092290bb38
7 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Marco Sadjadi
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8c6f04f034 |
feat: oauth refresh-token grant + per-runner subdomain TLS plumbing
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OAUTH REFRESH-TOKEN
- oauth_tokens.subject column added (migration applied to prod DB): stores
the JWT sub claim from the original authorization so refreshes can
re-mint with the same identity without re-walking the (consumed) code.
- Authorization-code branch now writes subject AND uses a 30-day
expires_at for the row (was 1h — same as access token, which killed
refresh after 1h).
- New refresh_token grant branch:
* looks up token by refresh-hash + expiry
* client_id must match, client_secret verified if confidential
* RFC 8707: requested resource must equal stored resource
* OAuth 2.1 rotation: atomic UPDATE WHERE old_hash → new access JWT,
new refresh token, extended expiry; loser of a race sees invalid_grant
- Access TTL (1h) and refresh TTL (30d) extracted as constants.
Clients no longer have to re-authorize hourly. Closes Zb-001.
PER-RUNNER SUBDOMAIN TLS (Z1-002)
Code path:
- New MCP_DOMAIN env (e.g. "mcp.buildmymcpserver.com") + RUNNER_MAP_DIR
(default /var/runner-map) in generator config.
- deployContainer: writes /var/runner-map/<slug>.conf with content
"slug.MCP_DOMAIN port;" and computes publicUrl as
https://<slug>.<MCP_DOMAIN>. Falls back to http://host:port when
MCP_DOMAIN is unset (zero behaviour change until host is configured).
- stopContainer (both api/lib/docker.ts and generator/lib/deploy.ts) now
accepts an optional slug arg and removes the map fragment. Callers
(DELETE /v1/servers/:id, admin template takedown) updated.
Infra path (one-time host setup — Marco runs as root):
- scripts/setup-runner-tls.sh:
1. nginx vhost matching *.mcp.buildmymcpserver.com via regex →
reads slug→port from /opt/buildmymcpserver/runner-map.combined
2. systemd inotify service watches the map dir, combines fragments
on any change, reloads nginx
3. installs inotify-tools if missing, idempotent
- Prereqs documented at top: Cloudflare wildcard DNS proxied, Origin CA
cert for *.mcp.buildmymcpserver.com, SSL mode Full (strict).
- After running: edit docker-compose.prod.yml to mount the map dir into
api + generator, set MCP_DOMAIN in env, recreate containers.
Closes Zb-001 fully. Closes Z1-002 on the code side; one Marco-on-host
action away from closing it on the infra side.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Marco Sadjadi
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aa79a71357 |
security: sovereign-audit Pass-2 fixes — auth-lib, oauth, templates
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Six confirmed findings closed (3 MEDIUM, 3 LOW). Tier-1 surfaces from
Pass-1 re-verified non-regressed; this pass deepened the audit on the
auth library, OAuth issuer, and template marketplace.
Za-002 MEDIUM (scrypt cost) — bump SCRYPT_N from 2^14 → 2^17 (131072)
matching current OWASP guidance for password hashing in 2026. Hash
format embeds N (`scrypt$N$salt$hash`), so the existing admin
password at the old cost still verifies — backward-compatible. Also
added explicit maxmem ceilings since Node's default (~32MiB) is
insufficient for the new N.
Za-003 MEDIUM (single-use race) — consumeMagicLink was SELECT-then-
UPDATE; two parallel redemptions could both win and mint two
sessions from the same token. Now uses the same atomic
`UPDATE … WHERE id = ? AND consumedAt IS NULL RETURNING id` pattern
/oauth/token already had — loser of the race gets
invalid_or_expired_token.
Za-004 LOW (membership ordering) — `.orderBy(memberships.createdAt)`
added so when org-invites eventually let a user belong to multiple
orgs, the same one wins every login instead of insertion-order
roulette. Latent-bug pre-empt.
Zb-002 LOW (OAuth register spam) — /oauth/register now per-IP daily
rate-limited at 20/day (well above any legitimate MCP-client
bootstrap pattern). Prevents DB-row spam.
Zc-001 MEDIUM (banned-pattern drift) — three separate copies of
BANNED_PATTERNS had drifted apart. The publish-time scanner in
templates.ts was MISSING the 7 new patterns added in Pass-1
(process.binding, dlopen, .constructor.constructor, vm.runIn*,
globalThis['..']). Single source of truth in @bmm/llm now exports
SHARED_BANNED_PATTERNS; templates.ts composes PUBLISH_BANNED_PATTERNS
= SHARED ∪ code-only-extras (dynamic import, fs.rm, setTimeout-with-
string, process.kill, jailbreak markers).
