buildmymcpserver/packages/db/src/schema.ts

323 lines
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import {
bigint,
boolean,
index,
integer,
jsonb,
pgEnum,
pgTable,
text,
timestamp,
uuid,
varchar,
} from 'drizzle-orm/pg-core';
export const planEnum = pgEnum('plan', ['hobby', 'pro', 'team', 'enterprise']);
export const serverStatusEnum = pgEnum('server_status', [
'draft',
'queued',
'generating',
'building',
'deploying',
'live',
'failed',
'paused',
]);
export const buildStatusEnum = pgEnum('build_status', [
'queued',
'generating',
'building',
'deploying',
'success',
'failed',
'cancelled',
]);
export const organizations = pgTable('organizations', {
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
slug: varchar('slug', { length: 64 }).notNull().unique(),
name: varchar('name', { length: 128 }).notNull(),
plan: planEnum('plan').default('hobby').notNull(),
stripeCustomerId: varchar('stripe_customer_id', { length: 128 }),
stripeSubscriptionId: varchar('stripe_subscription_id', { length: 128 }),
monthlyCallQuota: bigint('monthly_call_quota', { mode: 'number' }).default(100_000).notNull(),
callsThisPeriod: bigint('calls_this_period', { mode: 'number' }).default(0).notNull(),
periodStartsAt: timestamp('period_starts_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
suspended: boolean('suspended').default(false).notNull(),
suspendedReason: text('suspended_reason'),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
});
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
export const adminSettings = pgTable('admin_settings', {
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
key: varchar('key', { length: 64 }).notNull().unique(),
value: text('value'),
updatedBy: uuid('updated_by').references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'set null' }),
updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
});
feat(marketplace): template publish + fork + voting/ranking + admin moderation What this enables: - A user builds an MCP server. If others would benefit, they click 'Publish as template' on their server detail page. The spec + pre-rendered TypeScript snapshot is preserved. - Visitors browse /templates, filter by category, sort by trending/top/newest. Each template card shows fork count + active deployment count as natural manipulation-resistant popularity signal. - /templates/[slug] shows the full plan: tool list with input schemas, required-credential explanations (with 'how to get one' deep links), and a collapsible code preview so users can audit before forking. - Fork is one click → /servers/new?template=slug. The wizard skips Step 1 and pre-fills Step 2 with the template's parsed spec. Forker only fills in their own credentials. mcp_servers.template_id is recorded; template.fork_count is bumped atomically. Each fork gets its own isolated container with its own port, its own AES-256 secrets — the template author has zero visibility into the fork's traffic or data. - Admin /admin/templates moderation: verify quality templates (shows shield badge in marketplace), hide low-effort ones, takedown anything malicious. Takedowns cascade-pause every fork container — owners must re-deploy. Why template+fork instead of shared-container: - Shared containers would mean the publisher's quota + their secrets + their logs are exposed to forkers. Bad ergonomics, bad security, bad ownership. - Templates/forks decouple the spec (shared, vouched-for) from the runtime (isolated per user). Network-effect moat without the trust collapse. Why no 5-star voting in v1: - Manipulation-anfällig, empty lists without adoption. We use fork count + active deploys + verified badge. Trending algorithm: score = (activeDeploys * 3 + forks) / sqrt(ageDays + 1) Real signal, no brigading attack surface. Backend: - New schema: templates table (16 cols incl. tools_schema, generated_code, required_secrets, allowedDomains, status enum, verified, fork_count). - mcp_servers.template_id FK + idx for fork lookup. - @bmm/types: SpecEdit unchanged, CreateServerInput accepts optional templateId. - preview-cache.ts: new cachePrebuiltCode/loadPrebuiltCode for storing the template's full rendered server.ts alongside the spec. Generator worker detects this and skips the render step — uses the audited pre-built code verbatim. Banned-pattern re-scan at publish time. - routes/templates.ts: 5 public/auth routes + 2 admin routes. Banned-pattern