Prompts were sent to the model with no secret scan, so a pasted API key would leak to the LLM. Added findSecretInPrompt in @bmm/types (tight provider-key patterns: Anthropic/OpenAI/GitHub/AWS/Google/Slack/Stripe/JWT/private-key) shared by both sides. The web wizard blocks before sending with a clear message; the API preview and preview-stream endpoints reject with secret_in_prompt as the hard guarantee. Credential VALUES already never touched the model - they are entered in the separate encrypted step 2; this closes the remaining leak path where a user pastes a key into the prompt itself.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
fix(billing): correct Stripe API version + harden checkout; clarify wizard secrets
- Stripe apiVersion was pinned to 2025-10-29.acacia, but stripe@22 is built
for 2026-04-22.dahlia — where ui_mode embedded_page exists. The mismatch
made the embedded checkout create call fail/hang, surfacing in the browser
as an opaque CORS error (CF returns a 5xx without our ACAO header). Pin to
dahlia + add a 20s client timeout so any failure returns a readable 502.
- new-server wizard: step 1 now warns not to paste API keys into the prompt;
the credentials section (which already collects each secret in its own
encrypted field) is relabelled and its empty state invites adding one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@
The DELETE /v1/servers/:id endpoint existed (tears down the runner
container + removes the row) but nothing in the UI called it, so
servers could only be removed via SSH+psql. Adds a danger-variant
button in the top-right of the detail header with a native confirm,
spinner state, and inline error surfacing. Redirects to /servers
on success.
Architectural fix for "spec_too_large" / preview_timeout — the sync
endpoint had to fit the whole model run into Cloudflare's ~100s edge
window, which made the system fragile against any prompt that produced
a verbose spec. The new streaming path pipes Anthropic's token deltas
as Server-Sent Events; every chunk resets CF's idle timer and a 15s
keepalive comment guarantees activity even during slow first-token
windows.
@bmm/llm: new streamSpecFromAnthropic() exposes the SDK's .stream()
flow with the same typed-error contract as generateSpec — same
SpecTruncatedError / SpecValidationError / SpecTimeoutError raised from
the relevant moment.
API: POST /v1/servers/preview/stream returns text/event-stream with
events 'text' (deltas), 'spec' (final success payload, same shape as
the sync endpoint), 'error' (typed). Anthropic-only — GLM/hobby falls
back to the sync route via 409 streaming_unavailable.
Frontend: apiSseStream() handles the POST + ReadableStream + SSE
parser. The wizard's analyze() prefers the stream and only uses the
sync endpoint on the explicit 409 fallback.
nginx (api.buildmymcpserver.com): the /v1/builds/ location block (which
already had proxy_buffering off + 600s read timeout for the WS build
stream) now also matches /v1/servers/preview/stream so the SSE
response isn't buffered.
The free tier was hemorrhaging Anthropic cost with no abuse cap (no rate
limit on /preview, Opus default in the build worker, 5-min cache TTL that
made cache-miss the common case). This switches free users to GLM, paid
users to Claude tiers, and tightens every leak found in the audit.
Backend:
- @bmm/llm: GLM provider via Zhipu's OpenAI-compatible endpoint, pickPreviewModel
+ pickBuildModel helpers, plan-aware ModelChoice
- preview-cache TTL 5min -> 24h (kills the cache-miss path)
- /v1/servers/preview: picks model from caller's plan, returns model name to UI
- /v1/servers POST: enforces SERVER_LIMITS per plan (402), rate-limits builds
- daily rate-limit on preview (5/40/150/1000) and build (3/20/100/500)
- /v1/auth/me returns plan so the wizard can show the right model name
- generator worker: GLM default, Anthropic Sonnet fallback if GLM errors
Frontend:
- Wizard fetches plan, shows "<model> is drafting the tool spec" pre-emptively,
upgrade hint for hobby users, friendly errors for 402 / 429
- Pricing page: AI-model line per tier (Open-tier / Haiku / Sonnet / Opus),
Team €149 -> €199, Enterprise €499 -> €999, daily-preview limit per tier
- Privacy + Security: explicit subprocessor disclosure for Anthropic (US) /
Zhipu (CN) and which tier uses which
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sonnet still overran Cloudflare's edge timeout — the 504 fired at 90s but
the proxy had already cut the connection, so the browser saw a headerless
524 reported as a CORS error.
Measured against the live API: Haiku 4.5 generates the spec at ~200 tok/s,
so a full 8k-token spec completes in ~40s. With a hard 60s timeout and no
retries the route is guaranteed to answer well inside the proxy window.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The /v1/servers/preview route ran claude-opus-4-7 synchronously; full spec
generation routinely exceeded Cloudflare's ~100s proxy cap, so the browser
received a headerless 524 and reported it as a CORS failure.
