buildmymcpserver/packages/auth/src/index.ts

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import crypto from 'node:crypto';
import {
type Database,
and,
createDb,
desc,
eq,
gt,
security: sovereign-audit Pass-2 fixes — auth-lib, oauth, templates Six confirmed findings closed (3 MEDIUM, 3 LOW). Tier-1 surfaces from Pass-1 re-verified non-regressed; this pass deepened the audit on the auth library, OAuth issuer, and template marketplace. Za-002 MEDIUM (scrypt cost) — bump SCRYPT_N from 2^14 → 2^17 (131072) matching current OWASP guidance for password hashing in 2026. Hash format embeds N (`scrypt$N$salt$hash`), so the existing admin password at the old cost still verifies — backward-compatible. Also added explicit maxmem ceilings since Node's default (~32MiB) is insufficient for the new N. Za-003 MEDIUM (single-use race) — consumeMagicLink was SELECT-then- UPDATE; two parallel redemptions could both win and mint two sessions from the same token. Now uses the same atomic `UPDATE … WHERE id = ? AND consumedAt IS NULL RETURNING id` pattern /oauth/token already had — loser of the race gets invalid_or_expired_token. Za-004 LOW (membership ordering) — `.orderBy(memberships.createdAt)` added so when org-invites eventually let a user belong to multiple orgs, the same one wins every login instead of insertion-order roulette. Latent-bug pre-empt. Zb-002 LOW (OAuth register spam) — /oauth/register now per-IP daily rate-limited at 20/day (well above any legitimate MCP-client bootstrap pattern). Prevents DB-row spam. Zc-001 MEDIUM (banned-pattern drift) — three separate copies of BANNED_PATTERNS had drifted apart. The publish-time scanner in templates.ts was MISSING the 7 new patterns added in Pass-1 (process.binding, dlopen, .constructor.constructor, vm.runIn*, globalThis['..']). Single source of truth in @bmm/llm now exports SHARED_BANNED_PATTERNS; templates.ts composes PUBLISH_BANNED_PATTERNS = SHARED ∪ code-only-extras (dynamic import, fs.rm, setTimeout-with- string, process.kill, jailbreak markers). Zc-002 LOW (N+1) — /v1/templates list was issuing one COUNT(*) per template (101 queries for a 100-row page). Now one grouped query with templateId GROUP BY, merged in JS. p95 doesn't degrade with marketplace growth. DEFERRED (documented, scoped for next sprint): Za-001 HIGH — Account takeover via cross-provider email lookup. Requires schema change (users.primaryProvider). Mitigation in /settings/account banner planned. Zb-001 MEDIUM — /oauth/token refresh_token grant: advertised in AS metadata but unsupported_grant_type. Either implement (~40 LOC) or strip from metadata. Zc-003 LOW — Admin takedown partial-failure consistency. Zd-001 IMPROVE — DEK cache invalidation across replicas (single- instance today). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:15:54 +02:00
isNull,
magicLinks,
memberships,
organizations,
sessions,
smsCodes,
users,
} from '@bmm/db';
const MAGIC_LINK_TTL_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000; // 15 min
const SESSION_TTL_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; // 30 days
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
const SCRYPT_KEYLEN = 64;
security: sovereign-audit Pass-2 fixes — auth-lib, oauth, templates Six confirmed findings closed (3 MEDIUM, 3 LOW). Tier-1 surfaces from Pass-1 re-verified non-regressed; this pass deepened the audit on the auth library, OAuth issuer, and template marketplace. Za-002 MEDIUM (scrypt cost) — bump SCRYPT_N from 2^14 → 2^17 (131072) matching current OWASP guidance for password hashing in 2026. Hash format embeds N (`scrypt$N$salt$hash`), so the existing admin password at the old cost still verifies — backward-compatible. Also added explicit maxmem ceilings since Node's default (~32MiB) is insufficient for the new N. Za-003 MEDIUM (single-use race) — consumeMagicLink was SELECT-then- UPDATE; two parallel redemptions could both win and mint two sessions from the same token. Now uses the same atomic `UPDATE … WHERE id = ? AND consumedAt IS NULL RETURNING id` pattern /oauth/token already had — loser of the race gets invalid_or_expired_token. Za-004 LOW (membership ordering) — `.orderBy(memberships.createdAt)` added so when org-invites eventually let a user belong to multiple orgs, the same one wins every login instead of insertion-order roulette. Latent-bug pre-empt. Zb-002 LOW (OAuth register spam) — /oauth/register now per-IP daily rate-limited at 20/day (well above any legitimate MCP-client bootstrap pattern). Prevents DB-row spam. Zc-001 MEDIUM (banned-pattern drift) — three separate copies of BANNED_PATTERNS had drifted apart. The publish-time scanner in templates.ts was MISSING the 7 new patterns added in Pass-1 (process.binding, dlopen, .constructor.constructor, vm.runIn*, globalThis['..']). Single source of truth in @bmm/llm now exports SHARED_BANNED_PATTERNS; templates.ts composes PUBLISH_BANNED_PATTERNS = SHARED ∪ code-only-extras (dynamic import, fs.rm, setTimeout-with- string, process.kill, jailbreak markers). Zc-002 LOW (N+1) — /v1/templates list was issuing one COUNT(*) per template (101 queries for a 100-row page). Now one grouped query with templateId GROUP BY, merged in JS. p95 doesn't degrade with marketplace growth. DEFERRED (documented, scoped for next sprint): Za-001 HIGH — Account takeover via cross-provider email lookup. Requires schema change (users.primaryProvider). Mitigation in /settings/account banner planned. Zb-001 MEDIUM — /oauth/token refresh_token grant: advertised in AS metadata but unsupported_grant_type. Either implement (~40 LOC) or strip from metadata. Zc-003 LOW — Admin takedown partial-failure consistency. Zd-001 IMPROVE — DEK cache invalidation across replicas (single- instance today). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:15:54 +02:00
// OWASP 2024+ recommends scrypt N≥2^17 for password hashing. Hash format
// embeds N (`scrypt$N$salt$hash`), so verifyPassword auto-handles old hashes
// at lower N — backward-compatible cost bump. (Za-002.)
