buildmymcpserver/apps/api/src/routes/auth.ts

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import crypto from 'node:crypto';
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
import {
consumeMagicLink,
consumeSmsCode,
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
destroySession,
getSession,
issueMagicLink,
issueSmsCode,
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
loginWithPassword,
upsertOAuthLogin,
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
} from '@bmm/auth';
import type { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
import { z } from 'zod';
import { config } from '../config.js';
import { audit } from '../lib/audit.js';
import { getOrgPlan } from '../lib/plan.js';
security: sovereign-audit Phase 2 fixes — trustProxy, Docker hardening, banned-pattern overhaul Five confirmed findings from the sovereign-audit pass, ordered by severity: Z3-001 CRITICAL — Fastify now trustProxy:true so req.ip resolves to the real visitor IP via X-Forwarded-For instead of always being the nginx / docker-bridge peer. Every per-IP rate-limit in the codebase was silently collapsed into one global counter; this restores them. Z1-001 CRITICAL — runner container hardening flags (--read-only, --cap-drop=ALL, --security-opt=no-new-privileges:true, --pids-limit=100, --memory=512m, --cpus=0.5, tmpfs /tmp) were sitting commented-out as a TODO despite /security promising them. Now applied unconditionally on production/staging; opt-out flag RUNNER_DISABLE_HARDENING=1 for Win-dev. Z2-001 + Z2-002 CRITICAL / MEDIUM — banned-pattern blacklist tightened (Function(...) without `new`, process.binding, process.dlopen, .constructor.constructor, _load, vm.runIn*Context, globalThis['..'], "system prompt override"). scanForInjection now also walks tool.name and every inputSchema property description, not only implementation + description — closes the prompt-injection-into-AI-client surface that downstream clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor) read verbatim. The duplicate BANNED_PATTERNS in apps/api/src/routes/servers.ts deleted in favour of the single shared scanForInjection export from @bmm/llm. Z4-001 HIGH — /v1/auth/magic-link gained the two-axis daily rate-limit the SMS endpoint already had: 10/IP/day + 5/email/day. Combined with the trustProxy fix above these are now real per-visitor limits. Z4-002 MEDIUM — magic-link callback URL no longer printed to stdout in production. In dev it still prints (so devs can click the link); in production we log only "issued, URL withheld" and a loud error if no email sender is wired (Resend integration is the actual launch blocker — left as a TODO). Z6-001 MEDIUM — /v1/builds/:id/stream WebSocket now refuses cross-origin upgrades. SameSite=Lax already mitigates in modern browsers; this is the defense-in-depth against browser bugs and non-browser clients. FALSE POSITIVES dismissed: slug path-traversal (schema regex ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$ in @bmm/types catches it); session-after-promote (getSession re-fetches isAdmin from DB on every request). DEFERRED (not blockers, tracked): - Z1-002 generated-server HTTPS — needs nginx wildcard subdomain TLS - Z1-003 docker image cleanup cron - Z2-001 v2 — real sandbox runtime (multi-week refactor) - Z3-002 rawBody-per-request memory — branch on webhook path only - Z5-001 multi-user org RBAC for billing — gated on Team feature - Email sender integration (Resend) — launch blocker Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:02:59 +02:00
import { checkDailyLimit } from '../lib/rate-limit.js';
import { sendSms, smsConfigured } from '../lib/sms.js';
const SESSION_COOKIE = 'bmm_session';
const OAUTH_STATE_COOKIE = 'bmm_oauth_state';
const GoogleClaims = z.object({
iss: z.string(),
aud: z.string(),
exp: z.number(),
email: z.string().email(),
email_verified: z.union([z.boolean(), z.string()]).optional(),
name: z.string().optional(),
});
/**
* Decode (NOT signature-verify) a Google ID token payload. Signature verification
* is unnecessary here because the token is fetched directly from Google's token
* endpoint over TLS, authenticated with our client secret an intermediary-free
* channel, per Google's own guidance. We still validate iss / aud / exp / email
* below as defense-in-depth.