re-scan before publish. Slug auto-uniqued. forkCount atomic-increment via SQL. UI: - /templates marketplace with trending/top/newest tabs, category filter, search. Cards show forks + live count + author + verified badge. - /templates/[slug] full detail with tools, credentials-with-hints, expandable code preview, fork CTA, ownership + stats sidebar, 'forking is safe' explainer. - /servers/new?template=slug — wizard auto-jumps to Step 2 with template spec pre-filled, fork banner at top with link back to template. - /servers/[id] new Publish tab with title, category, descriptions, per-secret hint fields (description + howToGetUrl per UPPER_SNAKE_CASE key). - /admin/templates moderation with verify/hide/takedown actions. - Marketing nav now includes /templates. Verified end-to-end: - Published Echo Demo Template from marco@test.local's live server - Marketplace lists it correctly with stats - Detail page renders with all sections - Fork CTA navigates to wizard with ?template= param - Wizard skips Step 1, shows fork banner, pre-fills spec - Build succeeds in ~10s (cached spec + prebuilt code path skips Claude AND render), container live on :4109 with proper OAuth 401 → token → 200 flow - DB: templates.fork_count=1, activeDeployments=1, mcp_servers.template_id populated on the fork - /admin/templates shows the new template with verify/hide/takedown controls
2026-05-19 23:22:35 +02:00
export const templateStatusEnum = pgEnum('template_status', [
'draft',
'public',
'hidden',
'takedown',
]);
export const templates = pgTable(
'templates',
{
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
ownerUserId: uuid('owner_user_id').references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'set null' }),
ownerOrgId: uuid('owner_org_id').references(() => organizations.id, { onDelete: 'set null' }),
sourceServerId: uuid('source_server_id'),
slug: varchar('slug', { length: 64 }).notNull().unique(),
title: varchar('title', { length: 128 }).notNull(),
shortDescription: varchar('short_description', { length: 280 }).notNull(),
longDescription: text('long_description'),
category: varchar('category', { length: 64 }).notNull(),
toolsSchema: jsonb('tools_schema').notNull(),
generatedCode: text('generated_code').notNull(),
requiredSecrets: jsonb('required_secrets').notNull(),
scopes: jsonb('scopes').notNull(),
allowedDomains: jsonb('allowed_domains'),
status: templateStatusEnum('status').default('public').notNull(),
verified: boolean('verified').default(false).notNull(),
takedownReason: text('takedown_reason'),
forkCount: integer('fork_count').default(0).notNull(),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
},
(t) => ({
statusIdx: index('idx_templates_status').on(t.status, t.createdAt),
categoryIdx: index('idx_templates_category').on(t.category),
}),
);
export const users = pgTable('users', {
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
email: varchar('email', { length: 255 }).notNull().unique(),
name: varchar('name', { length: 128 }),
avatarUrl: text('avatar_url'),
emailVerified: boolean('email_verified').default(false).notNull(),
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
isAdmin: boolean('is_admin').default(false).notNull(),
passwordHash: text('password_hash'),
lastLoginAt: timestamp('last_login_at'),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
});
export const sessions = pgTable(
'sessions',
{
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
userId: uuid('user_id')
.references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' })
.notNull(),
tokenHash: text('token_hash').notNull().unique(),
expiresAt: timestamp('expires_at').notNull(),
ipAddress: varchar('ip_address', { length: 64 }),
userAgent: text('user_agent'),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
},
(t) => ({
userIdx: index('idx_sessions_user').on(t.userId),
}),
);
export const magicLinks = pgTable('magic_links', {
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
email: varchar('email', { length: 255 }).notNull(),
tokenHash: text('token_hash').notNull().unique(),
expiresAt: timestamp('expires_at').notNull(),
consumedAt: timestamp('consumed_at'),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
});
export const memberships = pgTable('memberships', {
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
orgId: uuid('org_id')
.references(() => organizations.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' })
