feat(crypto): envelope encryption + key rotation via admin panel
Closes structural weakness #4 from the audit (single global key, no rotation, no KMS path). Customer secrets now use envelope encryption with a real rotation story. Model: KEK — Key Encryption Key, 32 bytes from env (SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY). Never stored in the DB. Root of trust. DEK — Data Encryption Key, 32 random bytes we generate, stored in the new encryption_keys table *wrapped* (AES-256-GCM encrypted) with the KEK. Secrets are encrypted with the DEK. Schema: - encryption_keys (version, wrappedDek, active, rotatedBy, createdAt, retiredAt) - secrets.keyId — which DEK encrypted this row. NULL = legacy (KEK-direct, pre-envelope); decryptSecret handles both and the first rotation migrates legacy rows onto a DEK. crypto.ts (full rewrite): - ensureActiveKey() — boot-time, loads keys + creates v1 if none. Fail-closed: index.ts process.exit(1) if it throws — the API will not serve if encryption can't initialize. - encryptSecret() — encrypts with the active DEK, returns { value, keyId }. - decryptSecret(value, keyId) — DEK path or legacy KEK-direct path. - rotateKeys() — mints a fresh DEK, re-encrypts EVERY secret under it inside a single transaction (decrypt-old / encrypt-new per row), retires the old key, activates the new one. A partial failure is recoverable because every row carries its own keyId. - encryptionStatus() — active version, key history, secret + legacy counts. Admin: - GET /v1/admin/encryption — status - POST /v1/admin/encryption/rotate — triggers rotateKeys, audit-logged as admin.encryption.rotate with { newVersion, reEncrypted }. - /admin/encryption page — active-key/secret/legacy cards, Rotate button with confirm, key-history table, plain-English how-it-works. Added to admin nav. Verified end-to-end: - boot → encryption_keys v1 active, '[crypto] envelope encryption ready' - created a server with secret MY_API_KEY → stored ciphertext, keyId = v1 - POST rotate → { newVersion: 2, reEncrypted: 1 }; ciphertext changed, keyId now v2, v1 retired, v2 active. The decrypt-then-reencrypt round-trip succeeded (rotation throws otherwise) — the secret is provably recoverable. - admin UI renders the status + history correctly. Deferred, named honestly (not built this iteration): - worker reads secrets from the DB instead of the BullMQ job-data plaintext copy — would also remove plaintext secrets from Redis. Separate change with its own risk surface on the iterate/fork flows. - per-server secret-value rotation UI - audit_log hash-chaining (tamper-evidence) - rate limiting on auth endpoints
This commit is contained in:
parent
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commit
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@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import cookie from '@fastify/cookie';
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import websocket from '@fastify/websocket';
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import { seedAdmin } from '@bmm/auth';
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import { config } from './config.js';
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import { ensureActiveKey } from './lib/crypto.js';
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import { authRoutes } from './routes/auth.js';
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import { serverRoutes } from './routes/servers.js';
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import { oauthRoutes } from './routes/oauth.js';
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@ -26,6 +27,16 @@ await app.register(websocket, { options: { maxPayload: 1024 * 1024 } });
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app.get('/health', async () => ({ ok: true, ts: Date.now() }));
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// Fail-closed: initialize envelope encryption before serving any request that
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// could write a secret. If the encryption subsystem can't come up, don't run.
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try {
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await ensureActiveKey();
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app.log.info('[crypto] envelope encryption ready');
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} catch (err) {
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app.log.error({ err }, '[crypto] failed to initialize encryption — refusing to start');
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process.exit(1);
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}
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await app.register(authRoutes);
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await app.register(serverRoutes);
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await app.register(oauthRoutes);
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@ -1,30 +1,195 @@
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import crypto from 'node:crypto';
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import { count, createDb, desc, eq, encryptionKeys, secrets, sql } from '@bmm/db';
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import { config } from '../config.js';
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const ALGO = 'aes-256-gcm';
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const db = createDb();
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function getKey(): Buffer {
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const hex = config.SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY;
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const buf = Buffer.from(hex, 'hex');
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/**
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* Envelope encryption.
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*
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* KEK — Key Encryption Key. 32 bytes from env (SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY).
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* Never stored in the database. The root of trust.
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* DEK — Data Encryption Key. 32 random bytes, generated by us, stored in
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* the encryption_keys table *wrapped* (AES-256-GCM encrypted) with
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* the KEK. Secrets are encrypted with the DEK.
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*
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* Rotation mints a fresh DEK and re-encrypts every secret under it, so a
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* suspected DEK compromise is recoverable without ever touching the KEK.
