buildmymcpserver/packages/llm/src/index.ts

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import Anthropic from '@anthropic-ai/sdk';
import { GeneratorSpec, type GeneratorSpec as GeneratorSpecT } from '@bmm/types';
export const SYSTEM_PROMPT = `You generate production-grade MCP server specifications as STRICT JSON.
Output ONE JSON object (no markdown, no prose, no code fences) with this exact shape:
{
"name": "human-readable server name (max 128 chars)",
"description": "1-2 sentence purpose",
"tools": [
{
"name": "snake_case_tool_name",
"description": "what the AI client sees — single sentence, clear",
"inputSchema": {
"param_name": { "type": "string|number|boolean|array|object", "description": "...", "required": true }
},
"implementation": "ASYNC TypeScript body. Receives {args} pre-validated. Must return MCP content blocks: { content: [{ type: 'text', text: '...' }] }. Use process.env.SECRET_NAME for secrets. NEVER use eval/Function/child_process. Use globalThis.fetch for HTTP. Wrap external calls in try/catch and return { content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'Error: ...' }], isError: true } on failure."
}
],
"resources": [],
"prompts": [],
"requiredSecrets": ["UPPER_SNAKE_CASE"],
"scopes": ["mcp:read"],
"dependencies": {}
}
Rules:
- Tools are idempotent unless the description explicitly says destructive.
- Validate all string inputs before use.
- For databases: parameterized queries only (use the 'pg' library with $1 placeholders).
- For HTTP APIs: globalThis.fetch with explicit timeout via AbortSignal.timeout(10000).
- Never hardcode credentials; declare them under requiredSecrets and read via process.env.
- Keep tool implementations under 5000 characters.
- Do not include "import" statements in implementations the runtime injects fetch, pg, etc.
Return JSON only. No explanation.`;
security: sovereign-audit Phase 2 fixes — trustProxy, Docker hardening, banned-pattern overhaul Five confirmed findings from the sovereign-audit pass, ordered by severity: Z3-001 CRITICAL — Fastify now trustProxy:true so req.ip resolves to the real visitor IP via X-Forwarded-For instead of always being the nginx / docker-bridge peer. Every per-IP rate-limit in the codebase was silently collapsed into one global counter; this restores them. Z1-001 CRITICAL — runner container hardening flags (--read-only, --cap-drop=ALL, --security-opt=no-new-privileges:true, --pids-limit=100, --memory=512m, --cpus=0.5, tmpfs /tmp) were sitting commented-out as a TODO despite /security promising them. Now applied unconditionally on production/staging; opt-out flag RUNNER_DISABLE_HARDENING=1 for Win-dev. Z2-001 + Z2-002 CRITICAL / MEDIUM — banned-pattern blacklist tightened (Function(...) without `new`, process.binding, process.dlopen, .constructor.constructor, _load, vm.runIn*Context, globalThis['..'], "system prompt override"). scanForInjection now also walks tool.name and every inputSchema property description, not only implementation + description — closes the prompt-injection-into-AI-client surface that downstream clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor) read verbatim. The duplicate BANNED_PATTERNS in apps/api/src/routes/servers.ts deleted in favour of the single shared scanForInjection export from @bmm/llm. Z4-001 HIGH — /v1/auth/magic-link gained the two-axis daily rate-limit the SMS endpoint already had: 10/IP/day + 5/email/day. Combined with the trustProxy fix above these are now real per-visitor limits. Z4-002 MEDIUM — magic-link callback URL no longer printed to stdout in production. In dev it still prints (so devs can click the link); in production we log only "issued, URL withheld" and a loud error if no email sender is wired (Resend integration is the actual launch blocker — left as a TODO). Z6-001 MEDIUM — /v1/builds/:id/stream WebSocket now refuses cross-origin upgrades. SameSite=Lax already mitigates in modern browsers; this is the defense-in-depth against browser bugs and non-browser clients. FALSE POSITIVES dismissed: slug path-traversal (schema regex ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$ in @bmm/types catches it); session-after-promote (getSession re-fetches isAdmin from DB on every request). DEFERRED (not blockers, tracked): - Z1-002 generated-server HTTPS — needs nginx wildcard subdomain TLS - Z1-003 docker image cleanup cron - Z2-001 v2 — real sandbox runtime (multi-week refactor) - Z3-002 rawBody-per-request memory — branch on webhook path only - Z5-001 multi-user org RBAC for billing — gated on Team feature - Email sender integration (Resend) — launch blocker Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:02:59 +02:00
// Regex blacklist — explicitly NOT a security boundary, just an early-warning
// for obviously-dangerous LLM output. The real defence is the Docker
// hardening in apps/generator/src/lib/deploy.ts (--cap-drop=ALL etc.). A
// determined attacker can bypass any of these with string concatenation
// (`'chi'+'ld_process'`) or alternate APIs — that's why container isolation
// has to hold even when this fails.