.notNull(),
userId: uuid('user_id')
.references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' })
.notNull(),
role: varchar('role', { length: 32 }).default('owner').notNull(),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
});
export const mcpServers = pgTable(
'mcp_servers',
{
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
orgId: uuid('org_id')
.references(() => organizations.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' })
.notNull(),
slug: varchar('slug', { length: 64 }).notNull(),
name: varchar('name', { length: 128 }).notNull(),
description: text('description'),
status: serverStatusEnum('status').default('draft').notNull(),
currentVersion: integer('current_version').default(0).notNull(),
containerId: varchar('container_id', { length: 128 }),
hostPort: integer('host_port'),
publicUrl: text('public_url'),
toolsSchema: jsonb('tools_schema'),
oauthEnabled: boolean('oauth_enabled').default(true).notNull(),
feat(marketplace): template publish + fork + voting/ranking + admin moderation What this enables: - A user builds an MCP server. If others would benefit, they click 'Publish as template' on their server detail page. The spec + pre-rendered TypeScript snapshot is preserved. - Visitors browse /templates, filter by category, sort by trending/top/newest. Each template card shows fork count + active deployment count as natural manipulation-resistant popularity signal. - /templates/[slug] shows the full plan: tool list with input schemas, required-credential explanations (with 'how to get one' deep links), and a collapsible code preview so users can audit before forking. - Fork is one click → /servers/new?template=slug. The wizard skips Step 1 and pre-fills Step 2 with the template's parsed spec. Forker only fills in their own credentials. mcp_servers.template_id is recorded; template.fork_count is bumped atomically. Each fork gets its own isolated container with its own port, its own AES-256 secrets — the template author has zero visibility into the fork's traffic or data. - Admin /admin/templates moderation: verify quality templates (shows shield badge in marketplace), hide low-effort ones, takedown anything malicious. Takedowns cascade-pause every fork container — owners must re-deploy. Why template+fork instead of shared-container: - Shared containers would mean the publisher's quota + their secrets + their logs are exposed to forkers. Bad ergonomics, bad security, bad ownership. - Templates/forks decouple the spec (shared, vouched-for) from the runtime (isolated per user). Network-effect moat without the trust collapse. Why no 5-star voting in v1: - Manipulation-anfällig, empty lists without adoption. We use fork count + active deploys + verified badge. Trending algorithm: score = (activeDeploys * 3 + forks) / sqrt(ageDays + 1) Real signal, no brigading attack surface. Backend: - New schema: templates table (16 cols incl. tools_schema, generated_code, required_secrets, allowedDomains, status enum, verified, fork_count). - mcp_servers.template_id FK + idx for fork lookup. - @bmm/types: SpecEdit unchanged, CreateServerInput accepts optional templateId. - preview-cache.ts: new cachePrebuiltCode/loadPrebuiltCode for storing the template's full rendered server.ts alongside the spec. Generator worker detects this and skips the render step — uses the audited pre-built code verbatim. Banned-pattern re-scan at publish time. - routes/templates.ts: 5 public/auth routes + 2 admin routes. Banned-pattern re-scan before publish. Slug auto-uniqued. forkCount atomic-increment via SQL. UI: - /templates marketplace with trending/top/newest tabs, category filter, search. Cards show forks + live count + author + verified badge. - /templates/[slug] full detail with tools, credentials-with-hints, expandable code preview, fork CTA, ownership + stats sidebar, 'forking is safe' explainer. - /servers/new?template=slug — wizard auto-jumps to Step 2 with template spec pre-filled, fork banner at top with link back to template. - /servers/[id] new Publish tab with title, category, descriptions, per-secret hint fields (description + howToGetUrl per UPPER_SNAKE_CASE key). - /admin/templates moderation with verify/hide/takedown actions. - Marketing nav now includes /templates. Verified end-to-end: - Published Echo Demo Template from marco@test.local's live server - Marketplace lists it correctly with stats - Detail page renders with all sections - Fork CTA navigates to wizard with ?template= param - Wizard skips Step 1, shows fork banner, pre-fills spec - Build succeeds in ~10s (cached spec + prebuilt code path skips Claude AND render), container live on :4109 with proper OAuth 401 → token → 200 flow - DB: templates.fork_count=1, activeDeployments=1, mcp_servers.template_id populated on the fork - /admin/templates shows the new template with verify/hide/takedown controls