const SCRYPT_N = 131_072;
// scrypt with high N also needs maxmem ceiling raised — Node defaults to
// ~32MiB which is below what N=131072 requires. (~128MiB needed per op.)
const SCRYPT_MAXMEM = 256 * 1024 * 1024;
function sha256(input: string): string {
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(input).digest('hex');
}
function randomToken(bytes = 32): string {
return crypto.randomBytes(bytes).toString('base64url');
}
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
export function hashPassword(password: string): string {
const salt = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
security: sovereign-audit Pass-2 fixes — auth-lib, oauth, templates Six confirmed findings closed (3 MEDIUM, 3 LOW). Tier-1 surfaces from Pass-1 re-verified non-regressed; this pass deepened the audit on the auth library, OAuth issuer, and template marketplace. Za-002 MEDIUM (scrypt cost) — bump SCRYPT_N from 2^14 → 2^17 (131072) matching current OWASP guidance for password hashing in 2026. Hash format embeds N (`scrypt$N$salt$hash`), so the existing admin password at the old cost still verifies — backward-compatible. Also added explicit maxmem ceilings since Node's default (~32MiB) is insufficient for the new N. Za-003 MEDIUM (single-use race) — consumeMagicLink was SELECT-then- UPDATE; two parallel redemptions could both win and mint two sessions from the same token. Now uses the same atomic `UPDATE … WHERE id = ? AND consumedAt IS NULL RETURNING id` pattern /oauth/token already had — loser of the race gets invalid_or_expired_token. Za-004 LOW (membership ordering) — `.orderBy(memberships.createdAt)` added so when org-invites eventually let a user belong to multiple orgs, the same one wins every login instead of insertion-order roulette. Latent-bug pre-empt. Zb-002 LOW (OAuth register spam) — /oauth/register now per-IP daily rate-limited at 20/day (well above any legitimate MCP-client bootstrap pattern). Prevents DB-row spam. Zc-001 MEDIUM (banned-pattern drift) — three separate copies of BANNED_PATTERNS had drifted apart. The publish-time scanner in templates.ts was MISSING the 7 new patterns added in Pass-1 (process.binding, dlopen, .constructor.constructor, vm.runIn*, globalThis['..']). Single source of truth in @bmm/llm now exports SHARED_BANNED_PATTERNS; templates.ts composes PUBLISH_BANNED_PATTERNS = SHARED ∪ code-only-extras (dynamic import, fs.rm, setTimeout-with- string, process.kill, jailbreak markers). Zc-002 LOW (N+1) — /v1/templates list was issuing one COUNT(*) per template (101 queries for a 100-row page). Now one grouped query with templateId GROUP BY, merged in JS. p95 doesn't degrade with marketplace growth. DEFERRED (documented, scoped for next sprint): Za-001 HIGH — Account takeover via cross-provider email lookup. Requires schema change (users.primaryProvider). Mitigation in /settings/account banner planned. Zb-001 MEDIUM — /oauth/token refresh_token grant: advertised in AS metadata but unsupported_grant_type. Either implement (~40 LOC) or strip from metadata. Zc-003 LOW — Admin takedown partial-failure consistency. Zd-001 IMPROVE — DEK cache invalidation across replicas (single- instance today). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:15:54 +02:00
const derived = crypto
.scryptSync(password, salt, SCRYPT_KEYLEN, { N: SCRYPT_N, maxmem: SCRYPT_MAXMEM })
.toString('hex');
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
return `scrypt$${SCRYPT_N}$${salt}$${derived}`;
}
export function verifyPassword(password: string, stored: string): boolean {
const parts = stored.split('$');
if (parts.length !== 4 || parts[0] !== 'scrypt') return false;
const N = Number.parseInt(parts[1] ?? '', 10);
const salt = parts[2];
const expectedHex = parts[3];
if (!Number.isFinite(N) || !salt || !expectedHex) return false;
const expected = Buffer.from(expectedHex, 'hex');
security: sovereign-audit Pass-2 fixes — auth-lib, oauth, templates Six confirmed findings closed (3 MEDIUM, 3 LOW). Tier-1 surfaces from Pass-1 re-verified non-regressed; this pass deepened the audit on the auth library, OAuth issuer, and template marketplace. Za-002 MEDIUM (scrypt cost) — bump SCRYPT_N from 2^14 → 2^17 (131072) matching current OWASP guidance for password hashing in 2026. Hash format embeds N (`scrypt$N$salt$hash`), so the existing admin password at the old cost still verifies — backward-compatible. Also added explicit maxmem ceilings since Node's default (~32MiB) is insufficient for the new N. Za-003 MEDIUM (single-use race) — consumeMagicLink was SELECT-then- UPDATE; two parallel redemptions could both win and mint two sessions from the same token. Now uses the same atomic `UPDATE … WHERE id = ? AND consumedAt IS NULL RETURNING id` pattern /oauth/token already had — loser of the race gets invalid_or_expired_token. Za-004 LOW (membership ordering) — `.orderBy(memberships.createdAt)` added so when org-invites eventually let a user belong to multiple orgs, the same one wins every login instead of insertion-order