const BANNED_PATTERNS = [
/\beval\s*\(/,
/\bnew\s+Function\s*\(/,
security: sovereign-audit Phase 2 fixes — trustProxy, Docker hardening, banned-pattern overhaul Five confirmed findings from the sovereign-audit pass, ordered by severity: Z3-001 CRITICAL — Fastify now trustProxy:true so req.ip resolves to the real visitor IP via X-Forwarded-For instead of always being the nginx / docker-bridge peer. Every per-IP rate-limit in the codebase was silently collapsed into one global counter; this restores them. Z1-001 CRITICAL — runner container hardening flags (--read-only, --cap-drop=ALL, --security-opt=no-new-privileges:true, --pids-limit=100, --memory=512m, --cpus=0.5, tmpfs /tmp) were sitting commented-out as a TODO despite /security promising them. Now applied unconditionally on production/staging; opt-out flag RUNNER_DISABLE_HARDENING=1 for Win-dev. Z2-001 + Z2-002 CRITICAL / MEDIUM — banned-pattern blacklist tightened (Function(...) without `new`, process.binding, process.dlopen, .constructor.constructor, _load, vm.runIn*Context, globalThis['..'], "system prompt override"). scanForInjection now also walks tool.name and every inputSchema property description, not only implementation + description — closes the prompt-injection-into-AI-client surface that downstream clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor) read verbatim. The duplicate BANNED_PATTERNS in apps/api/src/routes/servers.ts deleted in favour of the single shared scanForInjection export from @bmm/llm. Z4-001 HIGH — /v1/auth/magic-link gained the two-axis daily rate-limit the SMS endpoint already had: 10/IP/day + 5/email/day. Combined with the trustProxy fix above these are now real per-visitor limits. Z4-002 MEDIUM — magic-link callback URL no longer printed to stdout in production. In dev it still prints (so devs can click the link); in production we log only "issued, URL withheld" and a loud error if no email sender is wired (Resend integration is the actual launch blocker — left as a TODO). Z6-001 MEDIUM — /v1/builds/:id/stream WebSocket now refuses cross-origin upgrades. SameSite=Lax already mitigates in modern browsers; this is the defense-in-depth against browser bugs and non-browser clients. FALSE POSITIVES dismissed: slug path-traversal (schema regex ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$ in @bmm/types catches it); session-after-promote (getSession re-fetches isAdmin from DB on every request). DEFERRED (not blockers, tracked): - Z1-002 generated-server HTTPS — needs nginx wildcard subdomain TLS - Z1-003 docker image cleanup cron - Z2-001 v2 — real sandbox runtime (multi-week refactor) - Z3-002 rawBody-per-request memory — branch on webhook path only - Z5-001 multi-user org RBAC for billing — gated on Team feature - Email sender integration (Resend) — launch blocker Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:02:59 +02:00
/\bFunction\s*\(\s*['"`]/, // Function('...') without `new`
/\brequire\s*\(\s*['"]child_process['"]/,
/\bchild_process\b/,
security: sovereign-audit Phase 2 fixes — trustProxy, Docker hardening, banned-pattern overhaul Five confirmed findings from the sovereign-audit pass, ordered by severity: Z3-001 CRITICAL — Fastify now trustProxy:true so req.ip resolves to the real visitor IP via X-Forwarded-For instead of always being the nginx / docker-bridge peer. Every per-IP rate-limit in the codebase was silently collapsed into one global counter; this restores them. Z1-001 CRITICAL — runner container hardening flags (--read-only, --cap-drop=ALL, --security-opt=no-new-privileges:true, --pids-limit=100, --memory=512m, --cpus=0.5, tmpfs /tmp) were