*/
function decodeGoogleIdToken(idToken: string): z.infer<typeof GoogleClaims> {
const parts = idToken.split('.');
if (parts.length !== 3 || !parts[1]) throw new Error('malformed_id_token');
const json = Buffer.from(parts[1], 'base64url').toString('utf8');
return GoogleClaims.parse(JSON.parse(json));
}
function googleRedirectUri(): string {
return `${config.CONTROL_PLANE_PUBLIC_URL}/v1/auth/google/callback`;
}
function googleConfigured(): boolean {
return Boolean(config.GOOGLE_OAUTH_ID && config.GOOGLE_OAUTH_SECRET);
}
function githubConfigured(): boolean {
return Boolean(config.GITHUB_OAUTH_ID && config.GITHUB_OAUTH_SECRET);
}
function githubRedirectUri(): string {
return `${config.CONTROL_PLANE_PUBLIC_URL}/v1/auth/github/callback`;
}
// In-memory per-IP throttle for SMS-code requests — SMS costs money per send,
// so cap how often one IP can trigger a send regardless of which number.
const smsIpHits = new Map<string, number[]>();
function smsIpRateOk(ip: string, max = 5, windowMs = 10 * 60 * 1000): boolean {
const now = Date.now();
const hits = (smsIpHits.get(ip) ?? []).filter((t) => now - t < windowMs);
if (hits.length >= max) {
smsIpHits.set(ip, hits);
return false;
}
hits.push(now);
smsIpHits.set(ip, hits);
return true;
}
export async function authRoutes(app: FastifyInstance): Promise<void> {
app.post('/v1/auth/magic-link', async (req, reply) => {
// Email auth is off by default — no SMTP wired yet. Closes the
// account-takeover-via-magic-link path (Za-001) until an email sender
// is configured AND a primaryProvider column lets us bind users to a
// single login method.
if (!config.EMAIL_AUTH_ENABLED) {
return reply.code(503).send({
error: 'email_auth_disabled',
detail: 'Email login is currently unavailable. Use Google, GitHub, or SMS.',
});
}
const Body = z.object({ email: z.string().email() });
const parsed = Body.safeParse(req.body);
if (!parsed.success) return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'invalid_email' });
security: sovereign-audit Phase 2 fixes — trustProxy, Docker hardening, banned-pattern overhaul Five confirmed findings from the sovereign-audit pass, ordered by severity: Z3-001 CRITICAL — Fastify now trustProxy:true so req.ip resolves to the real visitor IP via X-Forwarded-For instead of always being the nginx / docker-bridge peer. Every per-IP rate-limit in the codebase was silently collapsed into one global counter; this restores them. Z1-001 CRITICAL — runner container hardening flags (--read-only, --cap-drop=ALL, --security-opt=no-new-privileges:true, --pids-limit=100, --memory=512m, --cpus=0.5, tmpfs /tmp) were sitting commented-out as a TODO despite /security promising them. Now applied unconditionally on production/staging; opt-out flag RUNNER_DISABLE_HARDENING=1 for Win-dev. Z2-001 + Z2-002 CRITICAL / MEDIUM — banned-pattern blacklist tightened (Function(...) without `new`, process.binding, process.dlopen, .constructor.constructor, _load, vm.runIn*Context, globalThis['..'], "system prompt override"). scanForInjection now also walks tool.name and every inputSchema property description, not only implementation + description — closes the prompt-injection-into-AI-client surface that downstream clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor) read verbatim. The duplicate BANNED_PATTERNS in apps/api/src/routes/servers.ts deleted in favour of the single shared scanForInjection export from @bmm/llm. Z4-001 HIGH — /v1/auth/magic-link gained the two-axis daily rate-limit the SMS endpoint already had: 10/IP/day + 5/email/day. Combined with the trustProxy fix above these are now real per-visitor limits. Z4-002 MEDIUM — magic-link callback URL no longer printed to stdout in production. In dev it still prints (so devs can click the link); in production we log only "issued, URL withheld" and a loud error if no email sender is wired (Resend integration is the actual launch blocker — left as a TODO). Z6-001 MEDIUM — /v1/builds/:id/stream WebSocket now refuses cross-origin upgrades. SameSite=Lax already mitigates in modern browsers; this is the defense-in-depth against browser bugs and non-browser clients. FALSE POSITIVES dismissed: slug path-traversal (schema regex ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$ in @bmm/types catches it); session-after-promote (getSession re-fetches isAdmin from DB on every request). DEFERRED (not blockers, tracked): - Z1-002 generated-server HTTPS — needs nginx wildcard subdomain TLS - Z1-003 docker image cleanup cron - Z2-001 v2 — real sandbox runtime (multi-week refactor) - Z3-002 rawBody-per-request memory — branch on webhook path only - Z5-001 multi-user org RBAC for billing — gated on Team feature - Email sender integration (Resend) — launch blocker Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:02:59 +02:00
// Two-axis rate-limit: per-IP (prevents IP-flooding the endpoint) and
// per-email (prevents inbox-flooding a specific target). Both required
// because the IP cap protects us, the email cap protects the recipient.