2026-05-19 23:22:35 +02:00
templateId: uuid('template_id'),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
},
(t) => ({
orgSlugIdx: index('idx_servers_org_slug').on(t.orgId, t.slug),
feat(marketplace): template publish + fork + voting/ranking + admin moderation What this enables: - A user builds an MCP server. If others would benefit, they click 'Publish as template' on their server detail page. The spec + pre-rendered TypeScript snapshot is preserved. - Visitors browse /templates, filter by category, sort by trending/top/newest. Each template card shows fork count + active deployment count as natural manipulation-resistant popularity signal. - /templates/[slug] shows the full plan: tool list with input schemas, required-credential explanations (with 'how to get one' deep links), and a collapsible code preview so users can audit before forking. - Fork is one click → /servers/new?template=slug. The wizard skips Step 1 and pre-fills Step 2 with the template's parsed spec. Forker only fills in their own credentials. mcp_servers.template_id is recorded; template.fork_count is bumped atomically. Each fork gets its own isolated container with its own port, its own AES-256 secrets — the template author has zero visibility into the fork's traffic or data. - Admin /admin/templates moderation: verify quality templates (shows shield badge in marketplace), hide low-effort ones, takedown anything malicious. Takedowns cascade-pause every fork container — owners must re-deploy. Why template+fork instead of shared-container: - Shared containers would mean the publisher's quota + their secrets + their logs are exposed to forkers. Bad ergonomics, bad security, bad ownership. - Templates/forks decouple the spec (shared, vouched-for) from the runtime (isolated per user). Network-effect moat without the trust collapse. Why no 5-star voting in v1: - Manipulation-anfällig, empty lists without adoption. We use fork count + active deploys + verified badge. Trending algorithm: score = (activeDeploys * 3 + forks) / sqrt(ageDays + 1) Real signal, no brigading attack surface. Backend: - New schema: templates table (16 cols incl. tools_schema, generated_code, required_secrets, allowedDomains, status enum, verified, fork_count). - mcp_servers.template_id FK + idx for fork lookup. - @bmm/types: SpecEdit unchanged, CreateServerInput accepts optional templateId. - preview-cache.ts: new cachePrebuiltCode/loadPrebuiltCode for storing the template's full rendered server.ts alongside the spec. Generator worker detects this and skips the render step — uses the audited pre-built code verbatim. Banned-pattern re-scan at publish time. - routes/templates.ts: 5 public/auth routes + 2 admin routes. Banned-pattern re-scan before publish. Slug auto-uniqued. forkCount atomic-increment via SQL. UI: - /templates marketplace with trending/top/newest tabs, category filter, search. Cards show forks + live count + author + verified badge. - /templates/[slug] full detail with tools, credentials-with-hints, expandable code preview, fork CTA, ownership + stats sidebar, 'forking is safe' explainer. - /servers/new?template=slug — wizard auto-jumps to Step 2 with template spec pre-filled, fork banner at top with link back to template. - /servers/[id] new Publish tab with title, category, descriptions, per-secret hint fields (description + howToGetUrl per UPPER_SNAKE_CASE key). - /admin/templates moderation with verify/hide/takedown actions. - Marketing nav now includes /templates. Verified end-to-end: - Published Echo Demo Template from marco@test.local's live server - Marketplace lists it correctly with stats - Detail page renders with all sections - Fork CTA navigates to wizard with ?template= param - Wizard skips Step 1, shows fork banner, pre-fills spec - Build succeeds in ~10s (cached spec + prebuilt code path skips Claude AND render), container live on :4109 with proper OAuth 401 → token → 200 flow - DB: templates.fork_count=1, activeDeployments=1, mcp_servers.template_id populated on the fork - /admin/templates shows the new template with verify/hide/takedown controls