Zc-002 LOW (N+1) — /v1/templates list was issuing one COUNT(*) per
template (101 queries for a 100-row page). Now one grouped query
with templateId GROUP BY, merged in JS. p95 doesn't degrade with
marketplace growth.
DEFERRED (documented, scoped for next sprint):
Za-001 HIGH — Account takeover via cross-provider email lookup.
Requires schema change (users.primaryProvider). Mitigation in
/settings/account banner planned.
Zb-001 MEDIUM — /oauth/token refresh_token grant: advertised in
AS metadata but unsupported_grant_type. Either implement (~40
LOC) or strip from metadata.
Zc-003 LOW — Admin takedown partial-failure consistency.
Zd-001 IMPROVE — DEK cache invalidation across replicas (single-
instance today).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Marco Sadjadi
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cc3c5ad444 |
feat(auth): GitHub OAuth login + SMS one-time-code login
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GitHub: /v1/auth/github + /callback — authorization-code flow, fetches the verified primary email via /user/emails, reuses upsertOAuthLogin. SMS: phone is now a first-class login identity. - schema: users.email nullable, users.phone added, new sms_codes table. - @bmm/auth: issueSmsCode / consumeSmsCode — 6-digit code, hashed at rest, 10-min TTL, per-phone rate limit, 5-attempt cap, get-or-create user by phone. - apps/api: /v1/auth/sms/request + /verify, Twilio REST send (no SDK), per-IP throttle. /v1/auth/providers now reports google/github/sms. - login UI: Google + GitHub buttons, Email|Phone toggle, two-step SMS (number -> 6-digit code with one-time-code autofill). SMS link was rejected in favour of an OTP code — carrier link-scanners consume magic-link tokens before the user taps them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Marco Sadjadi
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414903f16d |
feat(marketplace): dashboard nav link + My-templates filter
The logged-in user can now reach the marketplace and filter to their own templates. Dashboard nav: - Added 'Marketplace' item (Overview · Servers · Marketplace · Audit · Settings). /templates page — login-aware: - Detects session via /v1/auth/me. Logged-in users get a 'Dashboard' + '+ New server' header instead of 'Home' + 'Start building'. - New [All templates | My templates] scope toggle, shown only when logged in. - 'My templates' loads GET /v1/templates/mine and shows EVERY status the user owns (public / hidden / draft / takedown) with a colored status badge on each card — so a template you unshared doesn't appear to have vanished. - Sort tabs (trending/top/newest) hide in 'mine' scope — meaningless for a handful of own templates. Category filter + search still apply (client-side). - Takedown cards link to the source server's Publish tab instead of the detail route (which 410s); everything else opens the detail page. Backend: - GET /v1/templates/mine (requireAuth) — all own templates, any status, registered before /:slug so the static route always wins the match. - GET /v1/templates/:slug — now does an optional session check: the OWNER can view their own hidden/draft template (so a 'My templates' card click never dead-ends in a 404). takedown stays 410 for everyone, owner included — that's an admin decision, not the owner's to reverse. Detail page: - Fork CTA is gated on status === 'public'. For a non-public template the owner sees an amber 'not forkable — re-share from the Publish tab' notice plus a 'Manage in server' link, instead of a Fork button that would fail silently. Verified: - GET /v1/templates/mine → marco's 1 template; 401 without auth - Owner GET of a hidden template → 200 status:hidden; anon → 404 - Dashboard nav shows Marketplace (screenshot) - /templates 'My templates' toggle → only own template, public badge, sort tabs hidden (screenshot) |
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Marco Sadjadi
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a189111782 |
feat(marketplace): default-on share in wizard + owner unshare anytime
Goal: maximize template volume without a dark pattern and without leaking data.
Wizard Done-page Share panel:
- 'Share as template in the marketplace (recommended)' checkbox, default ON,
rendered inline in the build-success flow where every user lands.
- Honest copy — corrected a draft that claimed 'only abstracted code pattern is
shared'. That is false: the FULL generated code becomes publicly viewable on
the template detail page (by design, for pre-fork audit). The panel now says:
'Your secrets stay private ... but your generated code becomes publicly
viewable so others can audit it before forking. Unshare anytime.'
- When checked: inline minimal form — short description (prefilled from the
spec), category select, optional per-secret credential hints. One 'Publish to
marketplace' click. Not auto-published silently — that would be a consent dark
pattern; one visible deliberate click keeps it clean.