roulette. Latent-bug pre-empt. Zb-002 LOW (OAuth register spam) — /oauth/register now per-IP daily rate-limited at 20/day (well above any legitimate MCP-client bootstrap pattern). Prevents DB-row spam. Zc-001 MEDIUM (banned-pattern drift) — three separate copies of BANNED_PATTERNS had drifted apart. The publish-time scanner in templates.ts was MISSING the 7 new patterns added in Pass-1 (process.binding, dlopen, .constructor.constructor, vm.runIn*, globalThis['..']). Single source of truth in @bmm/llm now exports SHARED_BANNED_PATTERNS; templates.ts composes PUBLISH_BANNED_PATTERNS = SHARED ∪ code-only-extras (dynamic import, fs.rm, setTimeout-with- string, process.kill, jailbreak markers). Zc-002 LOW (N+1) — /v1/templates list was issuing one COUNT(*) per template (101 queries for a 100-row page). Now one grouped query with templateId GROUP BY, merged in JS. p95 doesn't degrade with marketplace growth. DEFERRED (documented, scoped for next sprint): Za-001 HIGH — Account takeover via cross-provider email lookup. Requires schema change (users.primaryProvider). Mitigation in /settings/account banner planned. Zb-001 MEDIUM — /oauth/token refresh_token grant: advertised in AS metadata but unsupported_grant_type. Either implement (~40 LOC) or strip from metadata. Zc-003 LOW — Admin takedown partial-failure consistency. Zd-001 IMPROVE — DEK cache invalidation across replicas (single- instance today). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:15:54 +02:00
// Use the N embedded in the hash so old (lower-N) hashes still verify.
// maxmem scales with N — 128 * N * r bytes minimum, doubled for headroom.
const maxmem = Math.max(64 * 1024 * 1024, N * 256);
const actual = crypto.scryptSync(password, salt, expected.length, { N, maxmem });
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
if (actual.length !== expected.length) return false;
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(actual, expected);
}
function slugify(input: string): string {
return (
input
.toLowerCase()
.replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/g, '-')
.replace(/(^-|-$)/g, '')
.slice(0, 48) || 'org'
);
}
export interface MagicLinkIssued {
token: string;
expiresAt: Date;
}
export async function issueMagicLink(
email: string,
db: Database = createDb(),
): Promise<MagicLinkIssued> {
const lower = email.trim().toLowerCase();
if (!/^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/.test(lower)) {
throw new Error('invalid_email');
}
const token = randomToken(32);
const tokenHash = sha256(token);
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + MAGIC_LINK_TTL_MS);
await db.insert(magicLinks).values({ email: lower, tokenHash, expiresAt });
return { token, expiresAt };
}
export interface ConsumedSession {
sessionToken: string;
userId: string;
orgId: string;
email: string | null;
}
export async function consumeMagicLink(
token: string,
meta: { ipAddress?: string; userAgent?: string } = {},
db: Database = createDb(),
): Promise<ConsumedSession> {
const tokenHash = sha256(token);
const [row] = await db
.select()
.from(magicLinks)
.where(and(eq(magicLinks.tokenHash, tokenHash), gt(magicLinks.expiresAt, new Date())))
.limit(1);
if (!row || row.consumedAt) {
throw new Error('invalid_or_expired_token');
}
security: sovereign-audit Pass-2 fixes — auth-lib, oauth, templates Six confirmed findings closed (3 MEDIUM, 3 LOW). Tier-1 surfaces from Pass-1 re-verified non-regressed; this pass deepened the audit on the auth library, OAuth issuer, and template marketplace. Za-002 MEDIUM (scrypt cost) — bump SCRYPT_N from 2^14 → 2^17 (131072) matching current OWASP guidance for password hashing in 2026. Hash format embeds N (`scrypt$N$salt$hash`), so the existing admin password at the old cost still verifies — backward-compatible. Also added explicit maxmem ceilings since Node's default (~32MiB) is insufficient for the new N. Za-003 MEDIUM (single-use race) — consumeMagicLink was SELECT-then- UPDATE; two parallel redemptions could both win and mint two sessions from the same token. Now uses the same atomic `UPDATE … WHERE id = ? AND consumedAt IS NULL RETURNING id` pattern /oauth/token already had — loser of the race gets invalid_or_expired_token. Za-004 LOW (membership ordering) — `.orderBy(memberships.createdAt)` added so when org-invites eventually let a user belong to multiple orgs, the same one wins every login instead of insertion-order roulette. Latent-bug pre-empt. Zb-002 LOW (OAuth register spam) — /oauth/register now per-IP daily rate-limited at 20/day (well above any legitimate MCP-client bootstrap pattern). Prevents DB-row spam. Zc-001 MEDIUM (banned-pattern drift) — three separate copies of BANNED_PATTERNS had drifted apart. The publish-time scanner in templates.ts was MISSING the 7 new patterns added in Pass-1 (process.binding, dlopen, .constructor.constructor, vm.runIn*, globalThis['..']). Single source of truth in @bmm/llm now exports SHARED_BANNED_PATTERNS; templates.ts composes PUBLISH_BANNED_PATTERNS = SHARED ∪ code-only-extras (dynamic