2026-05-19 23:22:35 +02:00
templateIdx: index('idx_servers_template').on(t.templateId),
}),
);
export const builds = pgTable(
'builds',
{
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
serverId: uuid('server_id')
.references(() => mcpServers.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' })
.notNull(),
version: integer('version').notNull(),
prompt: text('prompt').notNull(),
generatedSpec: jsonb('generated_spec'),
generatedCode: text('generated_code'),
status: buildStatusEnum('status').default('queued').notNull(),
errorMessage: text('error_message'),
startedAt: timestamp('started_at'),
finishedAt: timestamp('finished_at'),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
},
(t) => ({
serverIdx: index('idx_builds_server').on(t.serverId),
}),
);
export const buildLogs = pgTable(
'build_logs',
{
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
buildId: uuid('build_id')
.references(() => builds.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' })
.notNull(),
level: varchar('level', { length: 16 }).default('info').notNull(),
message: text('message').notNull(),
timestamp: timestamp('timestamp').defaultNow().notNull(),
},
(t) => ({
buildIdx: index('idx_logs_build').on(t.buildId, t.timestamp),
}),
);
feat(crypto): envelope encryption + key rotation via admin panel Closes structural weakness #4 from the audit (single global key, no rotation, no KMS path). Customer secrets now use envelope encryption with a real rotation story. Model: KEK — Key Encryption Key, 32 bytes from env (SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY). Never stored in the DB. Root of trust. DEK — Data Encryption Key, 32 random bytes we generate, stored in the new encryption_keys table *wrapped* (AES-256-GCM encrypted) with the KEK. Secrets are encrypted with the DEK. Schema: - encryption_keys (version, wrappedDek, active, rotatedBy, createdAt, retiredAt) - secrets.keyId — which DEK encrypted this row. NULL = legacy (KEK-direct, pre-envelope); decryptSecret handles both and the first rotation migrates legacy rows onto a DEK. crypto.ts (full rewrite): - ensureActiveKey() — boot-time, loads keys + creates v1 if none. Fail-closed: index.ts process.exit(1) if it throws — the API will not serve if encryption can't initialize. - encryptSecret() — encrypts with the active DEK, returns { value, keyId }. - decryptSecret(value, keyId) — DEK path or legacy KEK-direct path. - rotateKeys() — mints a fresh DEK, re-encrypts EVERY secret under it inside a single transaction (decrypt-old / encrypt-new per row), retires the old key, activates the new one. A partial failure is recoverable because every row carries its own keyId. - encryptionStatus() — active version, key history, secret + legacy counts. Admin: - GET /v1/admin/encryption — status - POST /v1/admin/encryption/rotate — triggers rotateKeys, audit-logged as admin.encryption.rotate with { newVersion, reEncrypted }. - /admin/encryption page — active-key/secret/legacy cards, Rotate button with confirm, key-history table, plain-English how-it-works. Added to admin nav. Verified end-to-end: - boot → encryption_keys v1 active, '[crypto] envelope encryption ready' - created a server with secret MY_API_KEY → stored ciphertext, keyId = v1 - POST rotate → { newVersion: 2, reEncrypted: 1 }; ciphertext changed, keyId now v2, v1 retired, v2 active. The decrypt-then-reencrypt round-trip succeeded (rotation throws otherwise) — the secret is provably recoverable. - admin UI renders the status + history correctly. Deferred, named honestly (not built this iteration): - worker reads secrets from the DB instead of the BullMQ job-data plaintext copy — would also remove plaintext secrets from Redis. Separate change with its own risk surface on the iterate/fork flows. - per-server secret-value rotation UI - audit_log hash-chaining (tamper-evidence) - rate limiting on auth endpoints
2026-05-20 22:36:08 +02:00
// Envelope encryption: a Data Encryption Key (DEK) is generated, wrapped (itself
// AES-256-GCM encrypted) with the Key Encryption Key (KEK) from the env, and
// stored here. Secrets are encrypted with the DEK. Rotation mints a fresh DEK
// and re-encrypts every secret — the KEK never leaves the environment.