- preview now uses claude-sonnet-4-6 with a 45s per-attempt timeout and one
retry — comfortably inside the proxy budget
- generateSpec maps an exhausted timeout to SpecTimeoutError; the route
returns a clean 504 (with CORS headers) instead of a stalled connection
- analyze step: live elapsed-seconds counter as freeze-proof, plus a
reduced-motion exception so the loading spinner keeps spinning (a status
indicator, which WCAG exempts from reduced-motion)
- textarea resize grip restyled to dark theme (light hatch on dark square)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
/servers/new and /login/callback call useSearchParams() directly, which
bails the page out of static rendering and fails `next build` during
prerender. Split each into a thin Suspense wrapper + inner component.
Latent since `next dev` never prerenders — only surfaces in a prod build.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bug: forking a template POSTed /v1/servers with slug = trySlug(template.title),
a fixed value. If the user had any server with that slug already (e.g. forking
the same template twice, or a name collision), the create returned 409
slug_taken — and the fork wizard skips Step 1, so there was no slug field to
fix it with. The user was stuck (8 repeated 409s in the report).
Fix:
- On fork setup, after the fork call, GET /v1/servers and auto-unique the
default slug: echo-demo-template -> echo-demo-template-2 -> -3 ... against the
user's existing slugs. Lookup failure is non-fatal (slug field is editable).
- Fork step 2 now renders editable Name + Slug fields in the fork banner
('must be unique in your workspace' hint) — the normal wizard has these in
Step 1, which the fork flow skips, so they belong here.
- slug_taken build error now reads 'The slug "x" is already used by one of
your servers — change the Slug field above' instead of the raw code.
Note: the SES lockdown-install.js and content.js 'query' errors in the report
are browser extensions, not the app.
Verified: forked echo-demo-template (whose base slug was already taken) — slug
auto-filled echo-demo-template-2, build succeeded, container live on :4111,
template fork_count incremented to 2.
Goal: maximize template volume without a dark pattern and without leaking data.
Wizard Done-page Share panel:
- 'Share as template in the marketplace (recommended)' checkbox, default ON,
rendered inline in the build-success flow where every user lands.
- Honest copy — corrected a draft that claimed 'only abstracted code pattern is
shared'. That is false: the FULL generated code becomes publicly viewable on
the template detail page (by design, for pre-fork audit). The panel now says:
'Your secrets stay private ... but your generated code becomes publicly
viewable so others can audit it before forking. Unshare anytime.'
- When checked: inline minimal form — short description (prefilled from the
spec), category select, optional per-secret credential hints. One 'Publish to
marketplace' click. Not auto-published silently — that would be a consent dark
pattern; one visible deliberate click keeps it clean.
- Forked servers don't show the panel (re-publishing a fork is an edge case).
Owner unshare/reshare:
- GET /v1/servers/:id/template — owner lookup, drives the Publish tab UI.
- PATCH /v1/templates/:slug/visibility { shared } — owner-only toggle between
public and hidden. 403 for non-owners, 409 if an admin took it down (owner
cannot resurrect an admin takedown). Audit-logged as template.unshare /
template.reshare.
- Server-detail Publish tab now detects an existing template and shows the
shared status (public/hidden/takedown badge), fork count, a marketplace link
and an Unshare/Re-share button — instead of the publish form.
Why this is safe to default ON:
- Secrets are architecturally bound to mcp_servers, never copied into templates.
Publish reads tools_schema + generated_code only; the secrets table is never
touched. Data leak is structurally impossible, not policy-dependent.
- Publish re-scans the generated code for banned patterns AND hardcoded
credentials (sovereign-audit hardening) before it can reach the marketplace.
- The user sees a visible, pre-ticked checkbox and reads one honest sentence
before publishing. Privacy-conscious users untick; everyone else contributes
volume. Informed consent, GDPR-clean.
Verified end-to-end via API:
GET server/:id/template -> null (unpublished)
POST /v1/templates -> published, slug share-test-server
GET server/:id/template -> status public
PATCH visibility {shared:false} -> hidden, drops out of public list
PATCH visibility {shared:true} -> public again
UI: Publish tab renders the shared-status panel with View + Unshare (screenshot
confirmed).
Also: hero badge date set to 2026-05-20. Changed 'MCP spec 2025-11-25' to
'updated 2026-05-20' — claiming an MCP spec dated today would be factually wrong
(no such spec release exists); 'updated' is accurate and gives the requested
fresh date. The real spec date is still cited correctly in /docs.
P0 — three critical issues found by tracing every attack vector on the template
publish + fork + render path. All three fixed and verified with attack tests.