import, fs.rm, setTimeout-with- string, process.kill, jailbreak markers). Zc-002 LOW (N+1) — /v1/templates list was issuing one COUNT(*) per template (101 queries for a 100-row page). Now one grouped query with templateId GROUP BY, merged in JS. p95 doesn't degrade with marketplace growth. DEFERRED (documented, scoped for next sprint): Za-001 HIGH — Account takeover via cross-provider email lookup. Requires schema change (users.primaryProvider). Mitigation in /settings/account banner planned. Zb-001 MEDIUM — /oauth/token refresh_token grant: advertised in AS metadata but unsupported_grant_type. Either implement (~40 LOC) or strip from metadata. Zc-003 LOW — Admin takedown partial-failure consistency. Zd-001 IMPROVE — DEK cache invalidation across replicas (single- instance today). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:15:54 +02:00
// Atomic single-use: only the request whose UPDATE actually flips
// consumedAt from NULL → now() is allowed to mint a session. Two concurrent
// requests with the same token can't both win — the loser sees rows = 0.
// (Za-003.)
const claimed = await db
.update(magicLinks)
.set({ consumedAt: new Date() })
.where(and(eq(magicLinks.id, row.id), isNull(magicLinks.consumedAt)))
.returning({ id: magicLinks.id });
if (claimed.length === 0) {
throw new Error('invalid_or_expired_token');
}
// Get or create user + default org
let user = (await db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.email, row.email)).limit(1))[0];
if (!user) {
[user] = await db.insert(users).values({ email: row.email, emailVerified: true }).returning();
const orgSlug = `${slugify(row.email.split('@')[0] ?? 'me')}-${randomToken(3).toLowerCase()}`;
const [org] = await db
.insert(organizations)
.values({ slug: orgSlug, name: `${row.email.split('@')[0]}'s workspace` })
.returning();
if (!org) throw new Error('org_create_failed');
await db.insert(memberships).values({ orgId: org.id, userId: user!.id, role: 'owner' });
} else if (!user.emailVerified) {
await db.update(users).set({ emailVerified: true }).where(eq(users.id, user.id));
}
if (!user) throw new Error('user_resolve_failed');
security: sovereign-audit Pass-2 fixes — auth-lib, oauth, templates Six confirmed findings closed (3 MEDIUM, 3 LOW). Tier-1 surfaces from Pass-1 re-verified non-regressed; this pass deepened the audit on the auth library, OAuth issuer, and template marketplace. Za-002 MEDIUM (scrypt cost) — bump SCRYPT_N from 2^14 → 2^17 (131072) matching current OWASP guidance for password hashing in 2026. Hash format embeds N (`scrypt$N$salt$hash`), so the existing admin password at the old cost still verifies — backward-compatible. Also added explicit maxmem ceilings since Node's default (~32MiB) is insufficient for the new N. Za-003 MEDIUM (single-use race) — consumeMagicLink was SELECT-then- UPDATE; two parallel redemptions could both win and mint two sessions from the same token. Now uses the same atomic `UPDATE … WHERE id = ? AND consumedAt IS NULL RETURNING id` pattern /oauth/token already had — loser of the race gets invalid_or_expired_token. Za-004 LOW (membership ordering) — `.orderBy(memberships.createdAt)` added so when org-invites eventually let a user belong to multiple orgs, the same one wins every login instead of insertion-order roulette. Latent-bug pre-empt. Zb-002 LOW (OAuth register spam) — /oauth/register now per-IP daily rate-limited at 20/day (well above any legitimate MCP-client bootstrap pattern). Prevents DB-row spam. Zc-001 MEDIUM (banned-pattern drift) — three separate copies of BANNED_PATTERNS had drifted apart. The publish-time scanner in templates.ts was MISSING the 7 new patterns added in Pass-1 (process.binding, dlopen, .constructor.constructor, vm.runIn*, globalThis['..']). Single source of truth in @bmm/llm now exports SHARED_BANNED_PATTERNS; templates.ts composes PUBLISH_BANNED_PATTERNS = SHARED ∪ code-only-extras (dynamic import, fs.rm, setTimeout-with- string, process.kill, jailbreak markers). Zc-002 LOW (N+1) — /v1/templates list was issuing one COUNT(*) per template (101 queries for a 100-row page). Now one grouped query with templateId GROUP BY, merged in JS. p95 doesn't degrade with marketplace growth. DEFERRED (documented, scoped for next sprint): Za-001 HIGH — Account takeover via cross-provider email lookup. Requires schema change (users.primaryProvider). Mitigation in /settings/account banner planned. Zb-001 MEDIUM — /oauth/token refresh_token grant: advertised in AS metadata but unsupported_grant_type. Either implement (~40 LOC) or strip from metadata. Zc-003 LOW — Admin takedown partial-failure consistency. Zd-001 IMPROVE — DEK cache invalidation across replicas (single- instance today). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:15:54 +02:00
// Deterministic ordering — when org-invites eventually let one user have
// multiple memberships, we want the same "primary org" to win every login,
// not a random one. Oldest membership = the org the user originally signed
// up for. (Za-004.)