const ipOk = await checkDailyLimit('magic_ip', req.ip, 10);
if (!ipOk.ok) {
return reply.code(429).send({
error: 'rate_limited',
detail: 'Too many magic-link requests from this IP. Try again tomorrow.',
});
}
const emailOk = await checkDailyLimit('magic_email', parsed.data.email.toLowerCase(), 5);
if (!emailOk.ok) {
return reply.code(429).send({
error: 'rate_limited',
detail: 'Too many magic-link requests for this email. Try again tomorrow.',
});
}
try {
const { token, expiresAt } = await issueMagicLink(parsed.data.email);
const callbackUrl = `${config.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL}/login/callback?token=${token}`;
security: sovereign-audit Phase 2 fixes — trustProxy, Docker hardening, banned-pattern overhaul Five confirmed findings from the sovereign-audit pass, ordered by severity: Z3-001 CRITICAL — Fastify now trustProxy:true so req.ip resolves to the real visitor IP via X-Forwarded-For instead of always being the nginx / docker-bridge peer. Every per-IP rate-limit in the codebase was silently collapsed into one global counter; this restores them. Z1-001 CRITICAL — runner container hardening flags (--read-only, --cap-drop=ALL, --security-opt=no-new-privileges:true, --pids-limit=100, --memory=512m, --cpus=0.5, tmpfs /tmp) were sitting commented-out as a TODO despite /security promising them. Now applied unconditionally on production/staging; opt-out flag RUNNER_DISABLE_HARDENING=1 for Win-dev. Z2-001 + Z2-002 CRITICAL / MEDIUM — banned-pattern blacklist tightened (Function(...) without `new`, process.binding, process.dlopen, .constructor.constructor, _load, vm.runIn*Context, globalThis['..'], "system prompt override"). scanForInjection now also walks tool.name and every inputSchema property description, not only implementation + description — closes the prompt-injection-into-AI-client surface that downstream clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor) read verbatim. The duplicate BANNED_PATTERNS in apps/api/src/routes/servers.ts deleted in favour of the single shared scanForInjection export from @bmm/llm. Z4-001 HIGH — /v1/auth/magic-link gained the two-axis daily rate-limit the SMS endpoint already had: 10/IP/day + 5/email/day. Combined with the trustProxy fix above these are now real per-visitor limits. Z4-002 MEDIUM — magic-link callback URL no longer printed to stdout in production. In dev it still prints (so devs can click the link); in production we log only "issued, URL withheld" and a loud error if no email sender is wired (Resend integration is the actual launch blocker — left as a TODO). Z6-001 MEDIUM — /v1/builds/:id/stream WebSocket now refuses cross-origin upgrades. SameSite=Lax already mitigates in modern browsers; this is the defense-in-depth against browser bugs and non-browser clients. FALSE POSITIVES dismissed: slug path-traversal (schema regex ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$ in @bmm/types catches it); session-after-promote (getSession re-fetches isAdmin from DB on every request). DEFERRED (not blockers, tracked): - Z1-002 generated-server HTTPS — needs nginx wildcard subdomain TLS - Z1-003 docker image cleanup cron - Z2-001 v2 — real sandbox runtime (multi-week refactor) - Z3-002 rawBody-per-request memory — branch on webhook path only - Z5-001 multi-user org RBAC for billing — gated on Team feature - Email sender integration (Resend) — launch blocker Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:02:59 +02:00
// In dev we print the link to stdout so the developer can click it.
