create/iterate/delete — is recorded with IP, timestamp, user, and metadata. Available via /audit for Team-and-above orgs.',
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},
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{
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title: 'Rate limiting',
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body: 'Default 100 requests/min/IP per tool, enforced at the Traefik layer before traffic ever reaches your container.',
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},
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];
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export default function Security() {
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return (
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<div className="mx-auto max-w-3xl px-6 py-16">
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<header className="mb-12">
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<div className="text-[11px] uppercase tracking-[0.16em] text-[--color-fg-subtle]">
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Security posture
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</div>
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<h1 className="mt-2 text-[32px] font-semibold tracking-tight">
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Built like infrastructure.
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</h1>
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<p className="mt-3 text-[14px] leading-relaxed text-[--color-fg-muted]">
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We host code generated by an LLM, on behalf of customers, that exposes their internal
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APIs to AI clients. The threat model is real. Here is what we do about it.
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</p>
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</header>
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<div className="space-y-6">
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{PILLARS.map((p) => (
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<section key={p.title} className="panel p-5">
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<h2 className="text-[14px] font-semibold tracking-tight">{p.title}</h2>
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<p className="mt-2 text-[13px] leading-relaxed text-[--color-fg-muted]">{p.body}</p>
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</section>
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))}
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</div>
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<section className="mt-12">
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<h2 className="text-[18px] font-semibold tracking-tight">Disclosure</h2>
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<p className="mt-2 text-[13.5px] leading-relaxed text-[--color-fg-muted]">
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Found a vulnerability? Email{' '}
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<a className="text-[--color-accent] underline" href="mailto:security@buildmymcpserver.com">
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security@buildmymcpserver.com
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</a>{' '}
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with a clear reproduction. We respond within 48h. We do not run a paid bounty yet, but we
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will credit you publicly in the changelog (or anonymously if you prefer).
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</p>
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<div className="mt-4">
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<CodeBlock
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label="pgp"
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code={`Key fingerprint published at buildmymcpserver.com/.well-known/security.txt`}
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/>
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</div>
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</section>
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<section className="mt-12">
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<h2 className="text-[18px] font-semibold tracking-tight">Compliance roadmap</h2>
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<p className="mt-2 text-[13.5px] leading-relaxed text-[--color-fg-muted]">
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SOC 2 Type I is targeted for Q4 2026. The GDPR posture is described in our{' '}
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<Link href="/privacy" className="text-[--color-accent] underline">
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privacy policy
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</Link>
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. If you need a DPA or other contracts ahead of SOC 2, reach out — Team and Enterprise
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customers get one on request.
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</p>
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</section>
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</div>
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);
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}
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