sitting commented-out as a TODO despite /security promising them. Now applied unconditionally on production/staging; opt-out flag RUNNER_DISABLE_HARDENING=1 for Win-dev. Z2-001 + Z2-002 CRITICAL / MEDIUM — banned-pattern blacklist tightened (Function(...) without `new`, process.binding, process.dlopen, .constructor.constructor, _load, vm.runIn*Context, globalThis['..'], "system prompt override"). scanForInjection now also walks tool.name and every inputSchema property description, not only implementation + description — closes the prompt-injection-into-AI-client surface that downstream clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor) read verbatim. The duplicate BANNED_PATTERNS in apps/api/src/routes/servers.ts deleted in favour of the single shared scanForInjection export from @bmm/llm. Z4-001 HIGH — /v1/auth/magic-link gained the two-axis daily rate-limit the SMS endpoint already had: 10/IP/day + 5/email/day. Combined with the trustProxy fix above these are now real per-visitor limits. Z4-002 MEDIUM — magic-link callback URL no longer printed to stdout in production. In dev it still prints (so devs can click the link); in production we log only "issued, URL withheld" and a loud error if no email sender is wired (Resend integration is the actual launch blocker — left as a TODO). Z6-001 MEDIUM — /v1/builds/:id/stream WebSocket now refuses cross-origin upgrades. SameSite=Lax already mitigates in modern browsers; this is the defense-in-depth against browser bugs and non-browser clients. FALSE POSITIVES dismissed: slug path-traversal (schema regex ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$ in @bmm/types catches it); session-after-promote (getSession re-fetches isAdmin from DB on every request). DEFERRED (not blockers, tracked): - Z1-002 generated-server HTTPS — needs nginx wildcard subdomain TLS - Z1-003 docker image cleanup cron - Z2-001 v2 — real sandbox runtime (multi-week refactor) - Z3-002 rawBody-per-request memory — branch on webhook path only - Z5-001 multi-user org RBAC for billing — gated on Team feature - Email sender integration (Resend) — launch blocker Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:02:59 +02:00
/\bprocess\.binding\b/,
/\bprocess\.dlopen\b/,
/\.constructor\s*\.\s*constructor\b/, // [].constructor.constructor('...')
/\b_load\s*\(/,
/\bvm\.runIn(This|New)Context\b/,
/globalThis\s*\[\s*['"`]/, // globalThis['Fun'+'ction']
/ignore\s+previous\s+instructions/i,
/disregard\s+(the\s+)?(above|previous)/i,
security: sovereign-audit Phase 2 fixes — trustProxy, Docker hardening, banned-pattern overhaul Five confirmed findings from the sovereign-audit pass, ordered by severity: Z3-001 CRITICAL — Fastify now trustProxy:true so req.ip resolves to the real visitor IP via X-Forwarded-For instead of always being the nginx / docker-bridge peer. Every per-IP rate-limit in the codebase was silently collapsed into one global counter; this restores them. Z1-001 CRITICAL — runner container hardening flags (--read-only, --cap-drop=ALL, --security-opt=no-new-privileges:true, --pids-limit=100, --memory=512m, --cpus=0.5, tmpfs /tmp) were sitting commented-out as a TODO despite /security promising them. Now applied unconditionally on production/staging; opt-out flag RUNNER_DISABLE_HARDENING=1 for Win-dev. Z2-001 + Z2-002 CRITICAL / MEDIUM — banned-pattern blacklist tightened (Function(...) without `new`, process.binding, process.dlopen, .constructor.constructor, _load, vm.runIn*Context, globalThis['..'], "system prompt override"). scanForInjection now also walks tool.name and every inputSchema property description, not only implementation + description — closes the prompt-injection-into-AI-client surface that downstream clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor) read verbatim. The duplicate BANNED_PATTERNS in apps/api/src/routes/servers.ts deleted in favour of the single shared scanForInjection export from @bmm/llm. Z4-001 HIGH — /v1/auth/magic-link gained the two-axis daily rate-limit the SMS endpoint already had: 10/IP/day + 5/email/day. Combined with the trustProxy fix above these are now real per-visitor limits. Z4-002 MEDIUM — magic-link callback URL no longer printed to stdout in production. In dev it still prints (so devs can click the link); in production we log only "issued, URL withheld" and a loud error if no email sender is wired (Resend integration is the actual launch blocker — left as a TODO). Z6-001 MEDIUM — /v1/builds/:id/stream WebSocket now refuses cross-origin upgrades. SameSite=Lax already mitigates in modern browsers; this is the defense-in-depth against browser bugs and non-browser clients. FALSE POSITIVES dismissed: slug path-traversal (schema regex ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$ in @bmm/types catches it); session-after-promote (getSession re-fetches isAdmin from DB on every request). DEFERRED (not blockers, tracked): - Z1-002 generated-server HTTPS — needs nginx wildcard subdomain TLS - Z1-003 docker image cleanup cron - Z2-001 v2 — real sandbox runtime (multi-week refactor) - Z3-002 rawBody-per-request memory — branch on webhook path only - Z5-001 multi-user org RBAC for billing — gated on Team feature - Email sender integration (Resend) — launch blocker Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:02:59 +02:00
/system\s+prompt\s+override/i,
];
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Plan-aware model selection
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export type Plan = 'hobby' | 'pro' | 'team' | 'enterprise';
export type Purpose = 'preview' | 'build';
export type Provider = 'anthropic' | 'glm';
export type DisplayBadge = 'open-tier' | 'claude-haiku' | 'claude-sonnet' | 'claude-opus';
export interface ModelChoice {
provider: Provider;
model: string;
maxTokens: number;
timeoutMs: number;
/** User-facing model name shown in the wizard + previews. */
displayName: string;
displayBadge: DisplayBadge;
}
/**
* Preview runs synchronously inside an HTTP request behind Cloudflare's
* ~100s edge cap. Each tier's (model + max_tokens + timeout) is bounded to
* fit. Hobby uses GLM as the cost lever; paid tiers escalate to Claude the
* visible quality/speed jump *is* the upgrade pitch.
*
* Measured token rates: glm-4-plus ~58 tok/s (3500 tok 60s) ·
* Claude Haiku 4.5 ~200 tok/s (8192 tok 41s) · Claude Sonnet 4.6 ~80 tok/s.
*/
const PREVIEW_MODELS: Record<Plan, ModelChoice> = {
hobby: {
provider: 'glm',
model: 'glm-4-plus',
maxTokens: 3500,
timeoutMs: 65_000,
displayName: 'Open-tier AI',
displayBadge: 'open-tier',
},
pro: {
provider: 'anthropic',
model: 'claude-haiku-4-5-20251001',
maxTokens: 8192,
timeoutMs: 60_000,
displayName: 'Claude Haiku 4.5',
displayBadge: 'claude-haiku',
},
team: {
provider: 'anthropic',
model: 'claude-sonnet-4-6',
maxTokens: 8192,
timeoutMs: 60_000,
displayName: 'Claude Sonnet 4.6',
displayBadge: 'claude-sonnet',
},
enterprise: {
provider: 'anthropic',
model: 'claude-sonnet-4-6',
maxTokens: 8192,
timeoutMs: 60_000,
displayName: 'Claude Sonnet 4.6',
displayBadge: 'claude-sonnet',
},
};
/**
* Build worker runs async via BullMQ no proxy timeout. With the 24h preview
* cache TTL cache-misses are rare, so GLM as the default keeps that rare path
* cheap; Enterprise gets Opus as a premium-quality promise.