// In production we must NEVER log the full token — anyone with
// `docker logs` access would silently impersonate any user.
if (config.NODE_ENV !== 'production') {
app.log.info({ to: parsed.data.email, expiresAt }, `[magic-link] -> ${callbackUrl}`);
console.log(`\n[magic-link] ${parsed.data.email} ->\n ${callbackUrl}\n`);
} else {
app.log.info(
{ to: parsed.data.email, expiresAt },
'[magic-link] issued (URL withheld from logs)',
);
// TODO(launch): hook up Resend / SES here. Until then, production
// magic-link is effectively dead — fail loud rather than silent.
app.log.error('magic-link email sender not configured — link cannot reach user');
}
return reply.send({ ok: true });
} catch (e) {
app.log.error(e);
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'magic_link_failed' });
}
});
app.post('/v1/auth/verify', async (req, reply) => {
if (!config.EMAIL_AUTH_ENABLED) {
return reply.code(503).send({ error: 'email_auth_disabled' });
}
const Body = z.object({ token: z.string().min(10) });
const parsed = Body.safeParse(req.body);
if (!parsed.success) return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'invalid_token' });
try {
const session = await consumeMagicLink(parsed.data.token, {
ipAddress: req.ip,
userAgent: req.headers['user-agent'],
});
reply.setCookie(SESSION_COOKIE, session.sessionToken, {
httpOnly: true,
sameSite: 'lax',
path: '/',
secure: config.NODE_ENV === 'production',
maxAge: 30 * 24 * 60 * 60,
});
await audit({
orgId: session.orgId,
userId: session.userId,
action: 'auth.login',
resourceType: 'session',
metadata: { email: session.email },
ipAddress: req.ip,
});
return reply.send({
ok: true,
user: { id: session.userId, email: session.email, orgId: session.orgId },
});
} catch (e) {
app.log.warn({ err: e }, 'magic link verify failed');
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'invalid_or_expired_token' });
}
});
app.get('/v1/auth/me', async (req, reply) => {
const token = req.cookies[SESSION_COOKIE];
const session = await getSession(token);
if (!session) return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'unauthorized' });
// Plan is on the org, not the session — look it up fresh so a Stripe
// upgrade is reflected without forcing a re-login.
const plan = await getOrgPlan(session.orgId);
return reply.send({ user: { ...session, plan } });
});
feat(admin): password-auth admin panel with 8 pages + 15 API endpoints Schema migrations: - users.is_admin boolean - users.password_hash text (scrypt N=16384, 16-byte salt) - users.last_login_at timestamp - organizations.suspended + suspended_reason - admin_settings table (DB-stored prompt override + future settings) Auth (@bmm/auth): - hashPassword + verifyPassword via node:crypto scrypt (no extra dep) - loginWithPassword: scrypt-verifies, issues 30-day session, updates last_login_at - seedAdmin: idempotent upsert keyed on email; creates org + membership on first run - AuthedUser now carries isAdmin flag API: - POST /v1/auth/admin/login (email + password) — 300ms throttle on failure - requireAdmin preHandler — 401 if no session, 403 if non-admin - Bootstrap: api on boot calls seedAdmin(ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_NAME) if env present. Idempotent. Admin API routes (all gated by requireAdmin): - GET /v1/admin/overview (totals, trends 7d, server-status breakdown, builds 24h, recent activity) - GET /v1/admin/users (search, per-row org + plan + serverCount) - PATCH /v1/admin/users/:id (isAdmin, name) - DELETE /v1/admin/users/:id (self-delete blocked) - GET /v1/admin/orgs (member + server counts) - PATCH /v1/admin/orgs/:id (plan, quota, suspended; cascades to mcp_servers.status=paused on suspend) - GET /v1/admin/servers (cross-org with status filter) - POST /v1/admin/servers/:id/rebuild (re-queues build using last prompt) - DELETE /v1/admin/servers/:id - GET /v1/admin/builds (status filter, error messages, prompt previews) - GET /v1/admin/builds/:id/logs - GET /v1/admin/audit (system-wide with user email join) - GET /v1/admin/system (DB ping, Redis ping, BullMQ queue depth, docker ps count) - GET /v1/admin/prompt (builtin + override + updatedAt) - PATCH /v1/admin/prompt (value: string | null) — saves DB override or drops it UI (apps/web/app/admin/*): - /admin/login — password form, separate from /login magic-link - AdminLayout — Linear-style sidebar (8 nav items), bottom panel with user email + 'user view' shortcut + logout, client-side requireAdmin guard with redirect - /admin — overview dashboard with 4 metric cards, 2 panels (status + 24h builds), recent activity table linking to full audit - /admin/users — search + admin toggle + delete (self-delete blocked) - /admin/orgs — plan/quota/suspend actions via prompts - /admin/servers — cross-org table with rebuild + delete actions, status filter - /admin/builds — every build cross-fleet with error vs prompt preview - /admin/audit — system-wide log + CSV export + filter dropdowns - /admin/system — auto-refreshing 5s health probes for Postgres, Redis, queue, Docker - /admin/prompt — live editor for the LLM system prompt with built-in baseline, override-state badge, drop-override action, diff preview, save-as-override End-to-end verified: login as marco.frangiskatos@gmail.com + Melusa112233.*, every admin page returns 200, admin login + overview tested via screenshot, docker probe returns true count of running MCP containers.