FIX A — Takedown actually stops malicious containers
PATCH /v1/admin/templates with status=takedown previously only updated
mcp_servers.status to 'paused' in the DB. The Docker container kept running
and serving traffic on its allocated port — takedown was cosmetic. Now the
endpoint enumerates every fork's container, calls 'docker rm -f' on each,
clears container_id/public_url/host_port in the DB, and returns the
stoppedContainers count. New apps/api/src/lib/docker.ts owns the stop logic.
Verified: takedown stopped container f5632962, port 4109 connection refused.
FIX B — Reject specEdit on fork
A hand-crafted POST /v1/servers with {templateId, previewId, specEdit} would
enter the spec-edit branch, merge edits into the cached spec, but the worker
reads the pre-built template code (separate cache key), ignoring the merged
spec entirely. User thinks they changed something; deployed container behaves
as the original. Now returns 400 spec_edit_forbidden_on_fork with an explainer
pointing to the Iterate flow.
FIX C — templateId validation via Redis fork-ref
templateId on POST /v1/servers was user-controlled and unvalidated:
fork_count of any template could be pumped, mcp_servers got garbage
template_id rows, takedown cascade would miss the bogus rows. Fork endpoint
now writes a Redis key fork-ref:<previewId> -> templateId (5min TTL).
Server-create requires the ref to exist AND match the submitted templateId.
Verified attack: fake templateId without fork-ref returns 410 fork_ref_expired.
DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH — Hardened static checks
Banned patterns (added):
Function\s*\(['"`] — Function('code')() form, no 'new' needed
\bimport\s*\( — dynamic import escapes bundle scope
\bsetTimeout\s*\(['"`] — setTimeout('code', ms) eval form
\bsetInterval\s*\(['"`]
\bfs\s*\.\s*(unlink|rmdir|rm)\b
\bprocess\s*\.\s*kill\b
you are now in (developer|jailbreak|dan) mode — extra jailbreak markers
Hardcoded-credential patterns (new — scanForLeakedSecrets):
sk-ant-(api|sid)… — Anthropic
sk-… — OpenAI
sk_(live|test)_… — Stripe
ghp_… — GitHub PAT
github_pat_… — GitHub fine-grained
xox[bpoasr]-… — Slack
AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16} — AWS
-----BEGIN…PRIVATE KEY----- — RSA / SSH / GPG
Triggered when a publisher pasted their key into the prompt and Claude
embedded it literally in the generated code. Publish-blocking.
Verified attack: smuggled 'Function("return 1")' into a build's
generated_code, attempted publish → 422 publish_blocked.
Slug regex tightened — fork + detail routes now require
^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,63}$ (was loose min(1).max(64) — letting through
'../admin', long strings, mixed case).
UI warning — Publish-as-template form now shows an amber callout listing
what's scanned and explicitly stating egress allowlisting is roadmap, not
enforced today (was misleading: the field was collected, never enforced).
TEMPLATE_SECURITY_AUDIT.md added — documents all 20 audited vectors with
severity, status, and rationale for what's deferred.
UI polish
globals.css — select/input/textarea/button get color-scheme: dark + custom
chevron + option styling so Chrome's native popdown stops rendering as a
white OS-themed widget on dark pages. The /templates category dropdown was
the immediate trigger; same rule applies system-wide.
What this enables:
- A user builds an MCP server. If others would benefit, they click 'Publish as
template' on their server detail page. The spec + pre-rendered TypeScript
snapshot is preserved.
- Visitors browse /templates, filter by category, sort by trending/top/newest.
Each template card shows fork count + active deployment count as natural
manipulation-resistant popularity signal.
- /templates/[slug] shows the full plan: tool list with input schemas,
required-credential explanations (with 'how to get one' deep links), and a
collapsible code preview so users can audit before forking.
- Fork is one click → /servers/new?template=slug. The wizard skips Step 1 and
pre-fills Step 2 with the template's parsed spec. Forker only fills in their
own credentials. mcp_servers.template_id is recorded; template.fork_count is
bumped atomically. Each fork gets its own isolated container with its own
port, its own AES-256 secrets — the template author has zero visibility into
the fork's traffic or data.
- Admin /admin/templates moderation: verify quality templates (shows shield
badge in marketplace), hide low-effort ones, takedown anything malicious.
Takedowns cascade-pause every fork container — owners must re-deploy.
Why template+fork instead of shared-container:
- Shared containers would mean the publisher's quota + their secrets + their
logs are exposed to forkers. Bad ergonomics, bad security, bad ownership.
- Templates/forks decouple the spec (shared, vouched-for) from the runtime
(isolated per user). Network-effect moat without the trust collapse.
Why no 5-star voting in v1:
- Manipulation-anfällig, empty lists without adoption. We use fork count +
active deploys + verified badge. Trending algorithm:
score = (activeDeploys * 3 + forks) / sqrt(ageDays + 1)
Real signal, no brigading attack surface.