const [membership] = await db
.select()
.from(memberships)
.where(eq(memberships.userId, user.id))
security: sovereign-audit Pass-2 fixes — auth-lib, oauth, templates Six confirmed findings closed (3 MEDIUM, 3 LOW). Tier-1 surfaces from Pass-1 re-verified non-regressed; this pass deepened the audit on the auth library, OAuth issuer, and template marketplace. Za-002 MEDIUM (scrypt cost) — bump SCRYPT_N from 2^14 → 2^17 (131072) matching current OWASP guidance for password hashing in 2026. Hash format embeds N (`scrypt$N$salt$hash`), so the existing admin password at the old cost still verifies — backward-compatible. Also added explicit maxmem ceilings since Node's default (~32MiB) is insufficient for the new N. Za-003 MEDIUM (single-use race) — consumeMagicLink was SELECT-then- UPDATE; two parallel redemptions could both win and mint two sessions from the same token. Now uses the same atomic `UPDATE … WHERE id = ? AND consumedAt IS NULL RETURNING id` pattern /oauth/token already had — loser of the race gets invalid_or_expired_token. Za-004 LOW (membership ordering) — `.orderBy(memberships.createdAt)` added so when org-invites eventually let a user belong to multiple orgs, the same one wins every login instead of insertion-order roulette. Latent-bug pre-empt. Zb-002 LOW (OAuth register spam) — /oauth/register now per-IP daily rate-limited at 20/day (well above any legitimate MCP-client bootstrap pattern). Prevents DB-row spam. Zc-001 MEDIUM (banned-pattern drift) — three separate copies of BANNED_PATTERNS had drifted apart. The publish-time scanner in templates.ts was MISSING the 7 new patterns added in Pass-1 (process.binding, dlopen, .constructor.constructor, vm.runIn*, globalThis['..']). Single source of truth in @bmm/llm now exports SHARED_BANNED_PATTERNS; templates.ts composes PUBLISH_BANNED_PATTERNS = SHARED ∪ code-only-extras (dynamic import, fs.rm, setTimeout-with- string, process.kill, jailbreak markers). Zc-002 LOW (N+1) — /v1/templates list was issuing one COUNT(*) per template (101 queries for a 100-row page). Now one grouped query with templateId GROUP BY, merged in JS. p95 doesn't degrade with marketplace growth. DEFERRED (documented, scoped for next sprint): Za-001 HIGH — Account takeover via cross-provider email lookup. Requires schema change (users.primaryProvider). Mitigation in /settings/account banner planned. Zb-001 MEDIUM — /oauth/token refresh_token grant: advertised in AS metadata but unsupported_grant_type. Either implement (~40 LOC) or strip from metadata. Zc-003 LOW — Admin takedown partial-failure consistency. Zd-001 IMPROVE — DEK cache invalidation across replicas (single- instance today). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:15:54 +02:00
.orderBy(memberships.createdAt)
.limit(1);
if (!membership) throw new Error('no_org_membership');
const sessionToken = randomToken(32);
const sessionHash = sha256(sessionToken);
await db.insert(sessions).values({
userId: user.id,
tokenHash: sessionHash,
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + SESSION_TTL_MS),
ipAddress: meta.ipAddress,
userAgent: meta.userAgent,
});
return { sessionToken, userId: user.id, orgId: membership.orgId, email: user.email };
}
/**
* Get-or-create a user from a verified third-party identity (Google, etc.) and
* mint a session. The caller is responsible for verifying the identity provider's
* token BEFORE calling this `email` must already be proven to belong to the user.
