e198d44e1e
7 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Marco Sadjadi
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cc3c5ad444 |
feat(auth): GitHub OAuth login + SMS one-time-code login
Some checks failed
Deploy to Production / deploy (push) Failing after 1m8s
GitHub: /v1/auth/github + /callback — authorization-code flow, fetches the verified primary email via /user/emails, reuses upsertOAuthLogin. SMS: phone is now a first-class login identity. - schema: users.email nullable, users.phone added, new sms_codes table. - @bmm/auth: issueSmsCode / consumeSmsCode — 6-digit code, hashed at rest, 10-min TTL, per-phone rate limit, 5-attempt cap, get-or-create user by phone. - apps/api: /v1/auth/sms/request + /verify, Twilio REST send (no SDK), per-IP throttle. /v1/auth/providers now reports google/github/sms. - login UI: Google + GitHub buttons, Email|Phone toggle, two-step SMS (number -> 6-digit code with one-time-code autofill). SMS link was rejected in favour of an OTP code — carrier link-scanners consume magic-link tokens before the user taps them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Marco Sadjadi
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a68e882092 |
feat(crypto): envelope encryption + key rotation via admin panel
Closes structural weakness #4 from the audit (single global key, no rotation, no KMS path). Customer secrets now use envelope encryption with a real rotation story. Model: KEK — Key Encryption Key, 32 bytes from env (SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY). Never stored in the DB. Root of trust. DEK — Data Encryption Key, 32 random bytes we generate, stored in the new encryption_keys table *wrapped* (AES-256-GCM encrypted) with the KEK. Secrets are encrypted with the DEK. Schema: - encryption_keys (version, wrappedDek, active, rotatedBy, createdAt, retiredAt) - secrets.keyId — which DEK encrypted this row. NULL = legacy (KEK-direct, pre-envelope); decryptSecret handles both and the first rotation migrates legacy rows onto a DEK. crypto.ts (full rewrite): - ensureActiveKey() — boot-time, loads keys + creates v1 if none. Fail-closed: index.ts process.exit(1) if it throws — the API will not serve if encryption can't initialize. - encryptSecret() — encrypts with the active DEK, returns { value, keyId }. - decryptSecret(value, keyId) — DEK path or legacy KEK-direct path. - rotateKeys() — mints a fresh DEK, re-encrypts EVERY secret under it inside a single transaction (decrypt-old / encrypt-new per row), retires the old key, activates the new one. A partial failure is recoverable because every row carries its own keyId. - encryptionStatus() — active version, key history, secret + legacy counts. Admin: - GET /v1/admin/encryption — status - POST /v1/admin/encryption/rotate — triggers rotateKeys, audit-logged as admin.encryption.rotate with { newVersion, reEncrypted }. - /admin/encryption page — active-key/secret/legacy cards, Rotate button with confirm, key-history table, plain-English how-it-works. Added to admin nav. Verified end-to-end: - boot → encryption_keys v1 active, '[crypto] envelope encryption ready' - created a server with secret MY_API_KEY → stored ciphertext, keyId = v1 - POST rotate → { newVersion: 2, reEncrypted: 1 }; ciphertext changed, keyId now v2, v1 retired, v2 active. The decrypt-then-reencrypt round-trip succeeded (rotation throws otherwise) — the secret is provably recoverable. - admin UI renders the status + history correctly. Deferred, named honestly (not built this iteration): - worker reads secrets from the DB instead of the BullMQ job-data plaintext copy — would also remove plaintext secrets from Redis. Separate change with its own risk surface on the iterate/fork flows. - per-server secret-value rotation UI - audit_log hash-chaining (tamper-evidence) - rate limiting on auth endpoints |
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Marco Sadjadi
|
2ad4a7e34c |
fix(security): template integration sovereign audit + critical fixes
P0 — three critical issues found by tracing every attack vector on the template
publish + fork + render path. All three fixed and verified with attack tests.
FIX A — Takedown actually stops malicious containers
PATCH /v1/admin/templates with status=takedown previously only updated
mcp_servers.status to 'paused' in the DB. The Docker container kept running
and serving traffic on its allocated port — takedown was cosmetic. Now the
endpoint enumerates every fork's container, calls 'docker rm -f' on each,
clears container_id/public_url/host_port in the DB, and returns the
stoppedContainers count. New apps/api/src/lib/docker.ts owns the stop logic.
Verified: takedown stopped container f5632962, port 4109 connection refused.