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* Legacy secrets (keyId = null) were encrypted directly with the KEK before
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* envelope encryption existed; decryptSecret handles them, and the first
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* rotation migrates them onto a DEK.
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*/
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function getKEK(): Buffer {
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const buf = Buffer.from(config.SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, 'hex');
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if (buf.length !== 32) {
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throw new Error('SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY must be 32 bytes (64 hex chars)');
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}
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return buf;
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}
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export function encryptSecret(plaintext: string): string {
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// Low-level AES-256-GCM with an explicit key. Payload: iv.tag.ciphertext (base64).
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function aesEncrypt(key: Buffer, plaintext: string): string {
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const iv = crypto.randomBytes(12);
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const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv(ALGO, getKey(), iv);
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const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv(ALGO, key, iv);
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const enc = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, 'utf8'), cipher.final()]);
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const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
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return `${iv.toString('base64')}.${tag.toString('base64')}.${enc.toString('base64')}`;
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}
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export function decryptSecret(payload: string): string {
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function aesDecrypt(key: Buffer, payload: string): string {
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const [ivB64, tagB64, encB64] = payload.split('.');
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if (!ivB64 || !tagB64 || !encB64) throw new Error('malformed_secret_payload');
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const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(ALGO, getKey(), Buffer.from(ivB64, 'base64'));
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if (!ivB64 || !tagB64 || !encB64) throw new Error('malformed_ciphertext');
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const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(ALGO, key, Buffer.from(ivB64, 'base64'));
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decipher.setAuthTag(Buffer.from(tagB64, 'base64'));
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const dec = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(Buffer.from(encB64, 'base64')), decipher.final()]);
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return dec.toString('utf8');
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return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(Buffer.from(encB64, 'base64')), decipher.final()]).toString(
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'utf8',
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);
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}
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// In-memory DEK cache: encryption_keys.id -> raw 32-byte DEK.
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const dekCache = new Map<string, Buffer>();
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let activeKeyId: string | null = null;
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async function loadKeys(): Promise<void> {
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const rows = await db.select().from(encryptionKeys);
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const kek = getKEK();
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dekCache.clear();
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activeKeyId = null;
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for (const row of rows) {
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// wrappedDek decrypts to the base64 of the 32-byte DEK
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const dek = Buffer.from(aesDecrypt(kek, row.wrappedDek), 'base64');
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if (dek.length !== 32) throw new Error(`corrupt DEK for key version ${row.version}`);
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dekCache.set(row.id, dek);
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if (row.active) activeKeyId = row.id;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Boot-time: load existing keys and, if there is no active key yet, create
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* version 1. Must run before any encryptSecret call. Fail-closed: if this
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* throws, the API must not start.
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*/
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export async function ensureActiveKey(): Promise<void> {
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await loadKeys();
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if (activeKeyId) return;
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const dek = crypto.randomBytes(32);
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const wrapped = aesEncrypt(getKEK(), dek.toString('base64'));
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const [row] = await db
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.insert(encryptionKeys)
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.values({ version: 1, wrappedDek: wrapped, active: true })
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.returning();
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if (!row) throw new Error('failed to create initial encryption key');
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dekCache.set(row.id, dek);
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activeKeyId = row.id;
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}
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export interface EncryptResult {
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value: string;
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keyId: string;
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}
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export function encryptSecret(plaintext: string): EncryptResult {
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if (!activeKeyId) {
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throw new Error('encryption not initialized — ensureActiveKey() must run at boot');
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}
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const dek = dekCache.get(activeKeyId);
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if (!dek) throw new Error('active DEK missing from cache');
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return { value: aesEncrypt(dek, plaintext), keyId: activeKeyId };
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}
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export function decryptSecret(value: string, keyId: string | null): string {
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if (!keyId) {
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// Legacy: encrypted directly with the KEK before envelope encryption.
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return aesDecrypt(getKEK(), value);
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}
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const dek = dekCache.get(keyId);
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if (!dek) throw new Error(`unknown encryption key id: ${keyId}`);
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return aesDecrypt(dek, value);
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}
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export interface RotateResult {
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newVersion: number;
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reEncrypted: number;
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}
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/**
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* Mint a fresh DEK and re-encrypt every secret under it in a single
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* transaction. Legacy (KEK-direct) secrets are migrated in the same pass.