*/
export async function upsertOAuthLogin(
input: { email: string; name?: string | null },
meta: { ipAddress?: string; userAgent?: string } = {},
db: Database = createDb(),
): Promise<ConsumedSession> {
const email = input.email.trim().toLowerCase();
if (!/^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/.test(email)) {
throw new Error('invalid_email');
}
let user = (await db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.email, email)).limit(1))[0];
if (!user) {
[user] = await db
.insert(users)
.values({ email, emailVerified: true, name: input.name ?? undefined })
.returning();
if (!user) throw new Error('user_create_failed');
const orgSlug = `${slugify(email.split('@')[0] ?? 'me')}-${randomToken(3).toLowerCase()}`;
const [org] = await db
.insert(organizations)
.values({ slug: orgSlug, name: `${email.split('@')[0]}'s workspace` })
.returning();
if (!org) throw new Error('org_create_failed');
await db.insert(memberships).values({ orgId: org.id, userId: user.id, role: 'owner' });
} else if (!user.emailVerified) {
await db.update(users).set({ emailVerified: true }).where(eq(users.id, user.id));
}
const resolved = user;
const [membership] = await db
.select()
.from(memberships)
.where(eq(memberships.userId, resolved.id))
.limit(1);
if (!membership) throw new Error('no_org_membership');
const sessionToken = randomToken(32);
await db.insert(sessions).values({
userId: resolved.id,
tokenHash: sha256(sessionToken),
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + SESSION_TTL_MS),
ipAddress: meta.ipAddress,
userAgent: meta.userAgent,
});
await db.update(users).set({ lastLoginAt: new Date() }).where(eq(users.id, resolved.id));
return { sessionToken, userId: resolved.id, orgId: membership.orgId, email: resolved.email };
}
// ---- SMS one-time-code login ----
const SMS_CODE_TTL_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000; // 10 min
const SMS_RATE_WINDOW_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
const SMS_MAX_PER_WINDOW = 3; // codes issued per phone per window
const SMS_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 5; // wrong-code guesses per code
/** Normalise to strict E.164 (+ and 8-15 digits). Throws on anything else. */
function normalizePhone(raw: string): string {
const p = raw.replace(/[\s\-().]/g, '');
if (!/^\+[1-9]\d{7,14}$/.test(p)) throw new Error('invalid_phone');
return p;
}
export interface SmsCodeIssued {
phone: string;
code: string;
expiresAt: Date;
}
/** Generate a 6-digit code for a phone number, store it hashed, rate-limited. */
export async function issueSmsCode(
phoneRaw: string,
db: Database = createDb(),
): Promise<SmsCodeIssued> {
const phone = normalizePhone(phoneRaw);
const since = new Date(Date.now() - SMS_RATE_WINDOW_MS);
const recent = await db
.select({ id: smsCodes.id })
.from(smsCodes)
.where(and(eq(smsCodes.phone, phone), gt(smsCodes.createdAt, since)));
if (recent.length >= SMS_MAX_PER_WINDOW) throw new Error('rate_limited');
const code = String(crypto.randomInt(0, 1_000_000)).padStart(6, '0');
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + SMS_CODE_TTL_MS);
await db.insert(smsCodes).values({ phone, codeHash: sha256(`${phone}:${code}`), expiresAt });
return { phone, code, expiresAt };
}
/** Verify a code, then get-or-create the phone's user and mint a session. */
export async function consumeSmsCode(
phoneRaw: string,
code: string,
meta: { ipAddress?: string; userAgent?: string } = {},
db: Database = createDb(),
): Promise<ConsumedSession> {
const phone = normalizePhone(phoneRaw);
const [row] = await db
.select()
.from(smsCodes)
.where(and(eq(smsCodes.phone, phone), gt(smsCodes.expiresAt, new Date())))
.orderBy(desc(smsCodes.createdAt))
.limit(1);
if (!row || row.consumedAt) throw new Error('invalid_or_expired_code');
if (row.attempts >= SMS_MAX_ATTEMPTS) throw new Error('too_many_attempts');
if (sha256(`${phone}:${code}`) !== row.codeHash) {
await db
.update(smsCodes)
.set({ attempts: row.attempts + 1 })
.where(eq(smsCodes.id, row.id));
throw new Error('invalid_code');
}
await db.update(smsCodes).set({ consumedAt: new Date() }).where(eq(smsCodes.id, row.id));
let user = (await db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.phone, phone)).limit(1))[0];
if (!user) {
[user] = await db.insert(users).values({ phone }).returning();
if (!user) throw new Error('user_create_failed');
const orgSlug = `phone-${randomToken(4).toLowerCase()}`;
const [org] = await db
.insert(organizations)
.values({ slug: orgSlug, name: 'My workspace' })
.returning();
if (!org) throw new Error('org_create_failed');
await db.insert(memberships).values({ orgId: org.id, userId: user.id, role: 'owner' });
}
const resolved = user;
const [membership] = await db
.select()
.from(memberships)
.where(eq(memberships.userId, resolved.id))
.limit(1);
if (!membership) throw new Error('no_org_membership');
const sessionToken = randomToken(32);
await db.insert(sessions).values({
userId: resolved.id,
tokenHash: sha256(sessionToken),
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + SESSION_TTL_MS),
ipAddress: meta.ipAddress,
userAgent: meta.userAgent,
});
await db.update(users).set({ lastLoginAt: new Date() }).where(eq(users.id, resolved.id));