export const encryptionKeys = pgTable('encryption_keys', {
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
version: integer('version').notNull().unique(),
wrappedDek: text('wrapped_dek').notNull(),
active: boolean('active').default(false).notNull(),
rotatedBy: uuid('rotated_by').references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'set null' }),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
retiredAt: timestamp('retired_at'),
});
export const secrets = pgTable('secrets', {
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
serverId: uuid('server_id')
.references(() => mcpServers.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' })
.notNull(),
key: varchar('key', { length: 128 }).notNull(),
encryptedValue: text('encrypted_value').notNull(),
feat(crypto): envelope encryption + key rotation via admin panel Closes structural weakness #4 from the audit (single global key, no rotation, no KMS path). Customer secrets now use envelope encryption with a real rotation story. Model: KEK — Key Encryption Key, 32 bytes from env (SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY). Never stored in the DB. Root of trust. DEK — Data Encryption Key, 32 random bytes we generate, stored in the new encryption_keys table *wrapped* (AES-256-GCM encrypted) with the KEK. Secrets are encrypted with the DEK. Schema: - encryption_keys (version, wrappedDek, active, rotatedBy, createdAt, retiredAt) - secrets.keyId — which DEK encrypted this row. NULL = legacy (KEK-direct, pre-envelope); decryptSecret handles both and the first rotation migrates legacy rows onto a DEK. crypto.ts (full rewrite): - ensureActiveKey() — boot-time, loads keys + creates v1 if none. Fail-closed: index.ts process.exit(1) if it throws — the API will not serve if encryption can't initialize. - encryptSecret() — encrypts with the active DEK, returns { value, keyId }. - decryptSecret(value, keyId) — DEK path or legacy KEK-direct path. - rotateKeys() — mints a fresh DEK, re-encrypts EVERY secret under it inside a single transaction (decrypt-old / encrypt-new per row), retires the old key, activates the new one. A partial failure is recoverable because every row carries its own keyId. - encryptionStatus() — active version, key history, secret + legacy counts. Admin: - GET /v1/admin/encryption — status - POST /v1/admin/encryption/rotate — triggers rotateKeys, audit-logged as admin.encryption.rotate with { newVersion, reEncrypted }. - /admin/encryption page — active-key/secret/legacy cards, Rotate button with confirm, key-history table, plain-English how-it-works. Added to admin nav. Verified end-to-end: - boot → encryption_keys v1 active, '[crypto] envelope encryption ready' - created a server with secret MY_API_KEY → stored ciphertext, keyId = v1 - POST rotate → { newVersion: 2, reEncrypted: 1 }; ciphertext changed, keyId now v2, v1 retired, v2 active. The decrypt-then-reencrypt round-trip succeeded (rotation throws otherwise) — the secret is provably recoverable. - admin UI renders the status + history correctly. Deferred, named honestly (not built this iteration): - worker reads secrets from the DB instead of the BullMQ job-data plaintext copy — would also remove plaintext secrets from Redis. Separate change with its own risk surface on the iterate/fork flows. - per-server secret-value rotation UI - audit_log hash-chaining (tamper-evidence) - rate limiting on auth endpoints
2026-05-20 22:36:08 +02:00
// null = legacy (encrypted directly with the KEK, pre-envelope). Non-null
// rows are encrypted with the referenced key's DEK.