2026-05-19 23:01:26 +02:00
app.post('/v1/auth/admin/login', async (req, reply) => {
const Body = z.object({
email: z.string().email(),
password: z.string().min(8),
});
const parsed = Body.safeParse(req.body);
if (!parsed.success) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'invalid_input' });
}
try {
const session = await loginWithPassword(parsed.data.email, parsed.data.password, {
ipAddress: req.ip,
userAgent: req.headers['user-agent'],
});
if (!session.isAdmin) {
await destroySession(session.sessionToken);
return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'not_admin' });
}
reply.setCookie(SESSION_COOKIE, session.sessionToken, {
httpOnly: true,
sameSite: 'lax',
path: '/',
secure: config.NODE_ENV === 'production',
maxAge: 30 * 24 * 60 * 60,
});
await audit({
orgId: session.orgId,
userId: session.userId,
action: 'admin.login',
resourceType: 'session',
metadata: { email: session.email },
ipAddress: req.ip,
});
return reply.send({
ok: true,
user: { id: session.userId, email: session.email, orgId: session.orgId, isAdmin: true },
});
} catch (err) {
app.log.warn({ err }, 'admin login failed');
// Constant-time-ish to discourage username enumeration
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 300));
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'invalid_credentials' });
}
});
app.post('/v1/auth/logout', async (req, reply) => {
const token = req.cookies[SESSION_COOKIE];
const session = token ? await getSession(token) : null;
if (token) await destroySession(token);
reply.clearCookie(SESSION_COOKIE, { path: '/' });
if (session) {
await audit({
orgId: session.orgId,
userId: session.userId,
action: 'auth.logout',
resourceType: 'session',
ipAddress: req.ip,
});
}
return reply.send({ ok: true });
});
// Which login providers are configured. Lets the UI hide buttons + forms
// when their backing infra isn't wired. `email` defaults to false because
// we haven't bought an SMTP provider yet — flipping EMAIL_AUTH_ENABLED to
// true re-enables the magic-link form section.
app.get('/v1/auth/providers', async (_req, reply) => {
return reply.send({
google: googleConfigured(),
github: githubConfigured(),
sms: smsConfigured(),
email: config.EMAIL_AUTH_ENABLED,
});
});
// Step 1: hand the browser off to Google's consent screen.
app.get('/v1/auth/google', async (_req, reply) => {
if (!config.GOOGLE_OAUTH_ID || !config.GOOGLE_OAUTH_SECRET) {
return reply.code(503).send({ error: 'google_oauth_not_configured' });
}
const state = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('base64url');
reply.setCookie(OAUTH_STATE_COOKIE, state, {
httpOnly: true,
sameSite: 'lax',
path: '/',
secure: config.NODE_ENV === 'production',
maxAge: 600,
});
const url = new URL('https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth');
url.searchParams.set('client_id', config.GOOGLE_OAUTH_ID);
url.searchParams.set('redirect_uri', googleRedirectUri());
url.searchParams.set('response_type', 'code');
url.searchParams.set('scope', 'openid email profile');
url.searchParams.set('state', state);
url.searchParams.set('access_type', 'online');
url.searchParams.set('prompt', 'select_account');
return reply.redirect(url.toString());
});
// Step 2: Google redirects back here with an auth code. Exchange it, verify
// the ID token, mint a session, drop the user on the dashboard.
app.get('/v1/auth/google/callback', async (req, reply) => {
const loginUrl = `${config.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL}/login`;
const Query = z.object({
code: z.string().min(10).optional(),
state: z.string().min(8).optional(),
error: z.string().optional(),
});
const q = Query.safeParse(req.query);
const cookieState = req.cookies[OAUTH_STATE_COOKIE];
reply.clearCookie(OAUTH_STATE_COOKIE, { path: '/' });
if (!q.success || q.data.error || !q.data.code || !q.data.state) {
return reply.redirect(`${loginUrl}?error=google_failed`);
}
// CSRF: the state echoed back by Google must match the one we set.
