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Author SHA1 Message Date
Marco Sadjadi
8c6f04f034 feat: oauth refresh-token grant + per-runner subdomain TLS plumbing
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OAUTH REFRESH-TOKEN
- oauth_tokens.subject column added (migration applied to prod DB): stores
  the JWT sub claim from the original authorization so refreshes can
  re-mint with the same identity without re-walking the (consumed) code.
- Authorization-code branch now writes subject AND uses a 30-day
  expires_at for the row (was 1h — same as access token, which killed
  refresh after 1h).
- New refresh_token grant branch:
    * looks up token by refresh-hash + expiry
    * client_id must match, client_secret verified if confidential
    * RFC 8707: requested resource must equal stored resource
    * OAuth 2.1 rotation: atomic UPDATE WHERE old_hash → new access JWT,
      new refresh token, extended expiry; loser of a race sees invalid_grant
- Access TTL (1h) and refresh TTL (30d) extracted as constants.

Clients no longer have to re-authorize hourly. Closes Zb-001.

PER-RUNNER SUBDOMAIN TLS (Z1-002)
Code path:
- New MCP_DOMAIN env (e.g. "mcp.buildmymcpserver.com") + RUNNER_MAP_DIR
  (default /var/runner-map) in generator config.
- deployContainer: writes /var/runner-map/<slug>.conf with content
  "slug.MCP_DOMAIN port;" and computes publicUrl as
  https://<slug>.<MCP_DOMAIN>. Falls back to http://host:port when
  MCP_DOMAIN is unset (zero behaviour change until host is configured).
- stopContainer (both api/lib/docker.ts and generator/lib/deploy.ts) now
  accepts an optional slug arg and removes the map fragment. Callers
  (DELETE /v1/servers/:id, admin template takedown) updated.

Infra path (one-time host setup — Marco runs as root):
- scripts/setup-runner-tls.sh:
    1. nginx vhost matching *.mcp.buildmymcpserver.com via regex →
       reads slug→port from /opt/buildmymcpserver/runner-map.combined
    2. systemd inotify service watches the map dir, combines fragments
       on any change, reloads nginx
    3. installs inotify-tools if missing, idempotent
- Prereqs documented at top: Cloudflare wildcard DNS proxied, Origin CA
  cert for *.mcp.buildmymcpserver.com, SSL mode Full (strict).
- After running: edit docker-compose.prod.yml to mount the map dir into
  api + generator, set MCP_DOMAIN in env, recreate containers.

Closes Zb-001 fully. Closes Z1-002 on the code side; one Marco-on-host
action away from closing it on the infra side.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-25 22:09:06 +02:00
Marco Sadjadi
ef30baf52a feat: Swiss-compliant launch — Impressum/AGB/Contact, support panel, DSG exports, cookie banner
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Details 
Legal (Swiss minimum, no individual named):
- Impressum page (UWG Art. 3 lit. s) — provider, contact via support panel,
  no email required, jurisdiction = Switzerland
- AGB page — subscription terms, payment, cancellation, suspension on payment
  fail, 14-day money-back, AI-processing-per-tier disclosure, Swiss law +
  Swiss venue, modeled after typical Schweizer SaaS terms
- Privacy: Stripe added as subprocessor with full data-flow disclosure

Support panel replaces email contact entirely:
- @bmm/db: support_status enum + support_tickets + support_messages tables,
  migration applied to prod DB
- @bmm/api: support routes (user create/list/view/reply, admin list/view/reply
  /set-status), public /v1/contact for logged-out visitors with per-IP rate
  limit of 3 submissions/day to prevent spam-flood
- Web: /settings/support (list + new), /settings/support/[id] (conversation),
  /admin/support, /admin/support/[id]
- Public /contact form with email collection for guest tickets

Data rights (DSG Art. 25 / GDPR Art. 15+20):
- /v1/account/export returns user-scoped JSON of profile, org, servers,
  builds, audit, support tickets and messages — excludes hashes, encrypted
  secrets, other-user data
- /settings/account: download button + deletion-via-ticket workflow

Production-readiness gaps closed:
- org.suspended now blocks /v1/servers POST and /v1/servers/preview (402);
  webhook flagged this state but enforcement was missing
- Cookie banner: minimal, essential-cookies-only disclosure (Swiss DSG +
  GDPR compliant without dark-pattern consent UI), mounts on both layouts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-25 17:12:06 +02:00
Marco Sadjadi
cc3c5ad444 feat(auth): GitHub OAuth login + SMS one-time-code login
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GitHub: /v1/auth/github + /callback — authorization-code flow, fetches
the verified primary email via /user/emails, reuses upsertOAuthLogin.