*/
const BUILD_MODELS: Record<Plan, ModelChoice> = {
hobby: {
provider: 'glm',
model: 'glm-4.5',
maxTokens: 8192,
timeoutMs: 180_000,
displayName: 'Open-tier AI',
displayBadge: 'open-tier',
},
pro: {
provider: 'glm',
model: 'glm-4.5',
maxTokens: 8192,
timeoutMs: 180_000,
displayName: 'Open-tier AI',
displayBadge: 'open-tier',
},
team: {
provider: 'glm',
model: 'glm-4.5',
maxTokens: 8192,
timeoutMs: 180_000,
displayName: 'Open-tier AI',
displayBadge: 'open-tier',
},
enterprise: {
provider: 'anthropic',
model: 'claude-opus-4-7',
maxTokens: 8192,
timeoutMs: 600_000,
displayName: 'Claude Opus 4.7',
displayBadge: 'claude-opus',
},
};
export function pickPreviewModel(plan: Plan): ModelChoice {
return PREVIEW_MODELS[plan];
}
export function pickBuildModel(plan: Plan): ModelChoice {
return BUILD_MODELS[plan];
}
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Generation API
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export interface GenerationResult {
spec: GeneratorSpecT;
source: 'claude' | 'glm' | 'mock';
}
export interface GenerateOptions {
/** 'anthropic' (default) or 'glm'. */
provider?: Provider;
/** Anthropic API key — required if provider === 'anthropic'. */
apiKey?: string;
/** Zhipu (GLM) API key — required if provider === 'glm'. */
glmApiKey?: string;
model?: string;
maxTokens?: number;
/** Per-attempt request timeout in ms. */
timeoutMs?: number;
/** SDK retry count. Anthropic only. */
maxRetries?: number;
}
export async function generateSpec(
prompt: string,
opts: GenerateOptions = {},
): Promise<GenerationResult> {
const provider = opts.provider ?? 'anthropic';
if (provider === 'glm') {
if (!opts.glmApiKey) return { spec: mockSpec(prompt), source: 'mock' };
return generateWithGlm(prompt, {
apiKey: opts.glmApiKey,
model: opts.model ?? 'glm-4-plus',
maxTokens: opts.maxTokens ?? 4096,
timeoutMs: opts.timeoutMs,
});
}
if (!opts.apiKey) {
return { spec: mockSpec(prompt), source: 'mock' };
}
return generateWithAnthropic(prompt, {
apiKey: opts.apiKey,
model: opts.model ?? 'claude-opus-4-7',
maxTokens: opts.maxTokens ?? 8192,
timeoutMs: opts.timeoutMs,
maxRetries: opts.maxRetries,
});
}
async function generateWithAnthropic(
prompt: string,
opts: {
apiKey: string;
model: string;
maxTokens: number;
timeoutMs?: number;
maxRetries?: number;
},
): Promise<GenerationResult> {
const client = new Anthropic({ apiKey: opts.apiKey });
const requestOptions: { timeout?: number; maxRetries?: number } = {};
if (opts.timeoutMs !== undefined) requestOptions.timeout = opts.timeoutMs;
if (opts.maxRetries !== undefined) requestOptions.maxRetries = opts.maxRetries;
const response = await client.messages
.create(
{
model: opts.model,
max_tokens: opts.maxTokens,
system: SYSTEM_PROMPT,
messages: [{ role: 'user', content: prompt }],
},
requestOptions,
)
.catch((err: unknown) => {
if (err instanceof Anthropic.APIConnectionTimeoutError) {
throw new SpecTimeoutError('spec generation exceeded the time budget');
}
throw err;
});
const text = response.content
.filter((b): b is { type: 'text'; text: string } => b.type === 'text')
.map((b) => b.text)
.join('');
const json = extractJson(text);
const parsed = GeneratorSpec.safeParse(json);
if (!parsed.success) throw new SpecValidationError(parsed.error.message);
scanForInjection(parsed.data);
return { spec: parsed.data, source: 'claude' };
}
const GLM_ENDPOINT = 'https://open.bigmodel.cn/api/paas/v4/chat/completions';
async function generateWithGlm(
prompt: string,
opts: { apiKey: string; model: string; maxTokens: number; timeoutMs?: number },
): Promise<GenerationResult> {
const controller = new AbortController();
const timer = opts.timeoutMs ? setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), opts.timeoutMs) : null;
let res: Response;
try {
res = await fetch(GLM_ENDPOINT, {
method: 'POST',
headers: {
Authorization: `Bearer ${opts.apiKey}`,
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
},
body: JSON.stringify({
model: opts.model,
max_tokens: opts.maxTokens,
messages: [
{ role: 'system', content: SYSTEM_PROMPT },
{ role: 'user', content: prompt },
],
}),
signal: controller.signal,
});
} catch (err) {
if ((err as { name?: string }).name === 'AbortError') {
throw new SpecTimeoutError('glm spec generation exceeded the time budget');
}
throw err;
} finally {
if (timer) clearTimeout(timer);