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*/
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export async function rotateKeys(rotatedBy: string): Promise<RotateResult> {
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await loadKeys();
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const newDek = crypto.randomBytes(32);
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const wrapped = aesEncrypt(getKEK(), newDek.toString('base64'));
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const [{ maxV } = { maxV: 0 }] = await db
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.select({ maxV: sql<number>`coalesce(max(${encryptionKeys.version}), 0)` })
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.from(encryptionKeys);
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const nextVersion = Number(maxV) + 1;
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const reEncrypted = await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
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const [newKey] = await tx
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.insert(encryptionKeys)
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.values({ version: nextVersion, wrappedDek: wrapped, active: false, rotatedBy })
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.returning();
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if (!newKey) throw new Error('failed to insert new encryption key');
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const all = await tx.select().from(secrets);
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for (const s of all) {
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const plain = decryptSecret(s.encryptedValue, s.keyId);
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await tx
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.update(secrets)
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.set({ encryptedValue: aesEncrypt(newDek, plain), keyId: newKey.id })
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.where(eq(secrets.id, s.id));
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}
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await tx
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.update(encryptionKeys)
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.set({ active: false, retiredAt: new Date() })
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.where(eq(encryptionKeys.active, true));
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await tx.update(encryptionKeys).set({ active: true }).where(eq(encryptionKeys.id, newKey.id));
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return { count: all.length, keyId: newKey.id };
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});
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// Commit succeeded — update the in-memory cache.
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dekCache.set(reEncrypted.keyId, newDek);
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activeKeyId = reEncrypted.keyId;
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return { newVersion: nextVersion, reEncrypted: reEncrypted.count };
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}
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export interface EncryptionStatus {
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activeVersion: number | null;
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keyCount: number;
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secretCount: number;
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legacySecretCount: number;
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keys: {
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version: number;
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active: boolean;
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createdAt: Date;
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retiredAt: Date | null;
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}[];
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}
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export async function encryptionStatus(): Promise<EncryptionStatus> {
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const keys = await db.select().from(encryptionKeys).orderBy(desc(encryptionKeys.version));
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const [{ c: secretCount } = { c: 0 }] = await db.select({ c: count() }).from(secrets);
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const [{ c: legacy } = { c: 0 }] = await db
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.select({ c: count() })
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.from(secrets)
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.where(sql`${secrets.keyId} is null`);
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return {
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activeVersion: keys.find((k) => k.active)?.version ?? null,
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keyCount: keys.length,
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secretCount: Number(secretCount),
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legacySecretCount: Number(legacy),
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keys: keys.map((k) => ({
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version: k.version,
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active: k.active,
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createdAt: k.createdAt,
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retiredAt: k.retiredAt,
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})),
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};
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}
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@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import { requireAdmin } from '../plugins/session.js';
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import { getRedis } from '../lib/redis.js';
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import { getBuildQueue } from '../lib/queue.js';
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import { audit } from '../lib/audit.js';
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import { encryptionStatus, rotateKeys } from '../lib/crypto.js';
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const db = createDb();
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@ -565,5 +566,28 @@ export async function adminRoutes(app: FastifyInstance): Promise<void> {
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return reply.send({ ok: true });
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});
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// ---- Encryption: status + key rotation ----
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app.get('/v1/admin/encryption', { preHandler: requireAdmin }, async (_req, reply) => {
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return reply.send(await encryptionStatus());
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});
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app.post('/v1/admin/encryption/rotate', { preHandler: requireAdmin }, async (req, reply) => {
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try {
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const result = await rotateKeys(req.user!.userId);
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await audit({
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orgId: req.user!.orgId,
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userId: req.user!.userId,
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action: 'admin.encryption.rotate',
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resourceType: 'encryption_key',
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metadata: { newVersion: result.newVersion, reEncrypted: result.reEncrypted },
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ipAddress: req.ip,
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});
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return reply.send({ ok: true, ...result });
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} catch (err) {
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app.log.error({ err }, 'encryption key rotation failed');
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return reply.code(500).send({ error: 'rotation_failed', detail: (err as Error).message });
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}
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});
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void inArray; // referenced for future bulk operations
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}
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@ -164,10 +164,12 @@ export async function serverRoutes(app: FastifyInstance): Promise<void> {
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for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(secretValues)) {
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if (!value) continue;
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const enc = encryptSecret(value);
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await db.insert(secrets).values({
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serverId: server.id,
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key,
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encryptedValue: encryptSecret(value),
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encryptedValue: enc.value,
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keyId: enc.keyId,
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});
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}
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178
apps/web/app/admin/encryption/page.tsx
Normal file
178
apps/web/app/admin/encryption/page.tsx
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@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
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'use client';
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import { useEffect, useState } from 'react';
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import { apiFetch } from '@/lib/api';
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import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button';
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import { cn } from '@/lib/cn';