Backend:
- New schema: templates table (16 cols incl. tools_schema, generated_code,
required_secrets, allowedDomains, status enum, verified, fork_count).
- mcp_servers.template_id FK + idx for fork lookup.
- @bmm/types: SpecEdit unchanged, CreateServerInput accepts optional templateId.
- preview-cache.ts: new cachePrebuiltCode/loadPrebuiltCode for storing the
template's full rendered server.ts alongside the spec. Generator worker
detects this and skips the render step — uses the audited pre-built code
verbatim. Banned-pattern re-scan at publish time.
- routes/templates.ts: 5 public/auth routes + 2 admin routes. Banned-pattern
re-scan before publish. Slug auto-uniqued. forkCount atomic-increment via
SQL.
UI:
- /templates marketplace with trending/top/newest tabs, category filter, search.
Cards show forks + live count + author + verified badge.
- /templates/[slug] full detail with tools, credentials-with-hints, expandable
code preview, fork CTA, ownership + stats sidebar, 'forking is safe' explainer.
- /servers/new?template=slug — wizard auto-jumps to Step 2 with template spec
pre-filled, fork banner at top with link back to template.
- /servers/[id] new Publish tab with title, category, descriptions, per-secret
hint fields (description + howToGetUrl per UPPER_SNAKE_CASE key).
- /admin/templates moderation with verify/hide/takedown actions.
- Marketing nav now includes /templates.
Verified end-to-end:
- Published Echo Demo Template from marco@test.local's live server
- Marketplace lists it correctly with stats
- Detail page renders with all sections
- Fork CTA navigates to wizard with ?template= param
- Wizard skips Step 1, shows fork banner, pre-fills spec
- Build succeeds in ~10s (cached spec + prebuilt code path skips Claude AND
render), container live on :4109 with proper OAuth 401 → token → 200 flow
- DB: templates.fork_count=1, activeDeployments=1, mcp_servers.template_id
populated on the fork
- /admin/templates shows the new template with verify/hide/takedown controls
The wizard's confirm step is no longer read-only. Users can refine what Claude
parsed before committing to a build.
Backend:
- @bmm/types adds SpecEdit (tools[name,description,inputSchema] + requiredSecrets);
CreateServerInput accepts an optional specEdit alongside previewId.
- Servers create endpoint: when specEdit is provided, loads cached spec from Redis,
index-merges the edits in (keeping LLM-generated implementations untouched),
re-validates via GeneratorSpec, re-runs the banned-pattern scan, overwrites the
Redis cache so the worker reads the user's version. Refuses with
preview_expired/tool_count_mismatch/banned_pattern on safety failures.
- New overwriteSpec() helper in preview-cache.
Frontend:
- Step 2 renders each tool as an editable card: name input, description textarea,
JSON schema textarea with parse-on-keystroke validation (inline error if invalid).
- Required secrets list is editable: keys via uppercase-snake-case input, +Add /
remove buttons, secret values kept in sync when keys are renamed.
- Reset-to-AI-suggestion button appears when edits are dirty.
- Pre-submit validation: schema must parse, secret keys must match UPPER_SNAKE_CASE,
required secret values must be provided.
- Warning copy: 'Renaming parameters may require an Iterate after build — the
existing impl references the original names.'
Verified end-to-end via browser smoke test: edited description + renamed tool
landed correctly in mcp_servers.tools_schema and in the live container at :4107.
Implementation field preserved from the original cached spec.
Sprint 3.5: close every dead link and replace the single-step wizard with the
spec-mandated 3-step flow.
Wizard:
- Step 1 collects prompt + name + slug, calls /v1/servers/preview.
- Step 2 renders parsed tools (name, description, input schema as copyable JSON)
+ a credential field per requiredSecret Claude actually identified. Self-contained
servers see 'No credentials needed' instead of generic Notion placeholders.
- Step 3 streams the live build over WebSocket and shows install snippets.
New dashboard pages:
- /settings — org, plan/usage, members table, API keys + billing stubs (Sprint 4),
encryption status. Reads /v1/me/org.
- /audit — filterable table over /v1/audit with action pills, resource refs, IP,
metadata JSON.
Docs site (/docs + 6 sub-pages):
- Sticky 240px sidebar, max-w-prose article column, shared DocsTitle/H2/Code primitives.
- Quickstart, MCP concepts, OAuth 2.1 flow (full walkthrough with curl), Authoring
tools, Self-hosting, API reference, FAQ.
Marketing pages:
- /changelog with tagged release timeline.
- /security with 8 pillars + disclosure.
- /privacy with GDPR-aware sections.
- /terms (10 clauses).
- /pricing full page (nav now points here instead of /#pricing anchor).
- /status with live 10s probes against /api/health and /login.
Footer 'system status' badge now links to /status.
All 20 routes 200 OK in smoke crawl. Typecheck clean across packages.