FIX B — Reject specEdit on fork
A hand-crafted POST /v1/servers with {templateId, previewId, specEdit} would
enter the spec-edit branch, merge edits into the cached spec, but the worker
reads the pre-built template code (separate cache key), ignoring the merged
spec entirely. User thinks they changed something; deployed container behaves
as the original. Now returns 400 spec_edit_forbidden_on_fork with an explainer
pointing to the Iterate flow.
FIX C — templateId validation via Redis fork-ref
templateId on POST /v1/servers was user-controlled and unvalidated:
fork_count of any template could be pumped, mcp_servers got garbage
template_id rows, takedown cascade would miss the bogus rows. Fork endpoint
now writes a Redis key fork-ref:<previewId> -> templateId (5min TTL).
Server-create requires the ref to exist AND match the submitted templateId.
Verified attack: fake templateId without fork-ref returns 410 fork_ref_expired.
DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH — Hardened static checks
Banned patterns (added):
Function\s*\(['"`] — Function('code')() form, no 'new' needed
\bimport\s*\( — dynamic import escapes bundle scope
\bsetTimeout\s*\(['"`] — setTimeout('code', ms) eval form
\bsetInterval\s*\(['"`]
\bfs\s*\.\s*(unlink|rmdir|rm)\b
\bprocess\s*\.\s*kill\b
you are now in (developer|jailbreak|dan) mode — extra jailbreak markers
Hardcoded-credential patterns (new — scanForLeakedSecrets):
sk-ant-(api|sid)… — Anthropic
sk-… — OpenAI
sk_(live|test)_… — Stripe
ghp_… — GitHub PAT
github_pat_… — GitHub fine-grained
xox[bpoasr]-… — Slack
AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16} — AWS
-----BEGIN…PRIVATE KEY----- — RSA / SSH / GPG
Triggered when a publisher pasted their key into the prompt and Claude
embedded it literally in the generated code. Publish-blocking.
Verified attack: smuggled 'Function("return 1")' into a build's
generated_code, attempted publish → 422 publish_blocked.
Slug regex tightened — fork + detail routes now require
^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,63}$ (was loose min(1).max(64) — letting through
'../admin', long strings, mixed case).
UI warning — Publish-as-template form now shows an amber callout listing
what's scanned and explicitly stating egress allowlisting is roadmap, not
enforced today (was misleading: the field was collected, never enforced).
TEMPLATE_SECURITY_AUDIT.md added — documents all 20 audited vectors with
severity, status, and rationale for what's deferred.
UI polish
globals.css — select/input/textarea/button get color-scheme: dark + custom
chevron + option styling so Chrome's native popdown stops rendering as a
white OS-themed widget on dark pages. The /templates category dropdown was
the immediate trigger; same rule applies system-wide.
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Marco Sadjadi
|
8334de13a8 |
feat(marketplace): template publish + fork + voting/ranking + admin moderation
What this enables:
- A user builds an MCP server. If others would benefit, they click 'Publish as
template' on their server detail page. The spec + pre-rendered TypeScript
snapshot is preserved.
- Visitors browse /templates, filter by category, sort by trending/top/newest.
Each template card shows fork count + active deployment count as natural
manipulation-resistant popularity signal.
- /templates/[slug] shows the full plan: tool list with input schemas,
required-credential explanations (with 'how to get one' deep links), and a
collapsible code preview so users can audit before forking.
- Fork is one click → /servers/new?template=slug. The wizard skips Step 1 and
pre-fills Step 2 with the template's parsed spec. Forker only fills in their
own credentials. mcp_servers.template_id is recorded; template.fork_count is
bumped atomically. Each fork gets its own isolated container with its own
port, its own AES-256 secrets — the template author has zero visibility into
the fork's traffic or data.
- Admin /admin/templates moderation: verify quality templates (shows shield
badge in marketplace), hide low-effort ones, takedown anything malicious.
Takedowns cascade-pause every fork container — owners must re-deploy.
Why template+fork instead of shared-container:
- Shared containers would mean the publisher's quota + their secrets + their
logs are exposed to forkers. Bad ergonomics, bad security, bad ownership.
- Templates/forks decouple the spec (shared, vouched-for) from the runtime
(isolated per user). Network-effect moat without the trust collapse.
Why no 5-star voting in v1:
- Manipulation-anfällig, empty lists without adoption. We use fork count +
active deploys + verified badge. Trending algorithm:
score = (activeDeploys * 3 + forks) / sqrt(ageDays + 1)
Real signal, no brigading attack surface.