}
if (!res.ok) {
const body = await res.text().catch(() => '');
throw new Error(`glm_api_${res.status}: ${body.slice(0, 200)}`);
}
const data = (await res.json()) as {
choices?: Array<{ message?: { content?: string }; finish_reason?: string }>;
};
const content = data.choices?.[0]?.message?.content;
if (!content) throw new SpecValidationError('glm_empty_response');
const json = extractJson(content);
const parsed = GeneratorSpec.safeParse(json);
if (!parsed.success) throw new SpecValidationError(parsed.error.message);
scanForInjection(parsed.data);
return { spec: parsed.data, source: 'glm' };
}
export class SpecValidationError extends Error {
override readonly name = 'SpecValidationError';
}
export class BannedPatternError extends Error {
override readonly name = 'BannedPatternError';
}
export class SpecTimeoutError extends Error {
override readonly name = 'SpecTimeoutError';
}
function extractJson(text: string): unknown {
const trimmed = text.trim();
const fenced = trimmed.match(/```(?:json)?\s*([\s\S]*?)```/);
const body = fenced ? fenced[1] : trimmed;
if (!body) throw new SpecValidationError('empty_generation_output');
try {
return JSON.parse(body);
} catch (e) {
throw new SpecValidationError(`generation_not_json: ${(e as Error).message}`);
}
}
security: sovereign-audit Phase 2 fixes — trustProxy, Docker hardening, banned-pattern overhaul Five confirmed findings from the sovereign-audit pass, ordered by severity: Z3-001 CRITICAL — Fastify now trustProxy:true so req.ip resolves to the real visitor IP via X-Forwarded-For instead of always being the nginx / docker-bridge peer. Every per-IP rate-limit in the codebase was silently collapsed into one global counter; this restores them. Z1-001 CRITICAL — runner container hardening flags (--read-only, --cap-drop=ALL, --security-opt=no-new-privileges:true, --pids-limit=100, --memory=512m, --cpus=0.5, tmpfs /tmp) were sitting commented-out as a TODO despite /security promising them. Now applied unconditionally on production/staging; opt-out flag RUNNER_DISABLE_HARDENING=1 for Win-dev. Z2-001 + Z2-002 CRITICAL / MEDIUM — banned-pattern blacklist tightened (Function(...) without `new`, process.binding, process.dlopen, .constructor.constructor, _load, vm.runIn*Context, globalThis['..'], "system prompt override"). scanForInjection now also walks tool.name and every inputSchema property description, not only implementation + description — closes the prompt-injection-into-AI-client surface that downstream clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor) read verbatim. The duplicate BANNED_PATTERNS in apps/api/src/routes/servers.ts deleted in favour of the single shared scanForInjection export from @bmm/llm. Z4-001 HIGH — /v1/auth/magic-link gained the two-axis daily rate-limit the SMS endpoint already had: 10/IP/day + 5/email/day. Combined with the trustProxy fix above these are now real per-visitor limits. Z4-002 MEDIUM — magic-link callback URL no longer printed to stdout in production. In dev it still prints (so devs can click the link); in production we log only "issued, URL withheld" and a loud error if no email sender is wired (Resend integration is the actual launch blocker — left as a TODO). Z6-001 MEDIUM — /v1/builds/:id/stream WebSocket now refuses cross-origin upgrades. SameSite=Lax already mitigates in modern browsers; this is the defense-in-depth against browser bugs and non-browser clients. FALSE POSITIVES dismissed: slug path-traversal (schema regex ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$ in @bmm/types catches it); session-after-promote (getSession re-fetches isAdmin from DB on every request). DEFERRED (not blockers, tracked): - Z1-002 generated-server HTTPS — needs nginx wildcard subdomain TLS - Z1-003 docker image cleanup cron - Z2-001 v2 — real sandbox runtime (multi-week refactor) - Z3-002 rawBody-per-request memory — branch on webhook path only - Z5-001 multi-user org RBAC for billing — gated on Team feature - Email sender integration (Resend) — launch blocker Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:02:59 +02:00
/**
* Public so other layers (the spec-edit merge in apps/api) can re-scan a
* user-edited spec without duplicating the pattern list single source of
* truth for what counts as obviously-dangerous LLM output.