keyId: uuid('key_id').references(() => encryptionKeys.id),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
});
export const oauthClients = pgTable('oauth_clients', {
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
serverId: uuid('server_id')
.references(() => mcpServers.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' })
.notNull(),
clientId: varchar('client_id', { length: 128 }).notNull().unique(),
clientSecretHash: text('client_secret_hash'),
redirectUris: jsonb('redirect_uris').notNull(),
metadata: jsonb('metadata'),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
});
export const oauthCodes = pgTable('oauth_codes', {
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
clientDbId: uuid('client_db_id')
.references(() => oauthClients.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' })
.notNull(),
code: varchar('code', { length: 128 }).notNull().unique(),
codeChallenge: varchar('code_challenge', { length: 256 }).notNull(),
codeChallengeMethod: varchar('code_challenge_method', { length: 16 }).notNull(),
redirectUri: text('redirect_uri').notNull(),
scope: text('scope'),
resource: text('resource'),
userId: uuid('user_id').references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'set null' }),
expiresAt: timestamp('expires_at').notNull(),
consumedAt: timestamp('consumed_at'),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
});
export const oauthTokens = pgTable('oauth_tokens', {
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
clientDbId: uuid('client_db_id')
.references(() => oauthClients.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' })
.notNull(),
accessTokenHash: text('access_token_hash').notNull(),
refreshTokenHash: text('refresh_token_hash'),
scope: text('scope'),
resource: text('resource'),
expiresAt: timestamp('expires_at').notNull(),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
});
export const toolCallMetrics = pgTable(
'tool_call_metrics',
{
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
serverId: uuid('server_id')
.references(() => mcpServers.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' })
.notNull(),
toolName: varchar('tool_name', { length: 128 }).notNull(),
durationMs: integer('duration_ms'),
success: boolean('success').notNull(),
errorCode: varchar('error_code', { length: 64 }),
timestamp: timestamp('timestamp').defaultNow().notNull(),
},
(t) => ({
serverTimeIdx: index('idx_metrics_server_time').on(t.serverId, t.timestamp),
}),
);
export const auditLog = pgTable('audit_log', {
id: uuid('id').defaultRandom().primaryKey(),
orgId: uuid('org_id').references(() => organizations.id, { onDelete: 'set null' }),
userId: uuid('user_id').references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'set null' }),
action: varchar('action', { length: 128 }).notNull(),
resourceType: varchar('resource_type', { length: 64 }),
resourceId: varchar('resource_id', { length: 128 }),
metadata: jsonb('metadata'),
ipAddress: varchar('ip_address', { length: 64 }),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
});
export type Organization = typeof organizations.$inferSelect;
export type User = typeof users.$inferSelect;
export type Session = typeof sessions.$inferSelect;
export type McpServer = typeof mcpServers.$inferSelect;
export type Build = typeof builds.$inferSelect;
export type BuildLog = typeof buildLogs.$inferSelect;
export type Secret = typeof secrets.$inferSelect;
export type OAuthClient = typeof oauthClients.$inferSelect;
feat(marketplace): template publish + fork + voting/ranking + admin moderation What this enables: - A user builds an MCP server. If others would benefit, they click 'Publish as template' on their server detail page. The spec + pre-rendered TypeScript snapshot is preserved. - Visitors browse /templates, filter by category, sort by trending/top/newest. Each template card shows fork count + active deployment count as natural manipulation-resistant popularity signal. - /templates/[slug] shows the full plan: tool list with input schemas, required-credential explanations (with 'how to get one' deep links), and a collapsible code preview so users can audit before forking. - Fork is one click → /servers/new?template=slug. The wizard skips Step 1 and pre-fills Step 2 with the template's parsed spec. Forker only fills in their own credentials. mcp_servers.template_id is recorded; template.fork_count is bumped atomically. Each fork gets its own isolated container with its own port, its own AES-256 secrets — the template author has zero visibility into the fork's traffic or data. - Admin /admin/templates moderation: verify quality templates (shows shield badge in marketplace), hide low-effort ones, takedown anything malicious. Takedowns cascade-pause every fork container — owners must re-deploy. Why template+fork instead of shared-container: - Shared containers would mean the publisher's quota + their secrets + their logs are exposed to forkers. Bad ergonomics, bad security, bad ownership. - Templates/forks decouple the spec (shared, vouched-for) from the runtime (isolated per user). Network-effect moat