Backend:
- New schema: templates table (16 cols incl. tools_schema, generated_code,
required_secrets, allowedDomains, status enum, verified, fork_count).
- mcp_servers.template_id FK + idx for fork lookup.
- @bmm/types: SpecEdit unchanged, CreateServerInput accepts optional templateId.
- preview-cache.ts: new cachePrebuiltCode/loadPrebuiltCode for storing the
template's full rendered server.ts alongside the spec. Generator worker
detects this and skips the render step — uses the audited pre-built code
verbatim. Banned-pattern re-scan at publish time.
- routes/templates.ts: 5 public/auth routes + 2 admin routes. Banned-pattern
re-scan before publish. Slug auto-uniqued. forkCount atomic-increment via
SQL.
UI:
- /templates marketplace with trending/top/newest tabs, category filter, search.
Cards show forks + live count + author + verified badge.
- /templates/[slug] full detail with tools, credentials-with-hints, expandable
code preview, fork CTA, ownership + stats sidebar, 'forking is safe' explainer.
- /servers/new?template=slug — wizard auto-jumps to Step 2 with template spec
pre-filled, fork banner at top with link back to template.
- /servers/[id] new Publish tab with title, category, descriptions, per-secret
hint fields (description + howToGetUrl per UPPER_SNAKE_CASE key).
- /admin/templates moderation with verify/hide/takedown actions.
- Marketing nav now includes /templates.
Verified end-to-end:
- Published Echo Demo Template from marco@test.local's live server
- Marketplace lists it correctly with stats
- Detail page renders with all sections
- Fork CTA navigates to wizard with ?template= param
- Wizard skips Step 1, shows fork banner, pre-fills spec
- Build succeeds in ~10s (cached spec + prebuilt code path skips Claude AND
render), container live on :4109 with proper OAuth 401 → token → 200 flow
- DB: templates.fork_count=1, activeDeployments=1, mcp_servers.template_id
populated on the fork
- /admin/templates shows the new template with verify/hide/takedown controls
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Marco Sadjadi
|
dda8f94de4 |
feat(wizard): editable spec in step 2 — name, description, JSON schema, secrets
The wizard's confirm step is no longer read-only. Users can refine what Claude parsed before committing to a build. Backend: - @bmm/types adds SpecEdit (tools[name,description,inputSchema] + requiredSecrets); CreateServerInput accepts an optional specEdit alongside previewId. - Servers create endpoint: when specEdit is provided, loads cached spec from Redis, index-merges the edits in (keeping LLM-generated implementations untouched), re-validates via GeneratorSpec, re-runs the banned-pattern scan, overwrites the Redis cache so the worker reads the user's version. Refuses with preview_expired/tool_count_mismatch/banned_pattern on safety failures. - New overwriteSpec() helper in preview-cache. Frontend: - Step 2 renders each tool as an editable card: name input, description textarea, JSON schema textarea with parse-on-keystroke validation (inline error if invalid). - Required secrets list is editable: keys via uppercase-snake-case input, +Add / remove buttons, secret values kept in sync when keys are renamed. - Reset-to-AI-suggestion button appears when edits are dirty. - Pre-submit validation: schema must parse, secret keys must match UPPER_SNAKE_CASE, required secret values must be provided. - Warning copy: 'Renaming parameters may require an Iterate after build — the existing impl references the original names.' Verified end-to-end via browser smoke test: edited description + renamed tool landed correctly in mcp_servers.tools_schema and in the live container at :4107. Implementation field preserved from the original cached spec. |
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Marco Sadjadi
|
1c92964bbd |
feat(api,generator): preview endpoint + spec cache + audit-log writes
- POST /v1/servers/preview runs Claude synchronously, validates output, caches spec in Redis under preview:<id> with 5min TTL, returns previewId+spec+detectedSecrets. - POST /v1/servers accepts optional previewId; worker reuses the cached spec if the entry is still present, otherwise regenerates fresh. Skips the second Claude round-trip (~30s saved on the demoable path). - audit() helper writes auth.login, auth.logout, server.create, server.iterate, server.delete to audit_log with ip, metadata, resourceId. - GET /v1/me/org returns organization + members list for the settings page. - GET /v1/audit?limit=&action=&resourceType= returns scoped audit entries. |
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Marco Sadjadi
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9658e843df | feat(api): Fastify control plane (auth, servers, WS build stream, OAuth 2.1 AS, JWKS) |