*/
export function scanForInjection(spec: GeneratorSpecT): void {
for (const tool of spec.tools) {
security: sovereign-audit Phase 2 fixes — trustProxy, Docker hardening, banned-pattern overhaul Five confirmed findings from the sovereign-audit pass, ordered by severity: Z3-001 CRITICAL — Fastify now trustProxy:true so req.ip resolves to the real visitor IP via X-Forwarded-For instead of always being the nginx / docker-bridge peer. Every per-IP rate-limit in the codebase was silently collapsed into one global counter; this restores them. Z1-001 CRITICAL — runner container hardening flags (--read-only, --cap-drop=ALL, --security-opt=no-new-privileges:true, --pids-limit=100, --memory=512m, --cpus=0.5, tmpfs /tmp) were sitting commented-out as a TODO despite /security promising them. Now applied unconditionally on production/staging; opt-out flag RUNNER_DISABLE_HARDENING=1 for Win-dev. Z2-001 + Z2-002 CRITICAL / MEDIUM — banned-pattern blacklist tightened (Function(...) without `new`, process.binding, process.dlopen, .constructor.constructor, _load, vm.runIn*Context, globalThis['..'], "system prompt override"). scanForInjection now also walks tool.name and every inputSchema property description, not only implementation + description — closes the prompt-injection-into-AI-client surface that downstream clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor) read verbatim. The duplicate BANNED_PATTERNS in apps/api/src/routes/servers.ts deleted in favour of the single shared scanForInjection export from @bmm/llm. Z4-001 HIGH — /v1/auth/magic-link gained the two-axis daily rate-limit the SMS endpoint already had: 10/IP/day + 5/email/day. Combined with the trustProxy fix above these are now real per-visitor limits. Z4-002 MEDIUM — magic-link callback URL no longer printed to stdout in production. In dev it still prints (so devs can click the link); in production we log only "issued, URL withheld" and a loud error if no email sender is wired (Resend integration is the actual launch blocker — left as a TODO). Z6-001 MEDIUM — /v1/builds/:id/stream WebSocket now refuses cross-origin upgrades. SameSite=Lax already mitigates in modern browsers; this is the defense-in-depth against browser bugs and non-browser clients. FALSE POSITIVES dismissed: slug path-traversal (schema regex ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$ in @bmm/types catches it); session-after-promote (getSession re-fetches isAdmin from DB on every request). DEFERRED (not blockers, tracked): - Z1-002 generated-server HTTPS — needs nginx wildcard subdomain TLS - Z1-003 docker image cleanup cron - Z2-001 v2 — real sandbox runtime (multi-week refactor) - Z3-002 rawBody-per-request memory — branch on webhook path only - Z5-001 multi-user org RBAC for billing — gated on Team feature - Email sender integration (Resend) — launch blocker Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:02:59 +02:00
// Collect every string the LLM could have planted a payload in. Downstream
// AI clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor) read tool.name + every inputSchema
// description verbatim, so an injection there can pivot the user's AI
// session — not only the runtime code.
const surfaces: string[] = [tool.name, tool.description, tool.implementation];
for (const param of Object.values(tool.inputSchema)) {
if (param && typeof param === 'object' && 'description' in param) {
const d = (param as { description?: unknown }).description;
if (typeof d === 'string') surfaces.push(d);
}
}
for (const text of surfaces) {
for (const pattern of BANNED_PATTERNS) {
if (pattern.test(text)) {
throw new BannedPatternError(`banned_pattern_detected: ${pattern.source}`);
}
}
}
}
}
export function mockSpec(prompt: string): GeneratorSpecT {
return {
name: 'Echo MCP',
description: `Mock server (no LLM key). Prompt was: ${prompt.slice(0, 200)}`,
tools: [
{
name: 'echo',
description: 'Echoes the input string back to the caller.',
inputSchema: {
message: { type: 'string', description: 'Message to echo back', required: true },
},
implementation: `const msg = String(args.message ?? '');\nreturn { content: [{ type: 'text', text: \`echo: \${msg}\` }] };`,
},
{
name: 'now',
description: 'Returns the current server UTC timestamp.',
inputSchema: {},
implementation: `return { content: [{ type: 'text', text: new Date().toISOString() }] };`,
},
],
resources: [],
prompts: [],
requiredSecrets: [],
scopes: ['mcp:read'],
dependencies: {},
};
}