- Forked servers don't show the panel (re-publishing a fork is an edge case).
Owner unshare/reshare:
- GET /v1/servers/:id/template — owner lookup, drives the Publish tab UI.
- PATCH /v1/templates/:slug/visibility { shared } — owner-only toggle between
public and hidden. 403 for non-owners, 409 if an admin took it down (owner
cannot resurrect an admin takedown). Audit-logged as template.unshare /
template.reshare.
- Server-detail Publish tab now detects an existing template and shows the
shared status (public/hidden/takedown badge), fork count, a marketplace link
and an Unshare/Re-share button — instead of the publish form.
Why this is safe to default ON:
- Secrets are architecturally bound to mcp_servers, never copied into templates.
Publish reads tools_schema + generated_code only; the secrets table is never
touched. Data leak is structurally impossible, not policy-dependent.
- Publish re-scans the generated code for banned patterns AND hardcoded
credentials (sovereign-audit hardening) before it can reach the marketplace.
- The user sees a visible, pre-ticked checkbox and reads one honest sentence
before publishing. Privacy-conscious users untick; everyone else contributes
volume. Informed consent, GDPR-clean.
Verified end-to-end via API:
GET server/:id/template -> null (unpublished)
POST /v1/templates -> published, slug share-test-server
GET server/:id/template -> status public
PATCH visibility {shared:false} -> hidden, drops out of public list
PATCH visibility {shared:true} -> public again
UI: Publish tab renders the shared-status panel with View + Unshare (screenshot
confirmed).
Also: hero badge date set to 2026-05-20. Changed 'MCP spec 2025-11-25' to
'updated 2026-05-20' — claiming an MCP spec dated today would be factually wrong
(no such spec release exists); 'updated' is accurate and gives the requested
fresh date. The real spec date is still cited correctly in /docs.
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Marco Sadjadi
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2ad4a7e34c |
fix(security): template integration sovereign audit + critical fixes
P0 — three critical issues found by tracing every attack vector on the template
publish + fork + render path. All three fixed and verified with attack tests.
FIX A — Takedown actually stops malicious containers
PATCH /v1/admin/templates with status=takedown previously only updated
mcp_servers.status to 'paused' in the DB. The Docker container kept running
and serving traffic on its allocated port — takedown was cosmetic. Now the
endpoint enumerates every fork's container, calls 'docker rm -f' on each,
clears container_id/public_url/host_port in the DB, and returns the
stoppedContainers count. New apps/api/src/lib/docker.ts owns the stop logic.
Verified: takedown stopped container f5632962, port 4109 connection refused.
FIX B — Reject specEdit on fork
A hand-crafted POST /v1/servers with {templateId, previewId, specEdit} would
enter the spec-edit branch, merge edits into the cached spec, but the worker
reads the pre-built template code (separate cache key), ignoring the merged
spec entirely. User thinks they changed something; deployed container behaves
as the original. Now returns 400 spec_edit_forbidden_on_fork with an explainer
pointing to the Iterate flow.
FIX C — templateId validation via Redis fork-ref
templateId on POST /v1/servers was user-controlled and unvalidated:
fork_count of any template could be pumped, mcp_servers got garbage
template_id rows, takedown cascade would miss the bogus rows. Fork endpoint
now writes a Redis key fork-ref:<previewId> -> templateId (5min TTL).
Server-create requires the ref to exist AND match the submitted templateId.
Verified attack: fake templateId without fork-ref returns 410 fork_ref_expired.
DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH — Hardened static checks
Banned patterns (added):
Function\s*\(['"`] — Function('code')() form, no 'new' needed
\bimport\s*\( — dynamic import escapes bundle scope
\bsetTimeout\s*\(['"`] — setTimeout('code', ms) eval form
\bsetInterval\s*\(['"`]
\bfs\s*\.\s*(unlink|rmdir|rm)\b
\bprocess\s*\.\s*kill\b
you are now in (developer|jailbreak|dan) mode — extra jailbreak markers
Hardcoded-credential patterns (new — scanForLeakedSecrets):
sk-ant-(api|sid)… — Anthropic
sk-… — OpenAI
sk_(live|test)_… — Stripe
ghp_… — GitHub PAT
github_pat_… — GitHub fine-grained
xox[bpoasr]-… — Slack
AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16} — AWS
-----BEGIN…PRIVATE KEY----- — RSA / SSH / GPG
Triggered when a publisher pasted their key into the prompt and Claude
embedded it literally in the generated code. Publish-blocking.
Verified attack: smuggled 'Function("return 1")' into a build's
generated_code, attempted publish → 422 publish_blocked.