// Length-check first — timingSafeEqual throws on a length mismatch.
if (
!cookieState ||
cookieState.length !== q.data.state.length ||
!crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(cookieState), Buffer.from(q.data.state))
) {
return reply.redirect(`${loginUrl}?error=google_state`);
}
if (!config.GOOGLE_OAUTH_ID || !config.GOOGLE_OAUTH_SECRET) {
return reply.redirect(`${loginUrl}?error=google_failed`);
}
try {
const tokenRes = await fetch('https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
body: new URLSearchParams({
code: q.data.code,
client_id: config.GOOGLE_OAUTH_ID,
client_secret: config.GOOGLE_OAUTH_SECRET,
redirect_uri: googleRedirectUri(),
grant_type: 'authorization_code',
}),
});
if (!tokenRes.ok) throw new Error(`token_exchange_${tokenRes.status}`);
const tokens = (await tokenRes.json()) as { id_token?: string };
if (!tokens.id_token) throw new Error('no_id_token');
const claims = decodeGoogleIdToken(tokens.id_token);
if (claims.iss !== 'accounts.google.com' && claims.iss !== 'https://accounts.google.com') {
throw new Error('bad_iss');
}
if (claims.aud !== config.GOOGLE_OAUTH_ID) throw new Error('bad_aud');
if (claims.exp * 1000 < Date.now()) throw new Error('token_expired');
const verified = claims.email_verified === true || claims.email_verified === 'true';
if (!verified) throw new Error('email_unverified');
const session = await upsertOAuthLogin(
{ email: claims.email, name: claims.name ?? null },
{ ipAddress: req.ip, userAgent: req.headers['user-agent'] },
);
reply.setCookie(SESSION_COOKIE, session.sessionToken, {
httpOnly: true,
sameSite: 'lax',
path: '/',
secure: config.NODE_ENV === 'production',
maxAge: 30 * 24 * 60 * 60,
});
await audit({
orgId: session.orgId,
userId: session.userId,
action: 'auth.login',
resourceType: 'session',
metadata: { email: session.email, provider: 'google' },
ipAddress: req.ip,
});
return reply.redirect(`${config.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL}/dashboard`);
} catch (err) {
app.log.warn({ err }, 'google oauth callback failed');
return reply.redirect(`${loginUrl}?error=google_failed`);
}
});
// ---- GitHub OAuth ----
app.get('/v1/auth/github', async (_req, reply) => {
if (!config.GITHUB_OAUTH_ID || !config.GITHUB_OAUTH_SECRET) {
return reply.code(503).send({ error: 'github_oauth_not_configured' });
}
const state = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('base64url');
reply.setCookie(OAUTH_STATE_COOKIE, state, {
httpOnly: true,
sameSite: 'lax',
path: '/',
secure: config.NODE_ENV === 'production',
maxAge: 600,
});
const url = new URL('https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize');
url.searchParams.set('client_id', config.GITHUB_OAUTH_ID);
url.searchParams.set('redirect_uri', githubRedirectUri());
url.searchParams.set('scope', 'read:user user:email');
url.searchParams.set('state', state);
return reply.redirect(url.toString());
});
app.get('/v1/auth/github/callback', async (req, reply) => {
const loginUrl = `${config.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL}/login`;
const Query = z.object({
code: z.string().min(8).optional(),
state: z.string().min(8).optional(),
error: z.string().optional(),
});
const q = Query.safeParse(req.query);
const cookieState = req.cookies[OAUTH_STATE_COOKIE];
reply.clearCookie(OAUTH_STATE_COOKIE, { path: '/' });
if (!q.success || q.data.error || !q.data.code || !q.data.state) {
return reply.redirect(`${loginUrl}?error=github_failed`);
}
if (
!cookieState ||
cookieState.length !== q.data.state.length ||
!crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(cookieState), Buffer.from(q.data.state))
) {
return reply.redirect(`${loginUrl}?error=github_state`);
}
if (!config.GITHUB_OAUTH_ID || !config.GITHUB_OAUTH_SECRET) {
return reply.redirect(`${loginUrl}?error=github_failed`);
}
try {
const tokenRes = await fetch('https://github.com/login/oauth/access_token', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {
accept: 'application/json',
'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
},
body: new URLSearchParams({
client_id: config.GITHUB_OAUTH_ID,
client_secret: config.GITHUB_OAUTH_SECRET,
code: q.data.code,
redirect_uri: githubRedirectUri(),
}),
});
if (!tokenRes.ok) throw new Error(`token_exchange_${tokenRes.status}`);
const tokens = (await tokenRes.json()) as { access_token?: string };
if (!tokens.access_token) throw new Error('no_access_token');
// GitHub's API rejects requests without a User-Agent header.