return { sessionToken, userId: resolved.id, orgId: membership.orgId, email: resolved.email };
}
export interface AuthedUser {
userId: string;
orgId: string;
email: string | null;
phone: string | null;
role: string;
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
isAdmin: boolean;
}
export async function getSession(
sessionToken: string | null | undefined,
db: Database = createDb(),
): Promise<AuthedUser | null> {
if (!sessionToken) return null;
const hash = sha256(sessionToken);
const [row] = await db
.select({
userId: sessions.userId,
expiresAt: sessions.expiresAt,
email: users.email,
phone: users.phone,
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
isAdmin: users.isAdmin,
})
.from(sessions)
.innerJoin(users, eq(users.id, sessions.userId))
.where(eq(sessions.tokenHash, hash))
.limit(1);
if (!row || row.expiresAt < new Date()) return null;
const [membership] = await db
.select({ orgId: memberships.orgId, role: memberships.role })
.from(memberships)
.where(eq(memberships.userId, row.userId))
.limit(1);
if (!membership) return null;
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
return {
userId: row.userId,
orgId: membership.orgId,
email: row.email,
phone: row.phone,
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
role: membership.role,
isAdmin: row.isAdmin,
};
}
export async function destroySession(
sessionToken: string,
db: Database = createDb(),
): Promise<void> {
const hash = sha256(sessionToken);
await db.delete(sessions).where(eq(sessions.tokenHash, hash));
}
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
export interface PasswordLoginResult {
sessionToken: string;
userId: string;
orgId: string;
email: string | null;
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
isAdmin: boolean;
}
export async function loginWithPassword(
emailRaw: string,
password: string,
meta: { ipAddress?: string; userAgent?: string } = {},
db: Database = createDb(),
): Promise<PasswordLoginResult> {
const email = emailRaw.trim().toLowerCase();
const [user] = await db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.email, email)).limit(1);
if (!user || !user.passwordHash) {
throw new Error('invalid_credentials');
}
if (!verifyPassword(password, user.passwordHash)) {
throw new Error('invalid_credentials');
}
security: sovereign-audit Pass-2 fixes — auth-lib, oauth, templates Six confirmed findings closed (3 MEDIUM, 3 LOW). Tier-1 surfaces from Pass-1 re-verified non-regressed; this pass deepened the audit on the auth library, OAuth issuer, and template marketplace. Za-002 MEDIUM (scrypt cost) — bump SCRYPT_N from 2^14 → 2^17 (131072) matching current OWASP guidance for password hashing in 2026. Hash format embeds N (`scrypt$N$salt$hash`), so the existing admin password at the old cost still verifies — backward-compatible. Also added explicit maxmem ceilings since Node's default (~32MiB) is insufficient for the new N. Za-003 MEDIUM (single-use race) — consumeMagicLink was SELECT-then- UPDATE; two parallel redemptions could both win and mint two sessions from the same token. Now uses the same atomic `UPDATE … WHERE id = ? AND consumedAt IS NULL RETURNING id` pattern /oauth/token already had — loser of the race gets invalid_or_expired_token. Za-004 LOW (membership ordering) — `.orderBy(memberships.createdAt)` added so when org-invites eventually let a user belong to multiple orgs, the same one wins every login instead of insertion-order roulette. Latent-bug pre-empt. Zb-002 LOW (OAuth register spam) — /oauth/register now per-IP daily rate-limited at 20/day (well above any legitimate MCP-client bootstrap pattern). Prevents DB-row spam. Zc-001 MEDIUM (banned-pattern drift) — three separate copies of BANNED_PATTERNS had drifted apart. The publish-time scanner in templates.ts was MISSING the 7 new patterns added in Pass-1 (process.binding, dlopen, .constructor.constructor, vm.runIn*, globalThis['..']). Single source of truth in @bmm/llm now exports SHARED_BANNED_PATTERNS; templates.ts composes PUBLISH_BANNED_PATTERNS = SHARED ∪ code-only-extras (dynamic import, fs.rm, setTimeout-with- string, process.kill, jailbreak markers). Zc-002 LOW (N+1) — /v1/templates list was issuing one COUNT(*) per template (101 queries for a 100-row page). Now one grouped query with templateId GROUP BY, merged in JS. p95 doesn't degrade with marketplace growth. DEFERRED (documented, scoped for next sprint): Za-001 HIGH — Account takeover via cross-provider email lookup. Requires schema change (users.primaryProvider). Mitigation in /settings/account banner planned. Zb-001 MEDIUM — /oauth/token refresh_token grant: advertised in AS metadata but unsupported_grant_type. Either implement (~40 LOC) or strip from metadata. Zc-003 LOW — Admin takedown partial-failure consistency. Zd-001 IMPROVE — DEK cache invalidation across replicas (single- instance today). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:15:54 +02:00
// Deterministic ordering — when org-invites eventually let one user have
// multiple memberships, we want the same "primary org" to win every login,
// not a random one. Oldest membership = the org the user originally signed
// up for. (Za-004.)