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interface KeyRow {
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version: number;
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active: boolean;
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createdAt: string;
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retiredAt: string | null;
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}
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interface Status {
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activeVersion: number | null;
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keyCount: number;
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secretCount: number;
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legacySecretCount: number;
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keys: KeyRow[];
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}
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export default function AdminEncryptionPage() {
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const [status, setStatus] = useState<Status | null>(null);
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const [rotating, setRotating] = useState(false);
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const [message, setMessage] = useState<string | null>(null);
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async function reload() {
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setStatus(await apiFetch<Status>('/v1/admin/encryption'));
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}
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useEffect(() => {
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reload();
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}, []);
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async function rotate() {
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if (
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!confirm(
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'Rotate the encryption key?\n\nA fresh Data Encryption Key is generated and EVERY stored secret is re-encrypted under it in one transaction. The environment KEK is untouched. This is safe to run any time you suspect key compromise.',
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)
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) {
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return;
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}
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setRotating(true);
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setMessage(null);
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try {
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const r = await apiFetch<{ newVersion: number; reEncrypted: number }>(
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'/v1/admin/encryption/rotate',
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{ method: 'POST', body: '{}' },
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);
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setMessage(`Rotated to key v${r.newVersion} — ${r.reEncrypted} secret(s) re-encrypted.`);
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await reload();
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} catch (e) {
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const detail = (e as { detail?: { detail?: string; error?: string } }).detail;
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setMessage(`Rotation failed: ${detail?.detail ?? detail?.error ?? (e as Error).message}`);
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} finally {
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setRotating(false);
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}
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}
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return (
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<div className="px-8 py-8">
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<header className="mb-6">
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<h1 className="text-[22px] font-semibold tracking-tight">Encryption</h1>
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<p className="mt-1 text-[13px] text-[--color-fg-muted]">
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Envelope encryption for customer secrets. The KEK lives only in the environment;
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Data Encryption Keys are stored wrapped and rotated here.
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</p>
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</header>
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{!status && <div className="mono text-[12px] text-[--color-fg-muted]">Loading…</div>}
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{status && (
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<>
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<div className="grid gap-3 md:grid-cols-3">
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<Card label="Active key" value={status.activeVersion ? `v${status.activeVersion}` : '—'} />
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<Card label="Secrets encrypted" value={status.secretCount.toLocaleString()} />
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<Card
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label="Legacy (pre-envelope)"
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value={status.legacySecretCount.toLocaleString()}
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sub={
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status.legacySecretCount > 0
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? 'rotate once to migrate them onto a DEK'
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: 'all on a managed DEK'
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}
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/>
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</div>
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<div className="panel mt-6 p-4">
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<div className="flex items-baseline justify-between">
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<div>
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<h2 className="text-[14px] font-semibold tracking-tight">Rotate encryption key</h2>
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<p className="mt-1 text-[12.5px] leading-relaxed text-[--color-fg-muted]">
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Generates a new DEK and re-encrypts all {status.secretCount} secret(s) under it
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atomically. The environment KEK is never exposed or changed.
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</p>
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</div>
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<Button variant="primary" size="md" onClick={rotate} disabled={rotating}>
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{rotating ? 'Rotating…' : 'Rotate key'}
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</Button>
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</div>
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{message && (
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<p
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className={cn(
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'mt-3 text-[12.5px]',
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message.startsWith('Rotation failed')
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? 'text-[--color-danger]'
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: 'text-emerald-300',
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)}
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>
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{message}
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</p>
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)}
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</div>
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<div className="mt-6">
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<h2 className="text-[14px] font-semibold tracking-tight">Key history</h2>
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<div className="panel mt-3">
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<table className="w-full text-[12.5px]">
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<thead className="border-b border-[--color-border] text-[--color-fg-subtle]">
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<tr>
|
||||
<th className="px-4 py-2 text-left font-medium">Version</th>
|
||||
<th className="px-4 py-2 text-left font-medium">Status</th>
|
||||
<th className="px-4 py-2 text-left font-medium">Created</th>
|
||||
<th className="px-4 py-2 text-left font-medium">Retired</th>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
</thead>
|
||||
<tbody>
|
||||
{status.keys.map((k) => (
|
||||
<tr key={k.version} className="border-b border-[--color-border] last:border-0">
|
||||
<td className="px-4 py-2.5 mono">v{k.version}</td>
|
||||
<td className="px-4 py-2.5">
|
||||
<span
|
||||
className={cn(
|
||||
'mono rounded-full border px-2 py-0.5 text-[11px]',
|
||||
k.active
|
||||
? 'border-emerald-400/40 bg-emerald-400/10 text-emerald-300'
|
||||
: 'border-[--color-border] bg-[--color-bg-subtle] text-[--color-fg-subtle]',
|
||||
)}
|
||||
>
|
||||
{k.active ? 'active' : 'retired'}
|
||||
</span>
|
||||
</td>
|
||||
<td className="px-4 py-2.5 mono text-[--color-fg-muted]">
|
||||
{new Date(k.createdAt).toLocaleString()}
|
||||
</td>
|
||||
<td className="px-4 py-2.5 mono text-[--color-fg-muted]">
|
||||
{k.retiredAt ? new Date(k.retiredAt).toLocaleString() : '—'}
|
||||
</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
))}
|
||||
</tbody>
|
||||
</table>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<p className="mt-6 text-[11.5px] leading-relaxed text-[--color-fg-subtle]">
|
||||
How it works: a 32-byte Data Encryption Key (DEK) is generated, AES-256-GCM encrypted
|
||||
with the environment Key Encryption Key (KEK = SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY), and stored
|
||||
wrapped. Secrets are encrypted with the DEK. Rotation mints a fresh DEK, re-encrypts
|
||||
every secret, and retires the old one — recoverable from a suspected DEK compromise
|
||||
without ever touching the KEK.