const ghHeaders = {
authorization: `Bearer ${tokens.access_token}`,
accept: 'application/vnd.github+json',
'user-agent': 'BuildMyMCPServer',
};
const userRes = await fetch('https://api.github.com/user', { headers: ghHeaders });
if (!userRes.ok) throw new Error(`user_fetch_${userRes.status}`);
const ghUser = (await userRes.json()) as { name?: string; login?: string };
// /user omits the email when it is private — /user/emails always lists it.
const emailRes = await fetch('https://api.github.com/user/emails', { headers: ghHeaders });
if (!emailRes.ok) throw new Error(`email_fetch_${emailRes.status}`);
const emails = (await emailRes.json()) as Array<{
email: string;
primary: boolean;
verified: boolean;
}>;
const primary = emails.find((e) => e.primary && e.verified) ?? emails.find((e) => e.verified);
if (!primary) throw new Error('no_verified_email');
const session = await upsertOAuthLogin(
{ email: primary.email, name: ghUser.name ?? ghUser.login ?? null },
{ ipAddress: req.ip, userAgent: req.headers['user-agent'] },
);
reply.setCookie(SESSION_COOKIE, session.sessionToken, {
httpOnly: true,
sameSite: 'lax',
path: '/',
secure: config.NODE_ENV === 'production',
maxAge: 30 * 24 * 60 * 60,
});
await audit({
orgId: session.orgId,
userId: session.userId,
action: 'auth.login',
resourceType: 'session',
metadata: { email: session.email, provider: 'github' },
ipAddress: req.ip,
});
return reply.redirect(`${config.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL}/dashboard`);
} catch (err) {
app.log.warn({ err }, 'github oauth callback failed');
return reply.redirect(`${loginUrl}?error=github_failed`);
}
});
// ---- SMS one-time-code login ----
app.post('/v1/auth/sms/request', async (req, reply) => {
if (!smsConfigured()) return reply.code(503).send({ error: 'sms_not_configured' });
const Body = z.object({ phone: z.string().min(8).max(24) });
const parsed = Body.safeParse(req.body);
if (!parsed.success) return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'invalid_phone' });
if (!smsIpRateOk(req.ip)) return reply.code(429).send({ error: 'rate_limited' });
try {
const { phone, code } = await issueSmsCode(parsed.data.phone);
await sendSms(phone, `${code} is your BuildMyMCPServer login code. Valid for 10 minutes.`);
return reply.send({ ok: true });
} catch (e) {
const msg = (e as Error).message;
if (msg === 'invalid_phone') return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'invalid_phone' });
if (msg === 'rate_limited') return reply.code(429).send({ error: 'rate_limited' });
app.log.warn({ err: e }, 'sms request failed');
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'sms_request_failed' });
}
});
app.post('/v1/auth/sms/verify', async (req, reply) => {
const Body = z.object({
phone: z.string().min(8).max(24),
code: z.string().regex(/^\d{6}$/),
});
const parsed = Body.safeParse(req.body);
if (!parsed.success) return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'invalid_input' });
try {
const session = await consumeSmsCode(parsed.data.phone, parsed.data.code, {
ipAddress: req.ip,
userAgent: req.headers['user-agent'],
});
reply.setCookie(SESSION_COOKIE, session.sessionToken, {
httpOnly: true,
sameSite: 'lax',
path: '/',
secure: config.NODE_ENV === 'production',
maxAge: 30 * 24 * 60 * 60,
});
await audit({
orgId: session.orgId,
userId: session.userId,
action: 'auth.login',
resourceType: 'session',
metadata: { provider: 'sms' },
ipAddress: req.ip,
});
return reply.send({ ok: true, user: { id: session.userId, orgId: session.orgId } });
} catch (e) {
const msg = (e as Error).message;
const status: Record<string, number> = {
invalid_or_expired_code: 400,
invalid_code: 400,
too_many_attempts: 429,
invalid_phone: 400,
};
if (status[msg]) return reply.code(status[msg]).send({ error: msg });
app.log.warn({ err: e }, 'sms verify failed');
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'sms_verify_failed' });
}
});
}