Slug regex tightened — fork + detail routes now require
^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,63}$ (was loose min(1).max(64) — letting through
'../admin', long strings, mixed case).
UI warning — Publish-as-template form now shows an amber callout listing
what's scanned and explicitly stating egress allowlisting is roadmap, not
enforced today (was misleading: the field was collected, never enforced).
TEMPLATE_SECURITY_AUDIT.md added — documents all 20 audited vectors with
severity, status, and rationale for what's deferred.
UI polish
globals.css — select/input/textarea/button get color-scheme: dark + custom
chevron + option styling so Chrome's native popdown stops rendering as a
white OS-themed widget on dark pages. The /templates category dropdown was
the immediate trigger; same rule applies system-wide.
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Marco Sadjadi
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8334de13a8 |
feat(marketplace): template publish + fork + voting/ranking + admin moderation
What this enables:
- A user builds an MCP server. If others would benefit, they click 'Publish as
template' on their server detail page. The spec + pre-rendered TypeScript
snapshot is preserved.
- Visitors browse /templates, filter by category, sort by trending/top/newest.
Each template card shows fork count + active deployment count as natural
manipulation-resistant popularity signal.
- /templates/[slug] shows the full plan: tool list with input schemas,
required-credential explanations (with 'how to get one' deep links), and a
collapsible code preview so users can audit before forking.
- Fork is one click → /servers/new?template=slug. The wizard skips Step 1 and
pre-fills Step 2 with the template's parsed spec. Forker only fills in their
own credentials. mcp_servers.template_id is recorded; template.fork_count is
bumped atomically. Each fork gets its own isolated container with its own
port, its own AES-256 secrets — the template author has zero visibility into
the fork's traffic or data.
- Admin /admin/templates moderation: verify quality templates (shows shield
badge in marketplace), hide low-effort ones, takedown anything malicious.
Takedowns cascade-pause every fork container — owners must re-deploy.
Why template+fork instead of shared-container:
- Shared containers would mean the publisher's quota + their secrets + their
logs are exposed to forkers. Bad ergonomics, bad security, bad ownership.
- Templates/forks decouple the spec (shared, vouched-for) from the runtime
(isolated per user). Network-effect moat without the trust collapse.
Why no 5-star voting in v1:
- Manipulation-anfällig, empty lists without adoption. We use fork count +
active deploys + verified badge. Trending algorithm:
score = (activeDeploys * 3 + forks) / sqrt(ageDays + 1)
Real signal, no brigading attack surface.
Backend:
- New schema: templates table (16 cols incl. tools_schema, generated_code,
required_secrets, allowedDomains, status enum, verified, fork_count).
- mcp_servers.template_id FK + idx for fork lookup.
- @bmm/types: SpecEdit unchanged, CreateServerInput accepts optional templateId.
- preview-cache.ts: new cachePrebuiltCode/loadPrebuiltCode for storing the
template's full rendered server.ts alongside the spec. Generator worker
detects this and skips the render step — uses the audited pre-built code
verbatim. Banned-pattern re-scan at publish time.
- routes/templates.ts: 5 public/auth routes + 2 admin routes. Banned-pattern
re-scan before publish. Slug auto-uniqued. forkCount atomic-increment via
SQL.
UI:
- /templates marketplace with trending/top/newest tabs, category filter, search.
Cards show forks + live count + author + verified badge.
- /templates/[slug] full detail with tools, credentials-with-hints, expandable
code preview, fork CTA, ownership + stats sidebar, 'forking is safe' explainer.
- /servers/new?template=slug — wizard auto-jumps to Step 2 with template spec
pre-filled, fork banner at top with link back to template.
- /servers/[id] new Publish tab with title, category, descriptions, per-secret
hint fields (description + howToGetUrl per UPPER_SNAKE_CASE key).
- /admin/templates moderation with verify/hide/takedown actions.
- Marketing nav now includes /templates.
Verified end-to-end:
- Published Echo Demo Template from marco@test.local's live server
- Marketplace lists it correctly with stats
- Detail page renders with all sections
- Fork CTA navigates to wizard with ?template= param
- Wizard skips Step 1, shows fork banner, pre-fills spec
- Build succeeds in ~10s (cached spec + prebuilt code path skips Claude AND
render), container live on :4109 with proper OAuth 401 → token → 200 flow
- DB: templates.fork_count=1, activeDeployments=1, mcp_servers.template_id
populated on the fork
- /admin/templates shows the new template with verify/hide/takedown controls
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