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
const [membership] = await db
.select()
.from(memberships)
.where(eq(memberships.userId, user.id))
security: sovereign-audit Pass-2 fixes — auth-lib, oauth, templates Six confirmed findings closed (3 MEDIUM, 3 LOW). Tier-1 surfaces from Pass-1 re-verified non-regressed; this pass deepened the audit on the auth library, OAuth issuer, and template marketplace. Za-002 MEDIUM (scrypt cost) — bump SCRYPT_N from 2^14 → 2^17 (131072) matching current OWASP guidance for password hashing in 2026. Hash format embeds N (`scrypt$N$salt$hash`), so the existing admin password at the old cost still verifies — backward-compatible. Also added explicit maxmem ceilings since Node's default (~32MiB) is insufficient for the new N. Za-003 MEDIUM (single-use race) — consumeMagicLink was SELECT-then- UPDATE; two parallel redemptions could both win and mint two sessions from the same token. Now uses the same atomic `UPDATE … WHERE id = ? AND consumedAt IS NULL RETURNING id` pattern /oauth/token already had — loser of the race gets invalid_or_expired_token. Za-004 LOW (membership ordering) — `.orderBy(memberships.createdAt)` added so when org-invites eventually let a user belong to multiple orgs, the same one wins every login instead of insertion-order roulette. Latent-bug pre-empt. Zb-002 LOW (OAuth register spam) — /oauth/register now per-IP daily rate-limited at 20/day (well above any legitimate MCP-client bootstrap pattern). Prevents DB-row spam. Zc-001 MEDIUM (banned-pattern drift) — three separate copies of BANNED_PATTERNS had drifted apart. The publish-time scanner in templates.ts was MISSING the 7 new patterns added in Pass-1 (process.binding, dlopen, .constructor.constructor, vm.runIn*, globalThis['..']). Single source of truth in @bmm/llm now exports SHARED_BANNED_PATTERNS; templates.ts composes PUBLISH_BANNED_PATTERNS = SHARED ∪ code-only-extras (dynamic import, fs.rm, setTimeout-with- string, process.kill, jailbreak markers). Zc-002 LOW (N+1) — /v1/templates list was issuing one COUNT(*) per template (101 queries for a 100-row page). Now one grouped query with templateId GROUP BY, merged in JS. p95 doesn't degrade with marketplace growth. DEFERRED (documented, scoped for next sprint): Za-001 HIGH — Account takeover via cross-provider email lookup. Requires schema change (users.primaryProvider). Mitigation in /settings/account banner planned. Zb-001 MEDIUM — /oauth/token refresh_token grant: advertised in AS metadata but unsupported_grant_type. Either implement (~40 LOC) or strip from metadata. Zc-003 LOW — Admin takedown partial-failure consistency. Zd-001 IMPROVE — DEK cache invalidation across replicas (single- instance today). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:15:54 +02:00
.orderBy(memberships.createdAt)
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
.limit(1);
if (!membership) throw new Error('no_org_membership');
const sessionToken = randomToken(32);
await db.insert(sessions).values({
userId: user.id,
tokenHash: sha256(sessionToken),
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + SESSION_TTL_MS),
ipAddress: meta.ipAddress,
userAgent: meta.userAgent,
});
await db.update(users).set({ lastLoginAt: new Date() }).where(eq(users.id, user.id));
return {
sessionToken,
userId: user.id,
orgId: membership.orgId,
email: user.email,
isAdmin: user.isAdmin,
};
}
export interface SeedAdminInput {
email: string;
password: string;
name?: string;
}
export async function seedAdmin(
input: SeedAdminInput,
db: Database = createDb(),
): Promise<{ created: boolean; userId: string; orgId: string }> {
const email = input.email.trim().toLowerCase();
const existing = (await db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.email, email)).limit(1))[0];
if (existing) {
const updates: Partial<typeof users.$inferInsert> = {};
if (!existing.isAdmin) updates.isAdmin = true;
if (!existing.passwordHash) updates.passwordHash = hashPassword(input.password);
if (!existing.emailVerified) updates.emailVerified = true;
if (input.name && !existing.name) updates.name = input.name;
if (Object.keys(updates).length > 0) {
await db.update(users).set(updates).where(eq(users.id, existing.id));
}
const [m] = await db
.select()
.from(memberships)
.where(eq(memberships.userId, existing.id))
.limit(1);
if (!m) {
// Has a user but no org — bootstrap one
const orgSlug = `admin-${randomToken(3).toLowerCase()}`;
const [org] = await db
.insert(organizations)
.values({ slug: orgSlug, name: `${input.name ?? 'Admin'} workspace`, plan: 'enterprise' })
.returning();
if (!org) throw new Error('org_create_failed');
await db.insert(memberships).values({ orgId: org.id, userId: existing.id, role: 'owner' });
return { created: false, userId: existing.id, orgId: org.id };
}
return { created: false, userId: existing.id, orgId: m.orgId };
}
const [user] = await db
.insert(users)
.values({
email,
emailVerified: true,
isAdmin: true,
name: input.name,
passwordHash: hashPassword(input.password),
})
.returning();
if (!user) throw new Error('user_create_failed');
const orgSlug = `admin-${randomToken(3).toLowerCase()}`;
const [org] = await db
.insert(organizations)
.values({ slug: orgSlug, name: `${input.name ?? 'Admin'} workspace`, plan: 'enterprise' })
.returning();
if (!org) throw new Error('org_create_failed');
await db.insert(memberships).values({ orgId: org.id, userId: user.id, role: 'owner' });
return { created: true, userId: user.id, orgId: org.id };
}
export const __test = { sha256, randomToken, slugify };