SMS: phone is now a first-class login identity.
- schema: users.email nullable, users.phone added, new sms_codes table.
- @bmm/auth: issueSmsCode / consumeSmsCode — 6-digit code, hashed at
  rest, 10-min TTL, per-phone rate limit, 5-attempt cap, get-or-create
  user by phone.
- apps/api: /v1/auth/sms/request + /verify, Twilio REST send (no SDK),
  per-IP throttle. /v1/auth/providers now reports google/github/sms.
- login UI: Google + GitHub buttons, Email|Phone toggle, two-step SMS
  (number -> 6-digit code with one-time-code autofill).

SMS link was rejected in favour of an OTP code — carrier link-scanners
consume magic-link tokens before the user taps them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-21 22:59:58 +02:00
Marco Sadjadi
a68e882092 feat(crypto): envelope encryption + key rotation via admin panel 
Closes structural weakness #4 from the audit (single global key, no rotation,
no KMS path). Customer secrets now use envelope encryption with a real
rotation story.

Model:
  KEK — Key Encryption Key, 32 bytes from env (SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY). Never
        stored in the DB. Root of trust.
  DEK — Data Encryption Key, 32 random bytes we generate, stored in the new
        encryption_keys table *wrapped* (AES-256-GCM encrypted) with the KEK.
        Secrets are encrypted with the DEK.

Schema:
- encryption_keys (version, wrappedDek, active, rotatedBy, createdAt, retiredAt)
- secrets.keyId — which DEK encrypted this row. NULL = legacy (KEK-direct,
  pre-envelope); decryptSecret handles both and the first rotation migrates
  legacy rows onto a DEK.

crypto.ts (full rewrite):
- ensureActiveKey() — boot-time, loads keys + creates v1 if none. Fail-closed:
  index.ts process.exit(1) if it throws — the API will not serve if encryption
  can't initialize.
- encryptSecret() — encrypts with the active DEK, returns { value, keyId }.
- decryptSecret(value, keyId) — DEK path or legacy KEK-direct path.
- rotateKeys() — mints a fresh DEK, re-encrypts EVERY secret under it inside a
  single transaction (decrypt-old / encrypt-new per row), retires the old key,
  activates the new one. A partial failure is recoverable because every row
  carries its own keyId.
- encryptionStatus() — active version, key history, secret + legacy counts.

Admin:
- GET  /v1/admin/encryption        — status
- POST /v1/admin/encryption/rotate — triggers rotateKeys, audit-logged as
  admin.encryption.rotate with { newVersion, reEncrypted }.
- /admin/encryption page — active-key/secret/legacy cards, Rotate button with
  confirm, key-history table, plain-English how-it-works. Added to admin nav.

Verified end-to-end:
- boot → encryption_keys v1 active, '[crypto] envelope encryption ready'
- created a server with secret MY_API_KEY → stored ciphertext, keyId = v1
- POST rotate → { newVersion: 2, reEncrypted: 1 }; ciphertext changed, keyId
  now v2, v1 retired, v2 active. The decrypt-then-reencrypt round-trip
  succeeded (rotation throws otherwise) — the secret is provably recoverable.
- admin UI renders the status + history correctly.

Deferred, named honestly (not built this iteration):
- worker reads secrets from the DB instead of the BullMQ job-data plaintext
  copy — would also remove plaintext secrets from Redis. Separate change with
  its own risk surface on the iterate/fork flows.
- per-server secret-value rotation UI
- audit_log hash-chaining (tamper-evidence)
- rate limiting on auth endpoints
 2026-05-20 22:36:08 +02:00
Marco Sadjadi
8334de13a8 feat(marketplace): template publish + fork + voting/ranking + admin moderation 
What this enables:
- A user builds an MCP server. If others would benefit, they click 'Publish as
  template' on their server detail page. The spec + pre-rendered TypeScript
  snapshot is preserved.
- Visitors browse /templates, filter by category, sort by trending/top/newest.
  Each template card shows fork count + active deployment count as natural
  manipulation-resistant popularity signal.
- /templates/[slug] shows the full plan: tool list with input schemas,
  required-credential explanations (with 'how to get one' deep links), and a
  collapsible code preview so users can audit before forking.
- Fork is one click → /servers/new?template=slug. The wizard skips Step 1 and
  pre-fills Step 2 with the template's parsed spec. Forker only fills in their
  own credentials. mcp_servers.template_id is recorded; template.fork_count is
  bumped atomically. Each fork gets its own isolated container with its own
  port, its own AES-256 secrets — the template author has zero visibility into
  the fork's traffic or data.
- Admin /admin/templates moderation: verify quality templates (shows shield
  badge in marketplace), hide low-effort ones, takedown anything malicious.
  Takedowns cascade-pause every fork container — owners must re-deploy.