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
</>
|
||||
)}
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function Card({ label, value, sub }: { label: string; value: string; sub?: string }) {
|
||||
return (
|
||||
<div className="panel p-4">
|
||||
<div className="text-[11px] uppercase tracking-wider text-[--color-fg-subtle]">{label}</div>
|
||||
<div className="mt-1.5 text-[24px] font-semibold tabular-nums tracking-tight">{value}</div>
|
||||
{sub && <div className="mt-1 text-[12px] text-[--color-fg-muted]">{sub}</div>}
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import {
|
||||
LogOut,
|
||||
ShieldAlert,
|
||||
Package,
|
||||
KeyRound,
|
||||
} from 'lucide-react';
|
||||
import { apiFetch } from '@/lib/api';
|
||||
import { cn } from '@/lib/cn';
|
||||
@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ const NAV: { href: string; label: string; icon: React.ComponentType<{ size?: num
|
||||
{ href: '/admin/builds', label: 'Builds', icon: Hammer },
|
||||
{ href: '/admin/audit', label: 'Audit log', icon: FileClock },
|
||||
{ href: '/admin/system', label: 'System health', icon: Activity },
|
||||
{ href: '/admin/encryption', label: 'Encryption', icon: KeyRound },
|
||||
{ href: '/admin/prompt', label: 'AI prompt', icon: Wand2 },
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -211,6 +211,20 @@ export const buildLogs = pgTable(
|
||||
}),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Envelope encryption: a Data Encryption Key (DEK) is generated, wrapped (itself
|
||||
// AES-256-GCM encrypted) with the Key Encryption Key (KEK) from the env, and
|
||||
// stored here. Secrets are encrypted with the DEK. Rotation mints a fresh DEK
|
||||
// and re-encrypts every secret — the KEK never leaves the environment.
|
||||
export const encryptionKeys = pgTable('encryption_keys', {
|
||||
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
|
||||
version: integer('version').notNull().unique(),
|
||||
wrappedDek: text('wrapped_dek').notNull(),
|
||||
active: boolean('active').default(false).notNull(),
|
||||
rotatedBy: uuid('rotated_by').references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'set null' }),
|
||||
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
|
||||
retiredAt: timestamp('retired_at'),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
export const secrets = pgTable('secrets', {
|
||||
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
|
||||
serverId: uuid('server_id')
|
||||
@ -218,6 +232,9 @@ export const secrets = pgTable('secrets', {
|
||||
.notNull(),
|
||||
key: varchar('key', { length: 128 }).notNull(),
|
||||
encryptedValue: text('encrypted_value').notNull(),
|
||||
// null = legacy (encrypted directly with the KEK, pre-envelope). Non-null
|
||||
// rows are encrypted with the referenced key's DEK.
|
||||
keyId: uuid('key_id').references(() => encryptionKeys.id),
|
||||
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@ -302,3 +319,4 @@ export type BuildLog = typeof buildLogs.$inferSelect;
|
||||
export type Secret = typeof secrets.$inferSelect;
|
||||
export type OAuthClient = typeof oauthClients.$inferSelect;
|
||||
export type Template = typeof templates.$inferSelect;
|
||||
export type EncryptionKey = typeof encryptionKeys.$inferSelect;
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user