without the trust collapse. Why no 5-star voting in v1: - Manipulation-anfällig, empty lists without adoption. We use fork count + active deploys + verified badge. Trending algorithm: score = (activeDeploys * 3 + forks) / sqrt(ageDays + 1) Real signal, no brigading attack surface. Backend: - New schema: templates table (16 cols incl. tools_schema, generated_code, required_secrets, allowedDomains, status enum, verified, fork_count). - mcp_servers.template_id FK + idx for fork lookup. - @bmm/types: SpecEdit unchanged, CreateServerInput accepts optional templateId. - preview-cache.ts: new cachePrebuiltCode/loadPrebuiltCode for storing the template's full rendered server.ts alongside the spec. Generator worker detects this and skips the render step — uses the audited pre-built code verbatim. Banned-pattern re-scan at publish time. - routes/templates.ts: 5 public/auth routes + 2 admin routes. Banned-pattern re-scan before publish. Slug auto-uniqued. forkCount atomic-increment via SQL. UI: - /templates marketplace with trending/top/newest tabs, category filter, search. Cards show forks + live count + author + verified badge. - /templates/[slug] full detail with tools, credentials-with-hints, expandable code preview, fork CTA, ownership + stats sidebar, 'forking is safe' explainer. - /servers/new?template=slug — wizard auto-jumps to Step 2 with template spec pre-filled, fork banner at top with link back to template. - /servers/[id] new Publish tab with title, category, descriptions, per-secret hint fields (description + howToGetUrl per UPPER_SNAKE_CASE key). - /admin/templates moderation with verify/hide/takedown actions. - Marketing nav now includes /templates. Verified end-to-end: - Published Echo Demo Template from marco@test.local's live server - Marketplace lists it correctly with stats - Detail page renders with all sections - Fork CTA navigates to wizard with ?template= param - Wizard skips Step 1, shows fork banner, pre-fills spec - Build succeeds in ~10s (cached spec + prebuilt code path skips Claude AND render), container live on :4109 with proper OAuth 401 → token → 200 flow - DB: templates.fork_count=1, activeDeployments=1, mcp_servers.template_id populated on the fork - /admin/templates shows the new template with verify/hide/takedown controls
2026-05-19 23:22:35 +02:00
export type Template = typeof templates.$inferSelect;
feat(crypto): envelope encryption + key rotation via admin panel Closes structural weakness #4 from the audit (single global key, no rotation, no KMS path). Customer secrets now use envelope encryption with a real rotation story. Model: KEK — Key Encryption Key, 32 bytes from env (SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY). Never stored in the DB. Root of trust. DEK — Data Encryption Key, 32 random bytes we generate, stored in the new encryption_keys table *wrapped* (AES-256-GCM encrypted) with the KEK. Secrets are encrypted with the DEK. Schema: - encryption_keys (version, wrappedDek, active, rotatedBy, createdAt, retiredAt) - secrets.keyId — which DEK encrypted this row. NULL = legacy (KEK-direct, pre-envelope); decryptSecret handles both and the first rotation migrates legacy rows onto a DEK. crypto.ts (full rewrite): - ensureActiveKey() — boot-time, loads keys + creates v1 if none. Fail-closed: index.ts process.exit(1) if it throws — the API will not serve if encryption can't initialize. - encryptSecret() — encrypts with the active DEK, returns { value, keyId }. - decryptSecret(value, keyId) — DEK path or legacy KEK-direct path. - rotateKeys() — mints a fresh DEK, re-encrypts EVERY secret under it inside a single transaction (decrypt-old / encrypt-new per row), retires the old key, activates the new one. A partial failure is recoverable because every row carries its own keyId. - encryptionStatus() — active version, key history, secret + legacy counts. Admin: - GET /v1/admin/encryption — status - POST /v1/admin/encryption/rotate — triggers rotateKeys, audit-logged as admin.encryption.rotate with { newVersion, reEncrypted }. - /admin/encryption page — active-key/secret/legacy cards, Rotate button with confirm, key-history table, plain-English how-it-works. Added to admin nav. Verified end-to-end: - boot → encryption_keys v1 active, '[crypto] envelope encryption ready' - created a server with secret MY_API_KEY → stored ciphertext, keyId = v1 - POST rotate → { newVersion: 2, reEncrypted: 1 }; ciphertext changed, keyId now v2, v1 retired, v2 active. The decrypt-then-reencrypt round-trip succeeded (rotation throws otherwise) — the secret is provably recoverable. - admin UI renders the status + history correctly. Deferred, named honestly (not built this iteration): - worker reads secrets from the DB instead of the BullMQ job-data plaintext copy — would also remove plaintext secrets from Redis. Separate change with its own risk surface on the iterate/fork flows. - per-server secret-value rotation UI - audit_log hash-chaining (tamper-evidence) - rate limiting on auth endpoints
2026-05-20 22:36:08 +02:00
export type EncryptionKey = typeof encryptionKeys.$inferSelect;