Why template+fork instead of shared-container:
- Shared containers would mean the publisher's quota + their secrets + their
  logs are exposed to forkers. Bad ergonomics, bad security, bad ownership.
- Templates/forks decouple the spec (shared, vouched-for) from the runtime
  (isolated per user). Network-effect moat without the trust collapse.

Why no 5-star voting in v1:
- Manipulation-anfällig, empty lists without adoption. We use fork count +
  active deploys + verified badge. Trending algorithm:
    score = (activeDeploys * 3 + forks) / sqrt(ageDays + 1)
  Real signal, no brigading attack surface.

Backend:
- New schema: templates table (16 cols incl. tools_schema, generated_code,
  required_secrets, allowedDomains, status enum, verified, fork_count).
- mcp_servers.template_id FK + idx for fork lookup.
- @bmm/types: SpecEdit unchanged, CreateServerInput accepts optional templateId.
- preview-cache.ts: new cachePrebuiltCode/loadPrebuiltCode for storing the
  template's full rendered server.ts alongside the spec. Generator worker
  detects this and skips the render step — uses the audited pre-built code
  verbatim. Banned-pattern re-scan at publish time.
- routes/templates.ts: 5 public/auth routes + 2 admin routes. Banned-pattern
  re-scan before publish. Slug auto-uniqued. forkCount atomic-increment via
  SQL.

UI:
- /templates marketplace with trending/top/newest tabs, category filter, search.
  Cards show forks + live count + author + verified badge.
- /templates/[slug] full detail with tools, credentials-with-hints, expandable
  code preview, fork CTA, ownership + stats sidebar, 'forking is safe' explainer.
- /servers/new?template=slug — wizard auto-jumps to Step 2 with template spec
  pre-filled, fork banner at top with link back to template.
- /servers/[id] new Publish tab with title, category, descriptions, per-secret
  hint fields (description + howToGetUrl per UPPER_SNAKE_CASE key).
- /admin/templates moderation with verify/hide/takedown actions.
- Marketing nav now includes /templates.

Verified end-to-end:
- Published Echo Demo Template from marco@test.local's live server
- Marketplace lists it correctly with stats
- Detail page renders with all sections
- Fork CTA navigates to wizard with ?template= param
- Wizard skips Step 1, shows fork banner, pre-fills spec
- Build succeeds in ~10s (cached spec + prebuilt code path skips Claude AND
  render), container live on :4109 with proper OAuth 401 → token → 200 flow
- DB: templates.fork_count=1, activeDeployments=1, mcp_servers.template_id
  populated on the fork
- /admin/templates shows the new template with verify/hide/takedown controls
 2026-05-19 23:22:35 +02:00
Marco Sadjadi
c62fcd07ef feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints 
Schema migrations:
- users.is_admin boolean
- users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt)
- users.last_login_at timestamp
- organizations.suspended + suspended_reason
- admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings)

Auth (@bmm/auth):
- hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep)
- loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at
- seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run
- AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag

API:
- POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure
- requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin
- Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME)
  if env present. Idempotent.

Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin):
- GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity)
- GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount)
- PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name)
- DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked)
- GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts)
- PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend)
- GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter)
- POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt)
- DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id
- GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews)
- GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs
- GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join)
- GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count)
- GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt)
- PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it

UI (apps/web/app/admin/*):
- /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link
- AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email +
  'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect
- /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds),
  recent activity table linking to full audit
- /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked)
- /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts
- /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter
- /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview
- /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns
- /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker
- /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline,
  override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override

End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every
admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe
returns true count of running MCP containers.
 2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
Marco Sadjadi
439c91cbbf feat(db): drizzle schema and client (orgs, servers, builds, oauth, metrics, audit) 2026-05-19 00:21:18 +02:00